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REGIME THEORY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE:

CASE STUDIES IN LINKAGE

BY

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THESIS

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for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy Analysis-
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I hereby recommend that the thesis prepared under my supervision by

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This thesis is dedicated to my parents, and to my husband Mark, who never stopped cheering.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------|--|
| APEC | Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation |
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) |
| BAC | Bay Area Council |
| CFC | Chlorofluorocarbons |
| CRG | Citizens for Representative Government |
| CSCE | Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| CAO | Chief Administrative Officer |
| DC | Developed country |
| EC | European Community |
| EFTA | European Free Trade Area |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| G-7 | Group of Seven Most Industrialized Democracies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.) |
| GATT | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade |
| GCC | Gulf Cooperation Council |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GNP | Gross National Product |
| IBRD | International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ World Bank |
| IEA | International Environmental Agreement |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |

| | |
|-------|---|
| IPE | International Political Economy |
| IR | International Relations |
| ITC | (U.S.) International Trade Commission |
| ITO | International Trade Organization |
| LDC | Less Developed Country |
| MFN | Most-Favored Nation |
| MNC | Multinational Corporation |
| MTN | Multilateral trade negotiations (GATT Tokyo Round) |
| NAFTA | North American Free Trade Agreement |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organizations |
| NICs | Newly-Industrializing Countries |
| NIEO | New International Economic Order |
| NTB | Non-Tariff Barrier |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| OMA | Orderly Marketing Arrangement |
| OPEC | Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries |
| PD | Prisoners' Dilemma |
| SFRA | San Francisco Redevelopment Agency |
| SPUR | San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Agency |
| STR | (Office of) Special Trade Representative |
| TNC | Transnational Corporation |
| U.K. | United Kingdom |

| | |
|----------|--|
| UNCTAD | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development |
| U.S. | United States of America |
| U.S.S.R. | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| VER | Voluntary Export Restraint |
| WTO | World Trade Organization (GATT Uruguay Round) |

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SUMMARY

There are three case studies to be found in this dissertation: international policy-making as seen in GATT, U.S. trade policy as an example of federal-level policy-making and San Francisco's economic development policy as an example of urban-level policy-making. Regime theory is used to analyze policy-making at these three (international, national and urban) levels.

An analysis of these three kinds of policies allows an understanding of regime theory operating at the urban, national and international level. It makes an excellent argument for resolving the debate between internal differentiation (eg. comparative foreign policy) and system constraints models (eg. neorealist or structural models) vis-a-vis their respective claims to understanding the policy process.

The dissertation makes an argument for greater collaboration between scholars in various subfields in political science. For instance, trade policy has always fallen into the purview of Foreign Policy analysis, and reflects primarily the theoretical underpinnings of IR theory. Yet, the theoretical advances in this area apply just as easily to explaining the dynamics of urban politics as they do to national or international politics.

A regime is not just a set of decision making rules; it also embodies certain beliefs, norms and ideas that influence policy making in domestic and international spheres. The use of regime theory to analyze the three cases below helps resolve the tension between neorealists who pursue a mechanistic approach to state behavior, and institutionalists, who emphasize the role of non-state actors and non-material influences.

The following issue areas (trade, economic development) provide a useful medium in which to ascertain the existence of a regime, given the controversy over whether a regime can be said to exist at all apart from in the minds of social science theorists trying to explain aspects of social behavior that do not conform to standard paradigms. GATT, for instance, has inspired compliance for the most part in its member states (that cannot always be explained away by considerations of self-interest), notwithstanding occasional violations of GATT rules. The U.S.' post-World War II trade policy, as a dependent variable, is best explained with reference to regime variables (ideas, interests and institutions), as is any urban policy we would care to examine, such as housing or education or economic development.

In conclusion, the dissertation argues that scholars in different areas in political science have much to learn from one another, and that the discipline would be advanced considerably with such collaboration.

I. INTRODUCTION

Political science has become too fragmented, as a discipline. The tradeoff between utilizing "a single, universal, organizing principle" and allowing for "a richness to life that defies reduction to a unitary vision" (Stone, 1993) has come at the expense of strong, generalizable theory. Clarence Stone uses the analogy of the hedgehog (who knows one big thing) and the fox (who knows many things) to discuss the role of theory in political science. One of the goals of social science has been to formulate parsimonious theories that attempt to understand, explain and predict complex realities. This has frequently led to accusations that social scientists indulge in oversimplification and reductionism. Pursuing similar lines of enquiry at different times in different sub-fields has resulted in much duplication of work and unnecessarily expended labor. If more political scientists could be aware of parallel theoretical formulations in their respective areas of research, then this would pay off in the form of strong, integrative theory that was broadly applicable within various sub-fields of the discipline.

Though this approach has been utilized by a few political scientists in the past, it is uncommon, for example, to find instances of extrapolation of International Relations (IR) theory to national or urban political phenomena, or of Urban theory to IR. My work in this area tries to bridge that gap to some extent. For instance, studying urban politics, I found several of the theoretical constructs that were part of my vocabulary or background as a student of IR to be applicable to studies of national or urban Politics. Yet this linkage had not been clearly laid out or explicated.

A. **Purpose of this Research**

The premise of this dissertation is that greater unification between parallel fields within political science would aid the cause of the discipline as a whole. As an illustration of this point, I compare policy-making at an international policy-making level, at a federal government level and at the level of urban politics. International Relations theory is capable of application in studies of power in the fields of national and urban politics; the latter, in a sense, duplicated what had already gone before, albeit in a different area. Similarly, IR scholars may also learn something from national and urban politics in areas such as coalition-building at local, state, and national levels of politics that may aid understanding global regimes and international cooperation. Scholars of federal-level policy-making may benefit from the other two subdisciplines, in comparing decision-making at congressional levels to that at local and global levels.

Before Paul Peterson's ground breaking work on City Limits (1981), it seemed as though Urban studies had run adrift without any strong theories that could have taken up where community power studies left off. Peterson's argument in City Limits echoed what realists had been saying for decades. The idea of structural determinism in making policy -- which is explained at some length in Chapter IV -- is central to an understanding of inter-city competition and economic constraints on city governments. Structural determinism also helps explain policy making at national foreign policy and international levels, given that anarchic conditions prevail and shape politics between nations. Realist scholars, for example, see survival as the primary end of all states; politics, then, is largely a matter of most efficiently ensuring that survival.

On the other hand, idealist scholars since the 1920s have talked about the role of norms in explaining policy outcomes. The emergence of institutionalized cooperation in the second half of this century has challenged our acceptance of realist assumptions that international politics is largely a zero-sum game. Forces like transnationalism and supranationalism have further weakened the dominant role of the nation state as primary actor in world politics. The principle of national self-determination, an international norm that gained increasing strength and legitimacy in the aftermath of World War I, has borne fruit in the twentieth century with the proliferation of once-colonized and now newly-independent states. This has helped usher in a new world order that challenges traditional rules of the game. Policy outcomes in issue areas such as the environment, nuclear nonproliferation, arms control and trade that one might expect to be dominated by hegemonic powers defy conventional rules of power politics. So, this serves to validate a rather old tradition in IR, that norms and beliefs play an important explanatory role. Regime theory, which is useful in both international relations and urban studies, pays intellectual tribute to the old idea of the importance of norms. This is more explicitly developed in IR and empirically tested as well, and is now finding its uses in other fields.

Ideological convergence in IR suggests that IR scholars have had better - and earlier - success in being able to reach an accommodation between the differing paradigms of realists and idealists. There has always been a conflict in political science over the role of material interests (related to the concept of power) and non-material norms. This conflict pertains to basic differences in our understanding and expectations of human behavior. And the role of any good political theory is to understand, explain and predict political behavior. Just as

World War II proved to idealists that their expectations regarding cooperative action were too high, collaborative trends in IR in the second half of this century have been a reminder to realists that their understanding of human behavior may be incomplete.

Anomalies in research findings tend to eventually usher in scientific revolutions. An example of such an anomaly would be the slave trade regime; continuing trading in slaves was in the material interests of plantation owners and slave traders, yet we find that the idea of apartheid eventually grew so reprehensible to the international community that slave trade was abolished and outlawed. There has had to be a way of resolving the tension between theory and empirical findings for both idealist and realist scholars; I suggest that regime theory exemplifies this effort at convergence. Regime theory builds upon the strong points of both theories while abandoning those aspects that were seen as flawed or inconsistent with empirical realities.

Obviously the discipline is better served by evolution of a strong, explanatory theory aligned with empirical findings. Regime theory, I maintain, is a meeting ground or synthesis between two paradigms of human behavior, and for social scientists, there is no getting away from theories of human behavior. Thus, it is not surprising that such a theory is broadly applicable to all subfields within the discipline. Therefore, I use it as the common thread with which to analyze case studies in three subdisciplines in political science: urban politics, federal government policy and international relations.

B. Organization of Research

Chapter II provides a more in-depth introduction to the study of IR. I discuss the major paradigms in the discipline, and its theoretical offshoots, each of which holds at its core basic assumptions that carried over from the original paradigm. By traditional IR paradigms I mean idealism and realism; under the banner of idealism are included theories of complex interdependence, functionalism¹, neofunctionalism (whose assumptions about human interaction are similar to idealist assumptions in that they are founded on models of cooperation and collaboration) and the theory of hegemonic stability.

Idealism, discredited in the aftermath of World War II, eventually evolved into a theory called neoliberalism (also termed Neoliberal Institutionalism) which attempts to bridge the distance between realism and idealism. Similarly, a body of thought termed neorealism arose out of realism; neorealism evolved out of the need to explain complex state behavior within the realist paradigm. Both theoretical offshoots emphasize the systemic or structural nature of IR, even though they take this point of commonality to differing conclusions about international behavior.

I also elaborate on the concept of regime in IR, and its relationship to current theories in this discipline. Finally, I discuss the idea of convergence between conflicting paradigms. A brief discussion of the evolving role of regime theory in IR helps illustrate this theoretical convergence.

¹Strictly speaking however, Functionalism adds to Idealist goals, rather than being considered part and parcel of Idealism.

Chapter III discusses the main paradigms in national politics, chiefly the distribution of power models such as pluralism, plural elitism, intense pluralism and distributive politics. Over the years, congressional scholars have shifted their emphasis from who rules to who benefits; this has ushered in empirical work on policy benefits that has been used to shed some light on urban politics in recent years.

Chapter IV explored the dynamics of urban politics, following the development of major paradigms in these areas. For a while, after the 1950s, the study of urban politics focussed on issues that were seen as distinctly non-normative, and that lent themselves to empirical study. As with the bulk of empirical work in social science, these studies were chiefly explanatory and descriptive, and concerned with the distribution of power, and how this related to democratic theory, in American cities.

Some of the prominent paradigms within this context are pluralism, plural elitism, bureaucratic politics and a machine politics model. All these models attribute varying degrees of power to different sets of actors. Policy is seen as a function of the influence that a given set of actors brings to bear upon the policy agenda.

The next major perspective to shape Urban Politics has focussed on economic constraints on policy making. Authors like Paul Peterson and Floyd Hunter stressed a compelling degree of economic determinism in policy decisions put forth by urban policy elites. Peterson's City Limits' model postulates that egalitarian policies initiated by cities are severely constrained by systemic competition for economic capital. This is very similar to International Relations theory regarding structural constraints on policy making. While city policy makers have less scope in manipulating economic policy, the basic idea - that it is not

policy makers as actors, but rather certain systemic constraints that fashion policy - is enduring in both subdisciplines.

In recent years, however, political theorists such as Stephen Elkin (1987) and Clarence Stone (1989) have begun to refocus on the normative aspect of urban political theory. Of special interest is Stone's regime theory of urban politics, which combines elements of both economic and electoral constraints. Clarence Stone, rejecting the economic determinism of Peterson's model, makes compelling arguments for the existence of some "regime" that is prior to and independent of the kind of decisions that shape urban development. Ken Wong's study of urban politics adds an administrative bias to policy analysis, but essentially, like Stone, combines political and economic imperatives to explain policy outcomes in the urban field. Schumaker's theory of Critical Pluralism revises orthodox pluralism, incorporating into its conceptual framework an attention to the role of political ideals shared by citizens of a political community.

Chapter V explores the linkage between IR theories, National-level policy paradigms and Urban Politics; one of the arguments I make is that urban studies might be furthered by IR theory, and that the theoretical constructs employed by IR scholars could be used to explain policy outcomes in urban issue areas as well. Regime theory is one of the concepts that is central to an understanding of both urban and international politics. It may prove useful in future studies of national politics as well. The debate between systemic constraints and internal differentiation is another area of common interest. For instance, Peterson makes the point that cities are subject to economic constraints on policy because they do not have the same freedom that nation-states do in manipulating economic policy. I think that the

economic constraints model would apply even if cities were like nation-states. This is meaningful when considered within the context of IR theory. "Structural constraints explain why the [same] methods are repeatedly used despite differences in the persons and states who use them" (Waltz, 1979).

Chapter VI includes three case-studies of policy making: 1) an analysis of GATT is used as an example of policy-making at an international level; 2) U.S. foreign trade policy which is used to explain policy-making at the national level; and 3) a study of economic development policy in San Francisco is used as an example of urban policy-making. I have primarily concentrated on economic development policy to bring home a variety of points, one of which is that urban scholars have ignored the conventional wisdom in the field of IR about the various influences that come to bear upon the policy agenda in any given issue area. Trade policy, for instance, is theoretically flexible in that it is, at various times, considered to be both domestic politics as well as foreign policy. Curiously, foreign policy making has always fallen under the purview of IR theory; yet, any IR scholar could rattle off the domestic components (what are termed sub-state actors) of such policy. Therefore, this chapter serves to illustrate the linkage discussed in Chapter IV. Finally, the study illustrates the explanatory power of regime theory to domestic, national and international policy, and also evidences "convergence" between diametrically opposed paradigms in IR theory.

Chapter VII summarizes my conclusions about the study; there are obvious limitations to comparing urban, national and international relations theory and I would like to preempt the barrage of criticism that this study is likely to spawn. Eminent scholars in the field such as Charles Lindblom, Theodore Lowi and Jeffrey Pressman have spanned in the past various

subfields to theorize about political science as a whole. But this has not been the usual trend which is why the discipline is so fragmented today. I reiterate, therefore, that scholars have something to learn from unifying research from different subdisciplines.

II. POLICY PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. Introduction:

Traditional idealist and realist models used to explain regime structures in International Relations have always been incompatible and conflicting. Contemporary interpretations of these schools of thought have evolved into literature that distances itself from the original paradigms, now perceived as highly idealized. While arising from and aligning with their original paradigms respectively, current paradigms make significant concessions by accepting some of the other side's ideological assumptions.

These concessions derive from various efforts in the field to refine and improve on IR theory, making it more consistent and predictive, and less splintered and less committed to some "ideal" type. The purpose of any theory in the social sciences is to describe, explain and predict. As far as international politics is concerned, scholars have moved from a search for descriptive to explanatory to prescriptive theory over time; after all, International Relations is more than a documentation of history, it is an effort towards better understanding and peaceful coexistence within the world community.

In the first part of this chapter I introduce idealism and realism respectively, laying out their fundamental assumptions and framework. Also included is a discussion of "corollary" theories of IR that have evolved from these two main paradigms. An understanding of these theories and their underlying assumptions is essential to an evaluation of the vast difference between these two main paradigms. The elaboration, therefore, serves to point out the significance of scholars in IR bridging this intellectual divide. I see this

phenomenon as a convergence of sorts in the discipline today. As an illustration of this theoretical convergence, I provide an analysis of the evolving role of regime theory in IR.

Under Idealism I also evaluate chiefly its current intellectual heir, neoliberal institutionalism, summarizing in the process theories of complex interdependence, functionalism¹ and neofunctionalism, whose assumptions about human interaction are similar to idealist assumptions in that they are founded on models of cooperation and collaboration. Classical realism was revised in a body of work known as neorealism; it remains the main challenger to liberal paradigms in IR.

Regime theory, considered a fad for decades, has been in fact a serious effort by scholars to understand the emergence of cooperative behavior in international politics. Much of this original work was inspired by studies of regional integration in the 1960s. While idealism flourished in the period between the two world wars of this century, there has always been a bias towards realism on the part of students of IR, complemented by a defensiveness in the attitude of scholars whose work remained steeped in idealist traditions.

This has been changing in recent years; for instance, the fall of the Soviet Union illustrated realism's fallibility as a predictive model. The Soviet Union did not disintegrate under pressure from disproportionately strong military capabilities of its enemies, but rather as an inevitable response to domestic pressures that were a function of a tattered economy. In fact Soviet policy-makers might have benefitted earlier from abandoning realist guidelines to foreign policy, which in essence dictated that they prioritize guns over butter.

¹Strictly speaking however, functionalism adds to idealist goals, rather than being considered part and parcel of idealism.

Regime theory scholars themselves are to some extent divided over what such a theory really implies. The theoretical area is relatively young, and new trends in institutionalized cooperation emerge even as scholars write about regime theory. There is still much to be mapped and understood.

For instance, it is interesting to note that even neoliberals have a hard time getting away from basic assumptions (discussed at a later point in this chapter) about the international system; regime theory, for a lot of scholars, is cooperation built upon realist premises. The theory of hegemonic stability (arising out of the realist paradigm) is also a good example of this attitude. It is virtually impossible for IR scholars to relinquish their obsession with state power; cooperation is acknowledged far more readily when it is seen as a means to ensuring survival, and achieving more power in the long run.

B. Paradigms in International Relations

1. Idealism:

Political Idealism, following in the wake of World War I, was an attempt by scholars to theorize about international relations. This is remarkable in as much as it marked a departure from what had been conventional approaches to studying IR such as focussing on diplomatic history and describing historical events and personalities of leaders and other political actors. None of these approaches predicted a world war, or crafted a theory to prevent war. In the aftermath of World War I, the inadequacy of international politics as a body of research capable of providing explanatory, insightful and generalizable theories was borne home.

Political Idealism emerged as a backlash against power-oriented policies of national socialism (fascism, nazism) that glorified the role of the state and of war as an acceptable phenomenon in the pursuance of national interest.

Idealism is born out of an abiding belief in morality; it de-emphasizes the conventionally accepted role of power in IR. Idealists have faith that it is possible to bring out the best in human nature with an emphasis on education, international organization and international law. If one removes the structural impediments to cooperation, then cooperation will follow. The international system has the potential to evolve into a community of states working together for the larger good. A belief in morality is essential to the success of a community ruled by law. The Chinese author, Mo Ti stressed that while "everyone knows that [murder] is unrighteous" yet "when murder is committed in attacking a country it is not considered wrong; it is applauded and called righteous." "If a man calls black black when it is seen on a small scale, but calls black white when it is seen on a large scale, then he is one who cannot tell black from white" (Sun Tzu, 1963:22). This is in direct contrast to realist scholars like Machiavelli who stress that the state has its own morality, not subject to the dictates of individual or human conscience.

While idealists did not always converge on a common understanding of their theory, they shared certain paradigmatic beliefs and assumptions about humanity and the environment:

- 1) Humanity is essentially good, capable of cooperation and altruistic behavior.

- 2) Humans do possess a fundamental regard for the well-being of other humans, and this provides a foundation for moving civilization towards a more progressive, peaceful coexistence.
- 3) Conflict is not a function of human nature (as Hobbes assumed) but a result of flawed institutional and structural arrangements. Reforming the structural arrangements that cause selfish, socially destructive acts would eliminate conflict, including waging war.
- 4) Hence, it followed, war was not an inevitable political phenomenon and could be eliminated.
- 5) War anywhere was seen as a collective, international problem that called for multilateral cooperation on institutional reform.

Some reforms suggested by idealist blueprints for peace were as follows:

- 1) A system of collective security, rather than one of shifting alliances that reinforced balance-of-power politics, to maintain peace.
- 2) Legal control of war, exemplified by the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 that "outlawed" war as an instrument of national policy, and by the establishment and empowerment of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
- 3) Arms Control Agreements, as in the Washington and London naval conferences in the 1920s.
- 4) Norms and institutions that foster liberal (free and open) trade policies.
- 5) Open diplomacy subject to scrutiny of people who were affected by international treaties; President Wilson advocated "open covenants, openly arrived at"².

²Wilson's Fourteen Points speech presented to the American Senate on January 22, 1917.

- 6) International support of the principles of self determination, erasing arbitrary national borders imposed by colonizing forces. New borders would conform to satisfactory ethnic groupings and institute peace in lieu of conflict.
- 7) Collective support for democratic domestic institutions, believed to foster greater peace, for a variety of reasons not the least of which was accountability by political leaders to the populace.

Out of the ashes of idealism, once severely discredited, arose several paradigms united by a common thread, viz. a rejection of realist premises. These were termed functionalism, neofunctionalism, complex interdependence and neoliberalism or neoliberal institutionalism.

- a. **Functionalism**

Functionalism emerged as a theory to explain regional integration in the 1940s and early 1950s, with the writings of scholars such as Simeone Baldwin and David Mitrany, followed by Ernst Haas and Robert Keohane in the latter half of this century. It is similar in its intellectual underpinnings to neoliberalism, using the same examples - of regional integration - to drive home the point that sovereignty can be shared rather than surrendered. Barry Hughes describes this as "complex governance", an "emerging pattern of human governance in which the state continues to play a critical role, but in which many other institutions become increasingly important" (Hughes, 1995). Perhaps one point of difference in the two ideologies is that neoliberalism sees itself as more empirical while functionalism is more prescriptive, even though they share similar assumptions about the international system. Another point of difference, ironically enough, is that functionalists see government as playing a much greater role in satisfying the needs of the people. The scope

of governmental activity and jurisdiction will expand with increased demands made upon communication, information and technological capabilities of states, calling for greater interconnectedness and efficiency in higher levels of government. This implies a movement towards long-term structures of governance, the acceptance of a "multi-tiered" approach to government (Daltrop, 1986) rather than traditional federalist structures more commonly inspired by the term integration.

Functionalists focus on issue area cooperation, with technical experts sharing their knowledge with others from different nations, within the same issue area. They foster the image of horizontal cooperation cutting across vertical barriers of territoriality and nationalism. Technical considerations override traditional concerns with security imperatives that feed on insecurity in an anarchic environment and breed further insecurity and distrust, impeding collaborative ventures among states. Collaboration in one technical area that is seen as relatively non-threatening will create a convention and environment of cooperative activity that will eventually "spill over" into other issue areas. In order for this to be feasible, functionalists maintain that:

- (a) cooperation must prove jointly beneficial to all parties involved. Self interest, if used wisely, can be a source of great motivation and mutual gains, and
- (b) the initial areas of cooperation must be perceived by all nations involved to be relatively noncontroversial and nonthreatening to national security.

Critics of this approach question the applicability of functionalism to international politics. Does technical cooperation influence political dynamics or is it the other way around, with political relations determining collaboration in other issue areas? Secondly, does

international conflict necessarily derive from poverty and underdevelopment? Would economic well being ensure a peaceful coexistence? Thirdly, there is skepticism over separation of issue areas dealing with security matters on the one hand and technical matters, on the other.

b. **Neofunctionalism**

Neofunctionalism deals with the third criticism mentioned above; rather than waiting on spillover to occur, political concerns of integration should be addressed directly. Neofunctionalists ascribe a significant role to political entrepreneurs or visionaries who can push for integration and nation-building. The political agenda thus prescribed by neofunctionalists corresponds to the EC's efforts at securing an integrated and unified Europe. However, not only is there little empirical evidence of any real political integration in terms of an European superstate, but such a vision does not necessarily conform to a liberal interpretation of integration. What is evident is a trend towards policy coordination or overlap on issues such as environment (CFP, the Mediterranean Action Plan, UNECE, the 1989 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Protocols in 1985 and 1989 on issues of control of sulphur emissions and nitrogen oxide), human rights (ECHR, Council of Europe), self-determination (Bureau of Unrepresented Nations), culture, security (NATO, CSCE, CSBMs, NACC, WEU, IEPG) and economics (EU, GATT, EFTA, OECD, CSCE).

c. **Complex interdependence**

The theory of complex interdependence came into its own in the 1970s as an idealist challenge to realist assumptions. The theory challenges rival paradigms like

realism by treating international relations as a systemic, organic concept, seeing a "global society" comprised of the sum of its many interacting parts. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye strongly advocate of this point of view in Power and Interdependence (1977, 1983). Specifically, the theory of complex interdependence responds to, and modifies, the following realist premises:

- 1) that the nation-state is the primary political unit. Scholars from this school of thought emphasized the role played by NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and other non-traditional, non-state institutions such as multinational corporations and transnational banks. These institutions work for their own interests, and are not concerned with the issue of sovereignty except where it hinders their access to any given area. Their transnational linkages over several sovereign states make them akin to transmission belts, rendering government policies in various countries sensitive to one another.
- 2) that national security issues are always at the forefront of states' domestic agendas. The distinctions between "high" and "low" politics has become blurred and is no longer meaningful in light of the importance given to economic issues on the policy agenda. Economic linkages with world-wide institutions as well as with other states has necessitated a more holistic view of international relations; the primary unit of analysis is the global community, rather than the individual state.
- 3) that military force is still the most important currency of influence. Certain kinds of issues call for certain kinds of responses; military clout may be irrelevant to resolution of economic relations between states. It is not realistic to assume that leaders are going

to push for a response that involves using military force even when relations turn contentious, possibly over economic or trade issues.

While this was not a complete rejection of realist assumptions, it certainly modified realism's stance on these issues. For instance, it is impossible, even for an idealist to reject the notion that states are still the most important actors in world politics. But it is possible to play down traditional concerns that are associated with the concept of state sovereignty. Complex interdependence was eventually coopted into neoliberal institutionalism. Just as realism had been a belief or idea about how things work in IR -- before Waltz came up with his structural theory of international politics -- idealist thought pervaded all these paradigms without necessarily materializing into a well-crafted, specific theory of IR. Neoliberal institutionalism gave idealist thought the same element of structure that neorealism had credited to realist thought.

d. **Neoliberal Institutionalism**

Neoliberalism is, like Neorealism, a systemic or structural theory of international politics. Its intellectual roots derive from liberal international theory³ (Morse, Hoffman, Doyle, Keohane) and from studies of regional integration of the 1950s and 1960s. The same tenets discussed above are relevant here:

State sovereignty, considered the central tenet of realist premises, could possibly at some point be eclipsed by imperatives of economic transactions. While undermining the role of traditional state-centric perspectives, neoliberalism highlights the role of non-state or

³ Liberal international thought developed in the seventeenth century with its main proponents being political philosophers, political economists and scholars who shared a general interest in international politics.

transnational actors such as multinational corporations, and the impact of low politics issues (as versus high politics issues of peace and security) on national agendas. In keeping with the growing attractiveness of economic paradigms to explain international dynamics, neoliberalism emphasizes interdependent transnational linkages and the growing relevance of economic relationships over military power to state policy.

As mentioned earlier, neoliberalism is a structural theory of politics, focussing on the dynamics of the international system, rather than on state or sub-state/individual actors that comprise it. Just as theories of (European) integration attempted to explain cooperation between states, neoliberalism similarly focussed on areas of commonality between states; owing to the (increasing) extent of economic linkage and overlap of interests, states experience a degree of sensitivity to each other's policies, that renders them part of a global community of interests.

For a multitude of scholars of IR, this new intellectual reality has translated into an abandonment of old security-related studies, and instead into a move towards understanding the underpinnings of International Political Economy (IPE). It has also signalled a change from studying the behavior of nation-states to studying institutional dynamics. Out of this paradigm are born other, structured explanations for explaining international behavior, such as hegemonic stability theory and regime theory. While there is no getting away from the realist assertion that the international system is at heart an anarchic one (and this influences state behavior), it is also becoming clear that international institutions have begun to play an increasing role in bringing some order into this chaos.

2. Realism: (The decline of Idealism)

While idealism flourished in the inter-war period, subsequent events culminating in World War II discredited idealist theory, deeming it optimistic, moralistic and fallible. Just as World War I had inspired the idealist paradigm, the crisis of World War II spawned a new, diametrically opposite set of beliefs termed Political Realism.

As a political philosophy realism could not truly be termed "new" because the intellectual underpinnings of realism may be seen in political treatises ranging as far back as Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. Kautilya's "ArthaShastra" is a manual of political leadership for Mauryan emperors of India dating first century B.C., and Niccolo Machiavelli's "The Prince" is a manual of prescriptive behavior for a leader in pursuit of power. More contemporary influences on realist thought include E.H. Carr, Nicholas Spykman, Walter Lippman, Reinhold Niebuhr, George Kennan, John Herz, Arnold Wolfers, Raymond Aron, Hans Morgenthau, and Hedley Bull.

The main elements of realism are as follows:

- 1) There is no higher political authority than the nation-state, seen as the basic political unit in international politics.
- 2) The political behavior of nation-states has one common denominator: the drive for survival, and the subsequent quest for power that enables this drive. The end (survival in a hostile environment) justifies the means (power-maximizing behavior).
- 3) Ideology itself is subordinate and even irrelevant to this power equation, as is moralism or any political philosophy. Self-interest and dictates of power drive national policy.

- 4) Balance of power politics, supported by strategic and fluid alliance-making, is the most stable regulator of the international system.
- 5) Self-help is the most durable principle of self-protection, rather than reliance on collective security or any such universalistic arrangement.
- 6) An abiding belief in the Hobbesian view of human nature viz. that people are inherently wicked, engaging in self-interested behavior, leading to "a war of all against all" as Hobbes put it. It is utopian to expect the eradication of this lust for power.

Classical realism was politically suited to explaining World War II as well as the conflict-laden environment of the 1940s and 50s. But prudence and expedience tempered the drive for power; nation-states, by virtue of their own status, acknowledged the legitimacy of other nation-states. With this recognition came the acknowledgement of national interests of other nation-states. Scholars often found this view incompatible with dictates of classical realism, and not very helpful in studies that tried to establish a relationship between power resources and political outcomes.

Realism failed political scholars in a variety of ways. It did not serve to answer vital questions and demands made upon it by scholars seeking a general theory of IR. Realists themselves remained ambivalent about what constituted sound foreign policy, being divided on American intervention in Vietnam, for instance.

Realists could not equate their search for a theory of causality with their concern with the importance of accidental or unexpected events. "(Morgenthau) was fond of repeating Blaise Pascal's remark that the history of the world would have been different had

Cleopatra's nose been a bit shorter, and then asking, "how do you systemize that?" (Kegley, Jr., 1995).

Most importantly, realism alone could not predict and account for the new dynamics of cooperation in war-prone western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s⁴. If idealism had been accused of being moralistic, then realism too sustained the danger of seeming blinkered by emphasizing narrow, self-interested behavior, not always borne out by international events.

a. **NeoRealism**

Neorealist thinking derives from classical realism, but propounds a theory more suited to explaining complex - and sometimes contradictory - state behavior. Kenneth Waltz (1959) is credited with crafting a systemic or structural theory of realism that brought into play the different levels and units of analysis (system, state and individual -- with structural and unit levels at once distinct and connected). His efforts proved to be the most rigorous attempt at theorizing about IR up to his time. Neorealism is a systemic theory of international politics, attempting to "systemize political realism into a rigorous, deductive systemic theory of international politics" (Keohane, 1986b).

Waltz (Theories of International Politics, 1979) extrapolating from microeconomic theory (and following in the work of Raymond Aron), compared trends in international politics and foreign policy to behavior of markets and firms. Markets operate through the mechanism of individual choice, these influence the nature of the economic system and its

⁴On April 18th, 1951 a treaty creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was signed in Paris by the Benelux nations comprising of France, Germany and Italy.

On March 25th, 1957 treaties creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were signed in Rome.

"laws". Similarly, state capabilities guide state action, and determine the role or position of a state in the international arena. Power is sought not for its own sake as much as to ensure survival in an anarchic world. The nature of the international system therefore imposes its own rules on the players, and the latter in turn shape the existing system by the nature of their interactions, influenced by their respective positions in the power-hierarchy. For neorealists, this provides a satisfyingly generalized theory of IR. "Structural constraints explain why the [same] methods are repeatedly used despite differences in the persons and states who use them" (Waltz, 1979).

Neorealism allows for limited cooperation between states.⁵ However compelling the reasons for (largely economic) cooperation, two vital constraints still prevail:

- 1) Fear of disproportionate gains: the concept that international politics is still very much a zero-sum game, and that *relative* gains supersede the idea of absolute gains.
- 2) Fear of dependence: dependence can be unilateral or bilateral (interdependence); both forms are perceived as threatening a state's independence and self-sufficiency.

Even as neorealism attempts to explain cooperation (albeit limited) between nations, the insecurities that are attributed to state rationality imply that interdependence in fact limits the scope of international cooperation since it adds to rather than diminishes these fears.

⁵This assumes greater relevance when studying regimes and the role of hegemon in supporting these regimes. Keohane, in After Hegemony? (1984) supports the idea of states developing a sort of "bounded" rationality whereby "a nation's decision to participate in a regime depends upon more than a narrowly defined self-interest. A nation's decision to enter into a regime also depends upon available information, history, policy goals, policy inertia, and the self interest of various vested groups."(Jonathan R. Strand, "The Antarctic Resource regime, After Hegemony". Paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 14-16, 1994)

b. **Hegemonic stability**

The theory of hegemonic stability focusses on the role of the political entrepreneur in international politics who unilaterally incurs costs necessary to override market failure in the provision of some collective good. That is, the theory attempts to explain why hegemonic⁶ powers establish regimes in the first place (that is, why power is used to further group rather than individual ends) and why they in effect subsidize the membership of other states within that regime with the provision of collective goods vital to the smooth functioning of the regime. A classic example would be the role of the U.S. (along with a much-diminished Britain) in setting up a post-World War II, stable financial order that included the Bretton Woods system of gold-into-dollar convertibility and corollary institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

The theory of hegemonic stability relies on the distribution of power or state capabilities to explain trends and levels of openness or protectionism in the global trading community. One logical offshoot of the theory is that all other things being equal, a decline in the power of the hegemon will lead to an inevitable weakening of the regime itself, since the latter is founded upon the principle of asymmetric power distributions. Evidence corroborating this trend may be seen in a study of the postwar liberal trade regime such as GATT. The regime was established in Washington, and peaked in the 1950s and 1960s (in terms of rule adherence, tariff reductions, etc.) in accord with American hegemonic power. Then in the 1970s and 1980s, as the U.S. faced a greater challenge to its status from western

⁶Stephen Krasner defines a hegemonic system as "one in which there is a single state that is much larger and relatively more advanced than its trading partners." Krasner, State Power, p. 322.

industrialized nations such as Japan and Europe, the trade regime was beset by acts of defection (tariff disputes, rule-breaking) by member nations. Trade relations remains a troubled area for the global community; Robert Gilpin, speaking on declining American power, describes the world economy as "coalescing along three axes. Debt, monetary and trade matters as well as security concerns will surely pull the regions of the world further apart but should not cause a complete break" (Gilpin, 1987).

On the other hand, scholars like Arthur Stein argue that smaller states are aware of their interests being served by the regime in question; when the hegemonic power is no longer able to effectively provide necessary goods and services, these "weak" states start contributing towards the maintenance of the regime. With the decline or absence of the hegemon, payoffs from the regime might now be more equitably distributed; this implies a strengthening rather than weakening of the regime. Curiously, there is evidence -- within the liberal trade regime -- to demonstrate this trend. Even in the wake of declining American hegemony, the trade regime has not fallen prey to trade disputes and acts of narrow, self-interest considerations. On the contrary, the relatively successful conclusion of the Tokyo and more recently, Uruguay rounds has established a surprising degree of support for the norms and principles of free trade.

C. Regime Theory in International Relations

From a methodological point of view, regime theory provides an ideological background to empirical studies dealing with who wins on what issues in any given issue

area. Regimes incorporate not just the major players but also the nonplayers or disfranchised states who are affected by decisions within a given issue area.

Regime theory legitimizes, in a sense, the role of norms in shaping international agendas and behavior. While theories of complex interdependence laid the foundation for institutional cooperation, regime theory takes this idea a step further.

And thirdly, regime theory is a theory about the role of institutions as impacting state behavior. There is some disagreement over what an institutional outlook entails, exactly. It can imply an emphasis on rules⁷, on preferences, individual strategies or on customs and ethics. Andrew Schotter, in The Economic Theory of Social Institutions, views social institutions as standards of behavior rather than rules of the game. He is not as concerned with examining which rules lead to what outcomes as he is with analyzing regularities of behavior that arise from a set of rules. He concentrates on "the evolution of learned strategies among individuals who interact with one another repeatedly over a long period of time". Rawls (1968) terms this the "summary view of rules" that predicts that individuals come to follow similar strategies over time.

Idealists and (neo) realists may find ideological convergence of sorts here; while regimes, to Idealists, represent certain norms and principles, neorealists look to theories like that of hegemonic stability to explain why internationally preeminent states such as the U.S. sponsor and support -- to a disproportionate extent -- institutional arrangements that stabilize and benefit the international community as a whole.

⁷Riker defines institutions as "rules about behavior, especially about making decisions" (1982). Charles Plott also defines institutions as "the rules for individual expression, information transmittal, and social choice..."(1979).

"Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of facts, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for actions. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice" (Krasner, 1982). This definition of "regime" put forth by Stephen Krasner was consensually accepted at a conference on International Regimes held in Los Angeles in October 1980.

Keohane and Nye define regimes as "sets of governing arrangements" that include "networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects." Keohane interprets international regimes, in part, as "devices to facilitate the making of substantive agreements in world politics, particularly among states." Ernst Haas states that regimes are "man-made arrangements (social institutions) for managing conflict in a setting of interdependence", encompassing a mutually coherent set of procedures, rules and norms. Hedley Bull, using a different terminology refers to the importance of rules and institutions in institutional society where rules refer to "general imperative principles which require or authorize prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways." Oran Young defines regimes as "social institutions governing the actions of those interested in specifiable activities (or accepted sets of activities).

D. Approaches

There are three broad approaches or schools of thought concerning the paradigmatic importance and relevance of regimes.

Some (Oran Young, Raymond Hopkins, Donald Puchala) see regimes as pervasive, inevitable phenomena in the international system, a viewpoint attributed to a liberal understanding of the international order. Puchala and Hopkins stress the undeniability of existence of regimes in all issue-areas ... "In international relations there are revered principles, explicit and implicit norms, and written and unwritten rules, that are recognized by actors and govern their behavior." The second approach, espoused by Susan Strange and others, sees regimes as nothing more than constructs explained by underlying power relationships and the dynamics of realpolitik. The third position, known as "modified structural", taken by authors such as Keohane, Robert Jervis, John Ruggie, Charles Lipson, Benjamin Cohen, and Arthur Stein, falls somewhere in between, allowing for realist assumptions (international anarchy, power-maximizing states) but maintains that regimes play a significant role in the international arena in the absence of conditions favoring Pareto-optimal outcomes.

1. Realist Approach

For regimes to matter in international theory, they should be seen as independent variables influencing international behavior. Realists would argue that they are extraneous to the model; they have little or no impact or explanatory power where outcomes and related behavior are concerned. Economic rationalizations incorporated in the rational actor model (profit-seeking individual actors; whether individuals, firms, groups, classes or states) set the rules for interaction, defined by individual interests. Social actions "are not

determined by orientation to any sort of norm which is held to be valid, nor do they rest on custom, but entirely on the fact that the corresponding type of social action is in the nature of the case best adapted to the normal interests of the actors as they themselves are aware of them" (Weber, 1977, p.30). This renders concepts like "principles, norms, rules and decision-making behavior" largely irrelevant to the entire process. Kenneth Waltz echoes this market orientation of the international arena; he writes that at a minimum, states "seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination" (Waltz, p.118).

2. Liberal Approach

The "liberal" orientation of this argument rejects basic assumptions of the realist, structural models viz. that the international system is little more than sovereign states grappling for preservation and/or supremacy, restrained only by balance of power dynamics. National boundaries are made obsolete by new, transnational ties and by new economic and social priorities. State sovereignty itself is a dissipating force in the face of transnational networks set up by elites within individual states. The authors within this framework stress the complex nature and degree of global interdependence that prevails (Keohane, Nye), as well as what Haas calls "organic" theories - eco-environmentalism, eco-reformism and egalitarianism.

Compliance to regime norms is attributed to a variety of factors, yet even liberals like Puchala and Hopkins stress the realization that a powerful reason for compliance is simply calculated self-interest. At the same time, these authors include an assessment of the "moral" costs of compliance and noncompliance as part of the cost-benefit analysis done by actors in a regime. An interesting suggestion is that perhaps the actors overestimate costs of

compliance or noncompliance, thereby often conforming even when it might be in their interest to not do so.

Subjective and moral factors are often overlooked in the study of international relations; events are studied through the uni-dimensional lens of power politics. Regimes are responsible for normative mediation between power and behavior; as an analytic construct, it is of theoretical importance in that it qualifies this relationship. Here, regimes that merely reflect the interests of the dominant powers are not of theoretical interest, because the specification or identification of either of the two variables (power, regimes as normative mediation) would be the same. On the other hand, regimes promoting international law and morality without consideration of specific interests and goals of participants are extremely rare and ineffective. Further, where such regimes do apply, in narrow, technical issue-areas such as smallpox control and international posts and telegrams, they are perceived as theoretically uninspiring and analytically uninteresting. (Puchala and Hopkins claim as an exception the regime of the oceans: the Law of the Sea.)

3. **Modified Structuralists**

The "modified structuralists" find a meeting ground between two conflicting ideologies; while regimes are born of voluntary agreements among juridically equal actors (Keohane), their conceptualization is "rooted in the classic characterization of international politics as relations between sovereign states dedicated to their own self-preservation, ultimately able to depend only on themselves, and prepared to resort to force" (Stein, p. 116).

A classic analytic construct that falls under this school of thought is the Prisoners'

Dilemma game-theoretic example⁸. Uncoordinated individual calculations take second seat to considerations of Pareto-optimal outcomes acknowledged by participatory actors. As the game-theoretic analog of "chicken" suggests, purely autonomous, anarchic behavior can result in disaster for everyone in the international community. As global interdependence grows, and spans an increasing number of areas, there is a corresponding need for coordination in these issue-areas.

Unlike the liberals, the modified structuralists do not see an extension of this need in what are perceived as zero-sum situations, for example those in the security area.

E. Regimes As the Dependent Variable

The conception, maintenance and possible change in the nature of a regime may be attributed to a variety of factors. In Chapter V, my case studies chapter, I have studied regimes as the products of interaction between three main variables: ideas, interests and institutions. As I mentioned, IR scholars are divided over the efficacy of any one of these factors as contributing towards an explanatory theory of state behavior. Subsequently, I think the best way to explain regimes is to study the *synthesis* of these three components; the latter represent the main thrust of realist and idealist paradigms. Below, I explain in greater detail the rationale and the dynamics involved in each component and in this particular approach.

⁸An arms race would not be perceived as a regime, even though each player's decision depends upon the other player's previous move. Arthur Stein (1983) stresses that as long as "international state behavior results from unconstrained and independent decision making, there is no international regime.

1. Role of Ideas

Puchala and Hopkins see a regime as an "attitudinal phenomenon". It is argued that values suggesting and praising certain types of behavior may ultimately spawn institutions that embody and reinforce such values. According to Max Weber, the Calvinist work ethic arising out of its religious beliefs was responsible for evolving capitalism. Hopkins and Puchala distinguish between what they term the "superstructure" and the "substructure", introducing the concept of a hierarchy or regimes, with the superstructure referring to "general and diffuse principles and norms" (say, balance of power) that condition the principles and norms operative in a specific issue-area" (example, colonialism). Sovereignty is considered the most diffuse and most prevailing principle in the international arena.

An important principle touted by Jervis is that of "reciprocation" that binds most international regimes and leads to behavior that transcends short-term, specific interest calculations and may be termed generalized commitment. It is the belief that if one helps others or fails to hurt them, even at some opportunity cost to oneself, they will reciprocate when the tables are turned. This, for instance, was a norm applicable to the Concert of Europe. The principle of generalized commitment does away with the necessity for specific clusters of agreements, thus reducing organizational costs. It also reduces costs or frictions of uncertainty about the future, by making favorable assumptions about future behavior of other actors.

Haas refers to the concept of "order" as the benefits a regime is constructed to provide. Orders may be devoted to values such as equity or efficiency, valued respectively by Marxists and students of dependency theories, and liberals. Ecologists concern themselves with norms

of physical and biological survival, to improving quality of life at a global level. Pluralists may see state survival as a norm, that translates into retaining some semblance of autonomy given conditions of complex interdependence. Regimes in issue-areas correspond to the norms and the order underlying that issue-area.

Another important subcomponent of ideas is knowledge. Ernst Haas, the principle proponent of knowledge as an explanatory variable, defines knowledge as "the sum of technical information and of theories about that information which commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested actors to serve as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal" (Haas, 1980, pp.367-68). This is related to an understanding of the "interconnectedness" that spans national boundaries and unites countries into a global community. Stein points out the fact that early on, national health regulations were a function of political concerns. In the face of new discoveries like preventive vaccines, health regulations became a global concern. If technology is a contributory factor, then authors like Jervis see an extension of this argument to the security area, for instance, as in a arms control regime. Or a regime based on consensus on universal acceptance of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) in the presence of nuclear technology. The consensus and knowledge, however, have to be universally understood.

New knowledge may spark off evolutionary or revolutionary change within a regime. The former involves altering rules and procedures within the context of some given set of norms and principles. An example suggested by Benjamin Cohen is the floating exchange rate system agreed to in the 1970s that replaced the fixed exchange rate system established at Bretton Woods. This came from an increased knowledge and confidence in the institutions

that controlled monetary aggregates. The latter gives rise to new principles and norms stemming from shifts in power.

Ernst Haas talks about the evolution of consciousness, that transcends mere knowledge to a self-understanding and an understanding of political choices conditioned by one's relationship to nature and society. For instance, a state had control over areas in surrounding oceans based on the norm of maximum open access. Changes leading to current trends on fisheries conservation zones, pollution-free zones, restrictions on transit, and international controls on mining of the sea are perceived as changes in the ocean regime itself. Oceans are viewed as a public good, a heritage of all mankind. Putting together hitherto unconnected topics - in this case such as toxicity, natural resources, diets and development economics- to comprise this new consciousness is a process Haas terms "adaptive learning".

2. Role of Interests

This variable stems from the realist approach to IR, and focuses on state capabilities and the distribution of power in the international system. Power may be used either to serve the common good, something benefitting the system as a whole, or to serve particularistic, individual interests.

The first position falls under the economic paradigm of Keynesian economics. The "hidden hand" of Adam Smith's market works for the good of all, yet there is an acknowledged need for the state to step in and provide certain essential goods and services, such as national defense, maintenance of law and order, welfare legislation, public works, protection of infant industries and standards for commodities, and institutional safeguards establishing property rights, enforcing contracts and equating public and private rates of

return. In short, promoting cooperative, long-term oriented--as versus competitive, short-term oriented--behavior. Charles Kindleberger takes the argument beyond state boundaries to global-interest levels. For instance, he argues in The World in Depression that responsible state leadership -- for example by the United States, that was "able but unwilling"-- could have staved off the depression of the 1930s. State intervention, deemed necessary to provide a favorable market environment for the international trading system, includes the following functions (Kindleberger, 1978):

1. Protecting economic actors from force.
2. Cushioning the undesirable effects of an open system by, for instance, providing adjustment assistance for import-competing industries.
3. Establishing standards for products. In the absence of such standards inordinate energy may be wasted finding information about products.
4. Providing a national currency that can be used as an international reserve and transactions currency.
5. Constructing public works such as docks and domestic transportation systems.
6. Compensating for market imperfections by, for instance, becoming a lender of last resort when private financial institutions become so cautious that their conservatism could destroy global liquidity.

If the degree of interconnectedness and interdependence do indeed render all actors part of an international society or global community, the concept of regime intervention ought to be seen as merely an extension of classical and neoclassical economic thought. In what may be termed regimes of common interest, collaboration is seen as the best strategy. Haas

reads the situation as one of "policy contingency" with actors weighing the opportunity costs of abandoning an agreement and resorting to self-help.

Regimes of "common aversion" call for policy coordination only, rather than collaboration, with a view to avoiding a certain outcome. Haas quotes, as examples, imperialism, the balance of power, and UN practices for collective security. A coalition of weaker states may come together in a survival-oriented regime against some hegemonic power. Regimes of common aversion are not however seen as properly belonging to any functional notion of regimes.

Adopting the second position, the demand for regimes is tied in to the desire of international actors to use these regimes for their own narrow interests. Keohane's argument on the hegemon playing a crucial role -- as Olson's "political entrepreneur" -- in providing collective goods vital to the regime is founded on this rationale. A natural conclusion to this theory however is that as hegemonic power of the state declines, the regime will weaken in the absence of strong leadership. An offshoot of this argument, proposed by Stein, is that instead of the regime weakening with a decline in hegemonic power, the asymmetry of supply of goods will alter. Previous free riders will now become paying customers, recognizing the fact that without their contributions the regime will die.

Concurrent to the concept of asymmetry of power, especially in an oligopolistic market is Young's argument of imposed regimes. Dominant players in the regime may alter incentives for other, weaker players in order to coerce them into compliance with the principles and rules of the regime. A case in point would be that of the Bretton Woods system that was tailored to reflect the interests of the United States rather than those of Britain

(Cohen). Regimes, then- in a Marxist tradition- reflect the interests of the powerful actors; just as dominant classes in a state use the state and its ideology to justify the existing status quo. There is some disagreement over whether a shifting of power within a regime will culminate in its obsolescence, or whether the nature- and indeed, the norms, rules, principles of the regime itself will alter to reflect new distributions of power.

Even operating under the assumptions of the rational actor paradigm, it is possible to see how regimes are valuable in reaching Pareto-optimal outcomes. Krasner terms this "egoistic self-interest", referring to "the desire to maximize one's own utility function where that function does not include the utility of another party. The egoist is concerned with the behavior of others only insofar as that behavior can affect the egoist's utility" (Krasner, 1969). This is contrasted with pure power seeking behavior, where the main goal is to maximize the difference between one's own power capabilities and those of another.

The assumptions held by the modified structuralists are relevant to this explanation; what Stein terms the "dilemma of common interests", referring to the game-theoretic examples of prisoners' dilemma and provision of collective goods. The resolution of this dilemma necessitates concerted action and the existence of a regime, what he calls *collaboration*. Where anarchic behavior may result in disastrous consequences for the international community (using the game-construct of "chicken"), the dilemma of "common aversion" may be resolved through "coordination", which is more of an implicit agreement between actors.

Keohane, employing a microeconomic, market paradigm, sees regimes as basically institutionalized agreements to "provide frameworks for establishing legal liability (even if

these are not perfect); improve the quantity and quality of information available to actors; or reduce other transaction costs, such as costs of organization or of making side payments." He does not believe that regimes are spontaneous creations; their creation may be attributed to the initiative of political entrepreneurs (governments) who "see a potential profit in organizing collaboration". It is assumed that (transaction) costs of dealing in some issue area with "ad hoc" agreements is more costly than the cost of agreements within a regime framework. Keohane introduces the concept of "issue density", referring to the number and importance of issues arising within a given policy area. Density of the policy area is positively related to degree of interdependence of various issues, with greater issue density inviting the need for regimes based on principles such as interconnectedness of substantive objectives, organizational costs and economies of scale.

Young classifies regimes as "spontaneous", "negotiated" or "imposed"; the first two are a function of self-interested behavior. Lipson relates acceptance and roles of regimes to differential costs of adjustment across industrial sectors, to costs of adherence to such liberal principles, norms and beliefs. An added argument to this rationale is provided by Cohen who cites the reason for change in the balance of payments regime in the 1970s as attributable to higher oil prices and revised calculations of interest in the petrodollar market. Jervis claims that when countries accept the high cost of conflict and the spillover thereof, they will also come to a recognition of the need for regimes in the security arena. Haas, Puchala and Hopkins support this argument, focussing on the altered priorities arising out of complex, global interdependence and interconnectedness.

3. Role of Institutions

Routinized behavior may eventually culminate in a regime, a stand supported strongly by Hopkins, Puchala and Young. Weber describes usage as "regular patterns of behavior based on actual practice", and custom as "long-standing practice" (Weber, p.29). The routinization evolves out of motives of self-interest and extends to shared expectations of behavior that result in the development of acknowledged principles and norms. Over a period of time, routinized behavior assumes legitimacy, becomes normative. Much of commercial law in the West -- such as constitutional law in Britain, for instance -- has its origins in usage and custom. Young's "spontaneous" regimes classify as contenders for this category, since much of his inspiration for the term arises out of the paradigm of microeconomic thought. Even imposed orders, as Young states, may assume legitimacy or acceptance through habits of conformity, through obedience over a period of time.

The argument is not so much whether regimes are constrained by an institutional or systemic or structural analysis, or by human choices. Structures do reflect human choices in that they are a pattern or tendency that have become institutionalized through time and implementation. For instance, states or economies that have a comparative advantage will push for free trade in those sectors. Oran Young emphasizes the "human hand" in constructing regimes, the fact that they are distinctly human artifacts, and do not "exist as ideals or essences prior to their emergence as outgrowths of patterned human behavior." They are to be studied as social constructs, not as natural systems.

Institutional arrangements are going to stay at an equilibrium in the event that the costs of altering existing arrangements exceed the benefits to be accrued from such a move.

However, some legal or political event, or change in the norms and values of society, may have an impact on the institutional environment, opening a "window of opportunity" for redistributive policies. The institutional environment of a society, defined as the "set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution", is geared to accommodating the goals and philosophies of that society. It stands to reason, then, that changes in existing institutional structures reflect changing needs of the society in question.

Institutions are created by human beings, but impose pervasive constraints on individual choices. "Institutions, then, reflect a set of dominant ideas translated through legal mechanisms into formal government organizations" (Goldstein, 1988). Institutions minimize uncertainty and establish a stable order, but are responsive to changing needs and conceptions, and tend to evolve and change incrementally over time. This change is attributed to the "feedback" process of players within the system and evolution of organizations interacting "symbiotically" with the institutions. Taken together, ideas, interests and institutions account for creation and continued maintenance of regimes.

F. **Regime Characteristics/Types:**

Puchala and Hopkins distinguish between several different kinds of regimes: Specific and diffuse regimes, formal and informal regimes, and regimes subject to evolutionary or revolutionary change. The distinction between specific and diffuse regimes is whether an issue-area is diffuse or narrow, an explanation already touched on earlier when discussing superstructures and substructures. Formal regimes are created by international organizations,

maintained by legislative councils or other such bodies, and monitored by international bureaucracies. An example would be that of the European Monetary System. Informal regimes are seen as akin to "gentlemen's agreements", that are created and maintained by agreement among participants on some desired goals, enforced by mutual self-interest and monitored by mutual surveillance. An example would be Soviet-US detente between 1970-79. (On the other hand, from the point of view of some scholars, this might be seen as an example of common aversion, and therefore not quite a regime.)

Evolutionary change "preserves norms while changing principles; revolutionary change overturns norms in order to change principles". Evolutionary change may take place due to new information, altering the aims and interests of the participants. Regimes that are more specific, formalized and more universally rewarding are more likely to lend themselves to evolutionary change. Change in the food regime is seen as an example of evolutionary change. Revolutionary change is attributed to changes in power structure; when the dominant powers that dictate the norms and goals of an existing regime lose their hegemonic status, the previously disadvantaged participants organize to usher in a new order favoring their own interests. For instance, the colonial regime had a "distributive bias" in that distribution of benefits matched power alignments that were distinctly hierarchical and exploitative. Eventually, this regime was subject to revolutionary change. The latter is more likely to occur in regimes that are more diffuse, informal, and biased in the allocation of benefits.

Oran Young, while admitting to examples of revolutionary change in regimes (such as French Revolution and obsolescence of the Geneva convention as regards rules governing oceans) sees change as slow in coming and difficult to implement. First, individual actors

cannot, on their own initiative, wreak changes in such complex institutions. Social practices and convergent expectations often prove resistant to planned change, even when this is for the better for all concerned. Second, there is a reassuring familiarity about old, existing institutional practices -- they are tried and true, so to speak -- while new ones mean most of all, unknown outcomes, and dismantling of the old institutions, new ways of doing things and assimilation of fresh knowledge. Third, change calls for re-convergence of expectations around some new focal point, a daunting proposition considering the depth and multitude of conflicts of interest in any issue-area pertaining to the international community. Fourth, owing to the complex nature of institutions that will be affected by change, it really is hard to predict the effects of social restructuring, however well-intentioned and planned. Sometimes, of course, change is inevitable owing to circumstances such as the destruction of some previous established order -- for instance, the institution of international monetary arrangements in the wake of World War II.

Regimes prioritize values based on the interests of its participatory members; this may be termed *distributive bias*. Given the uneven power capabilities of actors within a regime, there is a corresponding inequality in terms of benefits to be received from compliance with that regime. Regimes benefit those who dominate it, and the distributive pattern of benefits is in a sense institutionalized and legitimized by its incorporation in that regime. Weaker members tend to be exploited, their interests subordinated to those of the stronger members. Compliance may be imposed or simply be a function of the weight assigned by the weaker members to the costs of noncompliance.

However, more equitable and "fair" regimes are more likely to survive (occasionally undergoing evolutionary change) as are those that permit some movement within the regime hierarchy. Hopkins and Puchala see the phenomenon as analogous to the caste system, with regimes like that of colonialism institutionalizing and embodying caste distinctions and caste rigidity.

A further distinction may be made between spontaneous, negotiated and imposed regimes. Spontaneous regimes are not a product of social engineering or some conscious design, planning or coordination. They are born out of an extraordinary convergence of expectations on the part of large number of individuals. This concept corresponds to an organic view of society. Large groups can benefit in the absence of high transaction costs and other organizational costs that work against coordinated behavior. Examples would be the natural working of markets, and balance of power politics in the international context. Usual explanations of rational and self-interested behavior do not serve to explain the convergence of expectations on some focal point.

Negotiated regimes are "characterized by conscious efforts to agree on their major provisions, explicit consent on the part of individual participants, and formal expressions of the results" (Young, 1989). Within the broad category of negotiated regimes, Young distinguishes between what he terms constitutional contracts, legislative bargains, comprehensive negotiated regimes and partial or piecemeal regimes. Constitutional contracts feature in establishment of regimes where the affected players are party to negotiations (eg. arrangements for Antarctica). Legislative bargains occur in regimes where the affected players do not participate directly but are represented (eg. United Nations' role in the future of

Palestine). Negotiations that are "careful and orderly" (eg. law of the sea convention) characterize comprehensive regimes. However, negotiations are often hindered by the scope of international conflicts and so tend to be worked out on a piecemeal basis, relying on practice and precedent.

An interesting caveat to this is that the incidence of negotiated orders corresponds to the degree of centralization of power within the society. In this case, it is easier to see why there is greater incidence of negotiated orders in domestic societies, especially advanced industrialized economies than in the more anarchic international sphere.

Imposed regimes, as the term suggests, operate in the absence of consensus or any formal expression thereof on the part of subordinate actors in that regime. They are deliberately established by powerful actors who successfully establish conformity by other players to the requirements of some desired order through a combination of coercion, cooptation and the manipulation of incentives. The driving force behind such an order is that of power; understanding imposed regimes is analyzing the dynamics of dominance.

Overt hegemony, one type of imposed order, is expressed in the explicit articulation and imposition of institutional structures favorable to the subordinating power. Examples include feudal arrangements and imperial systems. *De facto* imposition, the other kind of imposed regime, occurs when the subordinating actor is able to access benefits through institutional arrangements set up by means of manipulative leadership and incentives. Theories of dependency deal with this aspect of hegemonic rule and economic imperialism. Examples include the role of Britain in the nineteenth-century regime for oceans or that of the U.S. in the regime for continental shelves in the post-World War II era. It is suggested

that international regimes which resemble negotiated orders are in substance imposed orders of the *de facto* type.

In the final analysis however, it must be acknowledged that forces binding an imposed regime are more complex than they first appear to be. Dominant actors do not need to maintain the expense of constantly wielding power; habits of obedience more or less assure the perpetuation of an imposed regime. Oran Young stresses that there is a strong "ideational or cognitive component" to dependence. Further, hegemons have to shoulder the responsibility of leadership in times of crisis, and "forego positions of moral or ethical leadership in the relevant society" (Young, 1989).

Finally, the frequency of imposed orders will vary inversely with the degree of interdependence in societies. Interdependence renders actors vulnerable to one another, thus blurring the distinction between dominant and subordinate actors. Accordingly, imposed orders would be found operating to a lesser degree in domestic realms, especially advanced industrialized societies. As social systems grow more complex, they are characterized by spontaneous orders or regimes.

A final category is that of security regimes. International Relations scholars have been skeptical of the existence of regime in the issue-area of security; this is understandable if one continues to look for cooperation in security area on a global scale such as in the Concert of Europe (Jervis, 1983, 1978). According to Harold Muller, security regimes fall under the narrower sub-areas of security policy, and are "systems of principles, norms, rules and procedures regulating certain aspects of security relationships between states" (Muller, 1993).

G. Regime Transformation

Revolutionary and evolutionary change in regime structures has already been discussed above. Oran Young specifies some patterns of regime change. By transformation, he refers to important changes in a regime's structures of rights and rules, the nature of its social choice mechanisms, and the quality of its compliance mechanisms.

1. Internal Contradictions

These may be seen as frictions arising from inconsistencies or contradictions within the various aspects of a regime. Assuring unrestricted access to an area's resources to all members of a regime, while allowing for sovereign status of one state over that area, would be a source of possible friction. With respect to unrestricted common property regimes, evolutionary contradictions characterize periods of heavy usage of resources (eg. high seas fisheries). Marxists see a developmental character to regimes like the world capitalist order, with internal pressures and frictions that inevitably build up over a period of time.

2. Shifts in the Underlying Structure of Power

As has been discussed earlier, imposed, negotiated and spontaneous orders break down with a decline in power of the hegemon or hegemonic actors. An analytical problem in this context has been operationalizing the concept of power; major shifts in power are obvious once they have occurred, but it is difficult to recognize and hence predict early changes in power as they take place. While this is acknowledged as a powerful reason for regime transformation, lack of consensus on the definition of power proposed by competing paradigms (structuralist, behaviorist, etc.) has constrained the development of this particular perspective.

Patterns of interest, reflected in power structures comprising and shaping regimes, may also change, with the same net result. This is not always so, however, as Stein points out. If interests come between power structure and regimes, then only the structural changes that affect patterns of interest will affect regimes. Also, interests may be affected by other factors, such as technology. A change in knowledge can bring about regime change without change in power structures (eg. history of quarantine regulations). This may explain why power change is not always consistent with regime transformation.

Jeff Hart in The New International Economic Order explains changes in regimes as a function of power, interests and cognitions. (Changes in the distribution of power, in the configuration of primarily domestic interests, and in the beliefs of key policy-makers are the main explanatory variables of Hart's approach.)

3. Exogenous forces

Societal developments external to a specific regime may result in altered behavior patterns that threaten basic structures or elements of the regime. Technological developments are cited as the most obvious example of this trend. For instance, the use of large stern trawlers and factory ships decisively undermined the unrestricted common property regime for high seas fisheries. Other exogenous forces may include changes in demographics, or consumer tastes and preferences, that relate to problems of heavy usage. Changes in one regime affect other regimes as well. A further problem is that it is difficult to predict accurately changes in these exogenous factors, whether they are demographics, technology or tastes.

For instance, the developing countries have been able to transform the nature of existing regimes so as to include Third World preferences, due to three factors that Krasner lists as the decline of American power, increase of Third World ideological coherence, and the extent to which international organizations have been a forum for Third World demands.

H. Discussion

What does this say about regimes? That they are a conceptual tool to study orderly international processes outside the framework of institutionalized international organizations. And that they are far from being the anarchic international systems of most IR theories.

Some see regimes as having a definite set of norms which act as guidelines for behavior. Others see regimes as empirical manifestations of power relationships and trends in International Relations. Other authors focus on rules and distribution of authority that are ratified by a regime (Young, 1989). Regimes are seen by some as being viable alternatives or even complementing existing international organizations. Other theorists interest themselves with changes in regimes or in evaluating regimes in terms of some fixed set of criteria.

What school of thought one subscribed to would depend largely on the basic assumptions one started with. How profoundly has interdependence affected old world orders and power politics? If one were to subscribe to the theory of interdependence, then the concept of the territorial state is made obsolete by the presence of nonterritorial actors such

as multinational corporations, transnational movements and international organizations⁹. Yet nationalism is not a force to be discounted in some idealized explanation of international relations. Political realism, based on classical theories of world politics, views state behavior as a function of the constant tension borne out of potential military conflict; an ongoing state of war, as it were.

An understanding of regimes and their role in international relations provides a sort of meeting ground between traditionalist assumptions and modernist assertions. This meeting ground centers around new issue areas that do not directly address military-security concerns. Even though in an "issue-structure model" (Keohane and Nye, 1977) it is the dominant powers that make the rules, what is of relevance is strength within that issue area. Eventually, incongruity between underlying power structures and influence within a regime provokes change.

I believe that regimes work towards some common economic goal or provision of a desired order, and they are not just a function of transitive power relations¹⁰. Krasner, in Structural Conflict points out, regimes have little autonomy, and reflect underlying power structures. It is not possible to create regimes without the initiative of powerful states acting as political entrepreneurs. However, once regimes are established, the power configurations tend to be less meaningful. Krasner lists sunk costs and absence of alternatives as two

⁹Power and Interdependence, Keohane and Nye. The authors make note of the fact that traditionalists dismiss these assertions as "globaloney".

¹⁰Arms races, for instance, would not be an example of regimes because they are inherently anarchic. (Tacit arms control measures also are excluded because of a lack of explicit agreement).

possible generators of such inertia. Distribution of influence within existing regimes may come to reflect the "persuasiveness and coherence" of intellectual arguments. Indeed, voting patterns themselves, that set the agenda for international organizations, reflect such a change, the most overt example being that of one-nation one-vote procedures. Disparity between power structures and regime characteristics will threaten the stability and life-span of the regime, as well as the goal of producing mutually beneficial outcomes.

Some authors (Keohane and Nye, 1988) concern themselves with the ability of regimes to constrain hostile state action; Keohane's theory of international regimes asserts that international cooperation is possible without the existence of world government or a powerful hegemon. It is generally accepted however, that regimes are "easier to maintain than they are to create"; regimes are perceived to arise out of hegemonic rule¹¹ (U.S. in the post-World War II era) and periods of crisis (development of free-trade philosophy after the Great Depression; creation of OPEC after the oil crisis). It being acknowledgedly hard to create regimes, nations might not want to jeopardize the existence of a current regime by flouting its rules and undermining its authority.

Others highlight their role in promoting cooperation (Haas, Ruggie). The latter approach is functionalist in nature; functionalists tend to believe in some sort of implicit cooperation between nations, based on considerations of long-term interest. Ernst Haas,

¹¹As Keohane and Nye point out in Power and Independence hegemonical systems and their corresponding economic regimes often collapse because they are undermined by the actual economic processes they spawn. It is ironic that the benefits accruing from a hegemonic system, and the extent to which these are shared, serve to transform the old order. As the economic power of secondary states increases, they tend to prioritize political status and governmental autonomy.

studying the process of integration of a more unified Europe, has found the driving force behind this collaborative venture to be one of economic self-interest. "There has to be something in it for everyone". Haas makes an important point that I find significant for regimes at international and domestic levels: that the technical experts hired to provide objective information are capable of conflicting loyalties to their own country and the organization they work for. Thus Haas, in predicting outcomes, highlights the importance of beliefs, institutions and capacities, downplaying traditional realist concerns with security.

An interesting implication for cooperation on issue-lines is drawn by David Mitrany (1966) who refers to areas like labor, traffic and trade where international cooperation through international organization is made possible. Since the interaction is limited to an issue area, individual states do not feel threatened by the initiative or establishment of a relatively strong authority. Besides, a conflict in one area may not necessarily spill over into other areas, affecting cooperation in the latter.

Since cooperation in issue areas is less conflictual and hence less political, members do not have to deal with rigid, ideological topics. The emphasis is on information generated by "technical experts" which acts as policy guidelines for member countries. Issue area cooperation is also more flexible, since it does not require a general discipline to which all members have to conform or with which they must agree; it concerns itself with "specific ends and needs" within its (narrow) scope.

Krasner, in Structural Conflict, introduces the concepts of relational power and meta-power: "relational power refers to the ability to change outcomes or affect the behavior of others within a given regime. Meta-power refers to the ability to change the rules of the

game." Krasner further refers to Max Weber's discussion of formal rationality and substantive economic rationality. By formal rationality, Weber referred to the "extent of quantitative calculation or accounting which is technically possible and which is actually applied." By substantive rationality, he meant the extent to which economic activity is guided by "some criterion (past, present, or potential) of ultimate values, regardless of the nature of these ends" (Weber, 1977). Substantive rationality, therefore, reaches beyond principles of efficiency.

Relational power accepts existing goals and institutional structures. It operates within a given status quo, and is related therefore to formal rationality. Efficiency is the guiding principle of achieving those goals. Meta-power, while employing formal rationality to ascertain new goals and institutions, overturns old goals and institutions.

Developing countries exercise their options of using both relational and meta-power in their goal of aligning principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that govern international transactions to their own preferences and interests. Since they cannot compete in a world governed by market-mechanisms (relational power), it is in their interests to bring about a change in the rules themselves (meta-power). This phenomenon can be most clearly seen in the evolution of international organizations.

I. **Conclusion**

International Relations theorists have struggled to create a body of work that spans conflicting ideologies in an attempt to understand and explain complex political realities of cooperation and conflict. On the one hand, realists have partially relinquished their obsession with power as the sole explanatory variable in predicting international politics. On the other,

idealists have for the most part abandoned purely utopian expectations in order to adjust to realities of an anarchic international environment. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the "modified structuralist" approach taken by Keohane, et al.

I believe that regimes have contributed to a better understanding of IR theory, especially by modifying the ubiquitous idea that underlying power configurations determine state behavior in the international community. If the power-relationship model were true, then North-South relationships would be characterized by an absolute degree of exploitation of the latter by the former through institutionalized channels of access and interaction supported by a "liberal" order.

Krasner (Structural conflict) focuses on "profound asymmetries of power" that make a mockery of the concept of the "unseen hand" behind market forces. The latter, profoundly distrusted by the developing world, are forsaken instead for norms and principles that emphasize legitimate authoritative allocation based on state action.

For instance, in the issue areas of civil aviation and population movement, third world countries or the South inherited existing regimes that were authoritative rather than market-oriented in nature. The regime of aviation is interesting because considerations of security automatically inhibit arguments for market-oriented behavior. Every state has the authority to regulate movement inside its own territory; this negates or supersedes claims to airspace on commercial grounds.

The same considerations of national security apply to the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in developing countries. One can also quote the impact of financial regimes (what Krasner refers to as international financial institutions such as the

World Bank or the IMF) on the transfer of capital; the norms and principles involved related to authoritative allocation, rather than market-allocation. Newer institutions have been attuned to needs of developing countries; it is the latter who play a dominant role in institutions like the African Development Bank and the United Nations Development Program.

I have mentioned some of the factors that have made this possible: the decline in hegemonic power of the United States, the growth of international institutions, the acknowledgement of principles, norms and ideas that coincided with preferences of Third world countries. All these factors are interrelated; it would be hard to say which came first; perhaps decline in hegemony invited the insurgence of other factors. Certain issue areas, more than others, invite an enlightened, pragmatic approach to policy-making.

III. POLICY PARADIGMS IN NATIONAL-LEVEL POLITICS

A. Pluralism

Pluralism is essentially a theory of political power and decision making that puts special emphasis on the role of interest groups, in contrast to theories that emphasize other factors, such as elite theories, statist theories or class theories (McFarland, 1991). It is steeped in the long-ranging American tradition of a perceived bias against groups or factions. James Madison, in essay no.10 of The Federalist, saw decentralization, and a system of "checks and balances" as necessary to prevent a single faction such as a racial or economic minority to gain ascendancy and act in opposition to the public interest. Madison and his fellow authors used The Federalist to achieve ratification of the new Constitution in the critical colony/state of New York, without whose agreement the new nation would undoubtedly have failed. Though it is a well crafted piece on the evils of unequal influence as wielded by powerful interests, the entire effort of The Federalist was in fact one of the most outstanding examples of pressure group activity in American history¹.

Pluralism as a theory declared itself to be empirical and "realist", a product of the "behavioral revolution" in politics, subscribing to the philosophy of logical positivism.

¹David B. Truman, The Governmental Process, 1951, New York: Knopf. Truman attributes paranoia over interest group activity to the influence of "American perspectives and modes of inquiry". There seems to exist a predisposition to see the interest group as an all-explanatory unit of analysis, ignoring to a great extent the role and initiative of governmental actors, making organized lobbying the norm of political activity or some sort of pathological phenomenon.

Pluralism features "market" models based on simple economic concepts like rational calculation, having the individual as the unit of analysis.

David Truman's "group theory" stated that individuals unite to pursue their common interest. Truman, along with other interest group writers focusing on the idea of "Durkheimian" evolution of complexity, postulated that the number and type of interest groups proliferated with modernization and economic development. Pluralists built upon this assumption to observe that political power in the U.S. is widely distributed among competing groups; that is, there are as many groups as there are interests, so to speak. Citizens do not need to participate directly in decision making, since their internal group representatives and lobbyists can feed their inputs into the political process via a system of bargaining and compromise. Although for obvious reasons group power is not homogenous, no one group can wield enough power to restrict other groups' access to the political arena. Pluralists are not concerned so much with the sources of power as much as the exercise of it, so that to them, power is operationalized by "participation in decision-making". Thus, "countervailing power" (CV) exists just as Madison predicted it would; an increase in factions (an inevitable phenomenon according to Madison, since the causes of factions are rooted in human nature) would balance out each other. Representative government, then, was seen a triumph of pluralism.

Proponents of pluralism include Dahl, Truman and Lindblom; Dahl formulated a theory of elections based on an "implicit economic theory of democracy"², Truman

²Polsby, in "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative" Journal of Politics, Vol.22 (August 1960) suggests that pluralists, asking the question "Who Governs?" as Dahl did in his analysis of the New Haven community, start with an unspoken notion that at bottom

incorporated the complex procedures of decentralized bargaining into a theory of groups, and Lindblom used pluralism to produce a positive theory of polyarchies engaged in incremental and effective decision making. Other writers who derived their work from pluralist assumptions include Wildavsky (budgetary process, policy implementation), Polsby (community power studies, Congress), Wilson (urban politics, interest groups and regulation).

Pluralist scholars have not always been in agreement; Dahl, for instance, felt that Truman overemphasized the role of groups, and that political scientists should focus on decision-making in issue areas. Broadly speaking, however, the following assumptions define pluralist theory:

- 1) People can know their own self-interest.
- 2) People can organize in order to pursue these interests.
- 3) The political system is "permeable" enough to permit this flow of ideas; this includes more than one institutional forum -- Congress, courts, etc.
- 4) The political system features bargaining and opposition-oriented institutions; public policy is created through these institutions.
- 5) The process is empirical, and outside values are not to be imposed on the analysis of the political process. (This assumption rejects the idea of "public interest", categorizing it as propaganda and possibly researcher bias.)

Pluralism failed the American people as a philosophy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Citizens no longer believed that they were adequately represented by groups and

nobody dominates in a town. So the question really is, does anyone at all rule? Polsby compares the "Who runs this community?" query much to that of "Have you stopped beating your wife?", it being biased towards an "elitist" explanation of decision making.

organizations. The resulting policies were ones which a majority of citizens disagreed with; political alienation increased dramatically. Some of the reasons for pluralism's failure were:

- 1) It was not critical or explanatory enough of U.S. policy (eg. the Vietnam war abroad, the decay of urban cities within.)
- 2) Though Kingdon was later inspired by pluralism to formulate a theory of agenda setting³, it was becoming obvious that agendas were not a function of pluralistic forces.
- 3) Olson's criticism of group-theory in The Logic Of Collective Action (1965) as well as Anthony Down's arguments in An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) disproved many key pluralist assumptions.
- 4) Plural elitism, as an explanatory philosophy of American politics, was more and more accepted as a better theory. The socio-political experiences of the 1960-70s, wherein the government was seen as being unresponsive to citizen protests, paved the way for what was considered a better explanatory philosophy, that of "plural elitism".

B. Plural Elitism

Lowi is held to be the intellectual leader of plural elitism. He argues that policy is a function not of pluralist, but special interest forces, whose chief aim is a perpetuation of the existing status-quo in pursuance of their own, narrow interests. I earlier mentioned interest group liberalism in a pluralistic concept; I think it lends itself very well to a pluralist

³Kingdon built on David Riesman's "veto" theory of government to predict that "blocking" would occur due to plurality of interests.

argument⁴. But Lowi, equating the two concepts, criticizes pluralist thought for the assumption that countervailing power exists. Pluralism is biased against the poor, unless there exists a strong egalitarian power base.

Ambiguous legislation drafted by congress permits special interests like "big business" to influence congress and "capture" the administrative agencies created to regulate them. The plural elitist argument features the following arguments (McFarland, "Sources of Countervailing Power in America: Contributions From Recent Interest Group Theory"):

- 1) Many widely shared interests cannot be effectively organized within the political process.
- 2) Politics tends to be fragmented into decision-making in various specific policy areas, which are normally controlled by special-interest coalitions.
- 3) There are a variety of specific processes whereby plural elitist rule is maintained.
- 4) A widespread liberal ideology conceals this truth about American politics.

Lowi (1964) also conceptualized the now-famous "typology" of government policy that helped further the elitist paradigm in American politics. Policy could be classified as "distributive", "regulatory" or "redistributive". Distributive policy (a classic example being the Smoot-Hawley tariff, or government subsidies to established interest groups) is a function of political benefits that may be disaggregated and distributed as political "largesse"; it is usually the product of legislative action. Regulatory policy (eg. regulation of trade via the

⁴Look at the assumptions underlying Lowi's Interest Group Liberalism-

1. People know their own interests.
2. They are able to express these interests in political organizations, and thereby,
3. gain access to policy-makers.

Federal Trade Commission) is carried out by administrative agencies that set and enforce quality and price standards. Redistributive policy (eg. welfare state politics, New Deal, social security legislation) is based on a struggle between class interests and ideology, and is attributed largely to Presidential initiative in national politics.

Distributive politics -- what he termed the "new patronage" and features "pork-barrel" projects -- is a prime example of plural elitism in practice; Lowi felt that American politics was dominated by this type of policy. Regulatory politics features pluralism, with groups fighting for benefits in what is more of a "zero-sum" game. Regulation has to hurt one party (of the two sides) and policy analysts feel that agency decisions often reflect governmental bias in the policy arena. Lowi feels that redistributive politics has also become rare, and subverted under the guise of pluralist administration. Since distributive politics is king and this form of politics is an example of plural elitism, then plural elitism may be said to rule American politics.

Anthony Downs' and Olson's arguments, based on an economic, cost-benefit analysis of participation, supplied Lowi with a further arsenal; owing to the costs of organization to the individual being perceived as greater than its benefits to that individual, and the "free-rider" syndrome in the case of public goods as benefits, groups do not automatically organize. Smaller groups are better able to provide special incentives that help resolve the dilemma of collective action. But all interests are not readily represented because disadvantaged interests often fail to organize. This organizational bias particularly benefits the interests of groups having a small number of members.

Schattschneider foreshadowed Lowi's argument, asserting the absence of Countervailing Power, and the control of the scope of conflict by special interests in power. Disadvantaged groups remained not adequately represented by interest groups.

Plural elitist theory includes the idea of reform cycles. At first "routine" politics exhibits an issue area elite that tries to maintain the status quo. When faced with a scandal or unusual perturbation (social movements, non-institutional tactics like organizing protests, discussions), a reform movement occurs in an issue area. The passage of new legislation becomes the focus of attention and "high politics". Over time, as public attention (media exposure, chiefly) dissipates and the movement for reform declines too. The former elites resume control, as envisioned by Lowi and Olson, within the system. Under the proposition that the Few defeat the Many, plural elite theorists cite "symbolic" legislation (Edelman) that provides the impression to the public at large that something is being done to change the status quo. Organized political groups on the other hand do not confuse symbol with substance.

This corresponds to Olson's theory of small groups lobbying congress successfully, because opposing large groups may be unorganized. Olson's theory postulates the same end result, that of "capture". From the politicians' point of view, it is easier to assume that they respond to demands that are more clearly articulated and aggressively lobbied.

I think that just as pluralists naively assume countervailing power to exist, plural elitists cynically assume its absence. As Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz argue in their article, "Two Faces Of Power", there are two faces to power: power to influence policy as well power to set the legislative agenda. Pluralists emphasized the former while plural elitists

were obsessed with the latter. The plural elitist theory holds power structures to be fairly stable over time. Pluralists, on the other hand, argue that issues may be of cyclical or even fleeting interest, inspiring coalitions whose cohesion is subject to the relevance of an issue at a given time.

Dahl, in Who Governs? ascribes six characteristics to a system of "dispersed inequalities" that lie at the crux of his interpretation of interest group pluralism, and may be used to criticize plural elitism:

1. Different kinds of resources for influencing policy makers are available to different citizens.
2. With few exceptions, these resources are unequally distributed.
3. Individuals have better access to some kinds of resources and are badly off with respect to many other resources.
4. No one "influence resource" dominates all the others in most key decisions.
5. With some exceptions, an influence resource is effective in some issue areas or in some specific decisions but not in all.
6. Virtually no one, and certainly no group of more than a few individuals, is entirely lacking in some influence resources.

He also argued that politicians influence their political environment as well. If pluralists are concerned with the exercise rather than source of power, then a point that Dahl makes is relevant here: while political participation tends to increase with increase in resources, most citizens use their resources scarcely at all. Prevailing values and citizen rationality deem political participation as too "costly"; public recognition of elite control notwithstanding, it

is their failure to act upon their democratic beliefs, rather than these beliefs themselves, that is at fault.

Russell Hardin rebutted Olson's theory of collective action with a social choice perspective that focuses on long-run cost-benefit rationalization of participation. Social participation is not a one-shot game but an "iterated Prisoner's Dilemma"; this provides a rational basis for cooperation in the long run. Participation is seen as developing from recognition of the long-run rationalization of cooperation. In addition, his solution of a "K-factor" is in a sense analogous to Olson's "political entrepreneur", where the smallest number necessary to initiate action could conceivably be one. A case in point would be General Foods organizing a lobby which also represented the interests of small bakeries. Further, people have "asymmetries" in their commitments to different issues. Fourth, self-interested behavior -- without the need for selective incentives -- can fuel participation if knowledge about group ends is disseminated and there is an implicit understanding of "fairness" in the "contract". Hardin's extension of Schelling's "prominent solution" explains reduced costs of participation (though McFarland feels this applies more to social movements). A collective "bad" can often evoke greater participation; apparently, a "negative utility" has greater intensity or impact than a positive one. Extra-rational reasons for participation may exist too, like solidarity, though perhaps these contribute more to the maintenance than creation of a group.

Turning to Lowi, criticism has been levelled at his policy typologies as being too general, vague and frequently overlapping. He talks of agencies, Congress and the President

as policy makers; but the government also acts in the form of the courts⁵, to protect what are controversially labelled "natural" rights relating to civil and individual injustices, or even to protect the dominant beliefs of the time (however extra-rational) seen as some sort of "civic religion"⁶. Government as patron (a term coined by Jack Walker) with legal and institutional factors (non-profit organizations getting tax breaks, reduced postage rates, or even direct financing of group organization, etc.) is one countervailing power trend that plural elitism, even with its reform cycle theory, could not have predicted. I have already talked about social movements as a source of countervailing power; another source would be the "issue networks" that Hugh Hecló describes, or Kingdon's policy communities, that are communications networks (eg. "clustering") within a policy area that cut costs of participation.

Significant phenomena recorded after 1975 have disputed plural elitism. First, the groups lobbying government have increased in number and in the effectiveness of their lobbying techniques⁷. (A confounding factor here is that countervailing power groups did not have the legal right to sue till the 1970s.) An example would be Common Cause's efforts against special interests⁸ leading to significant pieces of legislation like the "Sunshine Law".

⁵Courts are also seen as friendlier than Congress, perhaps. It is also possible than litigation is cheaper than lobbying.

⁶For instance, policy favoring environmentalism could be an expression of pragmatism or "civic religion".

⁷Yet, the reform cycle theory of high and routine politics does often coopt social movements and the like.

⁸Common Cause initiated a study that disclosed that from 1983 to 1988, current members of the Senate received \$96.3 million in "special interest" contributions.

Second has been the rise of American executive institutions making policy autonomously, resisting "capture" with the help of countervailing power groups and their own growing "bureaucratic professionalism" i.e. adhering to some canon of values pertaining to that profession⁹. An example of this would be the continued regulation of the drug industry by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in spite of opposition from the drug industry and the American Medical Association (AMA). These have influenced the evolution of a third school of thought, termed "intense pluralism" or the triadic model of politics. In conclusion, if pluralists see policy making as it should be, then plural elitists see it as a little "less" than it is. It is a criticism often used when analyzing Machiavelli's view of the political world in "The Prince".

C. **Intense Pluralism**

"Intense" or "critical" pluralism is seen as a pragmatic outgrowth (consolidated by the end of the 1970s) or hybrid of both pluralism and plural elitism. Its predictive capacity extends to cover current research findings: the discovery by several authors (Berry, McFarland, Vogel, et al.) of the growth in political organizations lobbying government successfully and autonomous action by administrative agencies that seem to have developed professional value systems. These values are enhanced by the active presence of CV. The presence of these two variables determines the "space" or swing between triadic and subgovernment power.

⁹Lindblom, in his article, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'" points out however that even when an administrator decides to follow his own values as a criterion for decisions, he will not know how to rank them when they conflict, "as they usually do".

"The research situation is doubly confusing: after reading Olson we don't know why groups exist, and now we also have a surfeit of plausible explanations as to why they do" (McFarland, class lectures). The empirical aspect of this theory makes it relevant to considerations of politically feasible reforms that might improve on the policy-making process.

The pluralistic aspect of this theory derives from the number of actors influencing policy making. Sources of countervailing power include issue media, networks including affiliates of business and other economic powers as well as academics, journalists, politicians specializing in some policy area, government officials and members of countervailing power (Heclo), patrons (including the role of the state), social movements and effective policy implementation. Countervailing power also occurs when two economic producers oppose one another, such as lumbering against the recreational industry. Occasionally business groups may form coalitions with public-interest or other groups, professional associations and the like to form yet one more version of countervailing power.

For instance, the recent crisis in public confidence in government has inspired two movements for and against term limitations: the "Throw-them-out" side and the "If-it's-not-broken-don't-fix-it" side. In the state of Washington, one labor official said of the latter that it is the most unusual coalition he has seen in a lifetime of politics; labor, the John Birch Society and the League of Women Voters, all under one umbrella. The coalition includes Boeing Aircraft, Kaiser Aluminum, the State Grange and the State Patrol.¹⁰

¹⁰Charles Madigan, writing for the "Chicago Tribune", November 3, 1991.

Arguments analogous to the concept of countervailing power include Lowi's juridical democracy calling for rule of law, Schattschneider's call for strong political parties as CV since interest groups do not represent the underprivileged minorities, Wildavsky's support of a constitutional amendment to restrict federal government spending, etc.

Though some pluralists (McFarland) do see the prevalence of iron triangles and "entropy" in the system, phenomena like environmentalist lobbies in Washington are touted by Wilson *et. al.* to explain the pursuit of wide-based interests helping to strengthen agencies and defeat sub-governmental coalitions on occasion.

Wilson, in the Politics of Regulation includes case studies of regulatory legislation sponsored by agencies in the 1960s and 70s that regulated in the face of concerted business opposition (eg. FDA's regulation of the drug industry). He uses these to attack bulwarks of plural elitism such as the concepts of capture, iron triangles, and interest group liberalism.

So we know that the system features both entropy as well as countervailing power. McFarland subsumes the general (as yet developing) theory under the broad classification of "Countervailing Power", seen a symbol of all processes that hinder entropy within the political system. The visual metaphor is that of a set of scales (as of justice); if a weight is dropped on one side, then CV on the other side restores balance, or attempts to do so. Sometimes it may not be sufficient. Various authors over time have seen the balance as existent, illusionary or not even desirable. McFarland even includes in his overview the Marxian point of "universally rigged measures". The metaphor has its origins in cybernetics, which developed the terminology from statistical mechanics. The entropic system is one in

which energy is distributed evenly to create a perfect equilibrium with a status quo that is stable unless outside forces impinge on the system.

McFarland's triadic model states the centrality of interactions of economic producers, autonomous executive agencies and countervailing power lobbies within many policy areas. Other important factors like the President, courts, legislatures, experts, etc. are analyzed in relation to the three bases of the triad. The "intense" aspect of this theory derives from the number of groups and officials organized to exercise influence within this triadic perspective.

Theories of countervailing power also qualify the plural elitist conception of reform cycles. Excesses put an issue area on the public's political agenda, opening a possible "window of opportunity" for new legislation. Though frequent, reform cycles are not absolute; some degree of agency autonomy and countervailing power continues afterwards and it is debatable whether the policies in question ever revert to their original form even in routine politics.

James Cassing, Timothy McKeown and Jack Ochs in "The Political Economy of the Tariff Cycle" suggest that tariff levels tend to move in a cycle coupled with the business cycle. The implications for interest group activity are interesting: if the model is correct, the level of interest group activity on tariffs and other forms of rent-seeking ought to fluctuate with business conditions, with intense activity most likely to occur at a cyclical trough. Such a relationship or trend would help account for the disparity of findings by writers like Schattschneider and studies done by Bauer, Pool and Dexter on levels of interest group activity.

In some aspects the countervailing power theory comes close to that of corporatism, which "stresses the organic nature of politics and society", criticizing group pursuit of self-interest. This is certainly possible if the state coordinated competing demands of interests lobbying for benefits, even if it is seen as an authoritarian trend by most Americans. Perhaps even if we are moving towards such a state, the result would not be quite as institutionalized and formal as corporatism (eg. we cannot envision the creation of national federations of sectoral interests responding to centralized commands).

The theory of countervailing power also emphasizes the idea of "high" versus "routine" politics and subsystem cycles from one to another. This relates to the idea of power coalitions shifting according to the issue in question. For instance, during periods of "high" or crisis politics, the President may side with producer interest groups, or the courts or Congress may try to limit agency autonomy. Legislation may also take a less ambiguous form, fighting "capture"; an example would be the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that was established with the specific mandate to protect the interests of environmentalists. The framers of these regulations made sure that EPA regulations contained specific targets and deadlines to be met by industry. Such strictness ensured the involvement of environmental interest groups in the future development of pollution control.

Some statist writers, referring to the U.S. as a "weak" state, nevertheless admit that in certain core areas of state control (foreign policy, international relations, national security policy and macroeconomic policy direction in the areas of international trade, taxation and monetary regulation) state structures have a much greater impact upon the policy process than do interest groups. Andrew McFarland and Barbara Yarnold in their article, "Policy

Typologies and U.S. Asylum Policy: Joining Statist and Group Theories" mention how "state interest" in favoring hostile state aliens in U.S. refugee and asylum policy led to the formation of public interest litigation groups which work within constraints of the law, and was a catalyst in the formation of the sanctuary movement which, in turn led to the mobilization of new groups. "This serves as a good example of the interaction which may occur between government institutions, interest groups, and social movements. It also belies the suggestion that in all policy areas only groups (pluralists) or only government (statists) matters."

A parallel theory would be that of Graham Allison's third model of decision making - a model of bargaining, basically. Occasionally, Congress with countervailing power may work against the President and producer groups. It is, then, rational for Congress to make vague statutes -- so they can change in nature (and implementation) over election periods.

The concept of "governing" or "steering" is also related to the metaphor in the cybernetic context. Policy output is measured in terms of some critical variables in the policy equation; when the output falls beyond some acceptable range of these variables (though I'm not entirely sure just how one would operationalize that) the system initiates measures to put itself back on track and to put the variables back into an acceptable range. Apart from the pluralist role assigned to interest groups (representing individual interests) McFarland sees interest groups (as countervailing power) influencing government officials through sanctions and rewards, though he does not specify what forms these might take.

D. Distributive Politics

I have already discussed Lowi's typology (distributive, regulatory and redistributive policies) in an earlier section. The politics of resource allocation has always been a motif that has inspired tremendous amount of research on the part of political scientists, whether at the international, national or urban level. Congressional scholars have found that earlier models such as pluralism, or plural elitism, did not satisfactorily explain "who gets what, and how" (Lasswell, 1938). Distributive politics -- at the congressional as well as urban level -- may be identified by "the ease with which they can be disaggregated and dispensed unit by small unit, each unit more or less in isolation from other units and from any general rule" (Lowi, 1964. p.690). Examples of such types of policies include subsidies, grants, licenses, tariff authorizations as well as what are termed pork barrel programs. Political influence, whether by committee membership or similar considerations, is the dominant variable affecting policy outcomes, specifically those pertaining to the allocation of resources.

E. Conclusion

The preceding paradigms do not satisfactorily explain the dynamics of political decision-making at the national level. Lowi's typology, similar to Peterson's classification of policies, tells us that certain kinds of policies are more likely to be subject to one kind of political paradigm than another. The political influence models, for instance, may best explain distributive types of policies.

However, it may well be that just as regime theory has helped to combine the strengths of idealism and realism in the study of international politics, it may be able to provide a solid theoretical framework for improving the study of national politics as well. After all, much of the current literature (and empirical work on distributive politics) that focuses on the question of who benefits, goes towards establishing a governing regime of some kind at the national level. Regime theory is applicable to the study of all types of policy, whether distributive, regulatory or redistributive. Therein, I think, lies its greatest strength. This will be demonstrated in the case study of trade policy contained in Chapter 6.

IV. POLICY PARADIGMS IN URBAN POLITICS

A. Theories of political power distribution in Urban Politics

Theories of political power in urban studies may be categorized as having evolved through five stages: Elitism, Pluralism, Political Economy, Regime Theory and Critical Pluralism. While Pluralism and Elitism have been discussed in the preceding chapter, their application to local, rather than national, levels of policy-making will be outlined in this chapter.

1. Elitism

Theorists such as Floyd Hunter, working within this paradigm, maintain that political power in American communities is not held in a democratic, diffused fashion but rather concentrated among an *elite*, that is, a small and advantaged group of people within that community. Their impact upon the political agenda may be ascertained by evidence suggesting that policy is not responsive to wishes of the general public, and that community goals (ranging from affordable, low-income housing to preservation of historical sites) may frequently be overridden by goals of this elite.

Schumaker (1991) summarizes the reasons for this disproportionate degree of influence awarded to a few over the many: political alienation, failure to speak out, a lack of conviction that citizen participation or pressure can make a difference and an overall pessimism or fear on the part of the masses, all unwittingly collude in maintenance of this dominance. Sometimes (as mentioned in the earlier chapter) this is done by controlling what gets onto the political agenda. Other ways include the shaping of a political culture and values that reaffirm

the primacy of elite goals, a point reiterated by Elkin (1987) when discussing the idea of a commercial republic. Lastly, an economic determinism of sorts, that is, the need of legislators for capital in order to promote growth and services, dictates policies that attract tax-paying, revenue-generating citizens and businesses to that community. This implies an unofficial deference to the needs of potential and current investors, which usually happen to be a few, advantaged citizens of a community -- the elite.

2. **Pluralism**

Pluralists refute elitist arguments that contend that power is concentrated in the hands of a resource-advantaged few. Democratic systems provide a decentralized, diffused system of empowerment to citizens participating in the political arena. Community politics is often about such diffused participation in issues such as the preservation of a landmark site or a park over corporate interests that might wish to convert that space into a commercial area. Lindblom describes such policies as the end result of a process best described as "muddling through" (Lindblom, 1959). The nature and complexity of issues makes it not viable for any single elite to dominate the policy process in its entirety. Similarly, pluralists do not believe in the ubiquity of a set of values that emphasizes the primacy of elite goals. Within any community there exist a variety of ideas, ideals, norms and values, which may be seen as several distinct local subcultures. Adherence to democratic procedures and electoral considerations, if not unbiased neutrality on the part of city legislators, results in the creation of a policy arena that is open to all. Policy often reflects not one elite view but a compromise between various goals of the community. In any case, pluralists argue that policy is

influenced by a greater degree of responsiveness to community pressures than elitists maintain.

3. Machine Politics

The machine politics model has been used by urban scholars (Banfield, Rakove) to analyze the distribution of benefits accruing from public policy. The political machine in question operates on the principle of distributive politics discussed at the national level: the exchange of resources or favors for votes. This is very much a model of political influence, and benefits from the machine accrue to those support it. Chicago was once considered a prime example of machine politics, inspiring Mike Royko's classic, Boss. Today, it is generally considered that political machines have disappeared for the most part, making the paradigm historically passe to some extent. Yet traces of this kind of political exchange may be found, in varying degrees, in an analysis of any city's politics.

B. Models of Economic Constraints

Mancur Olson pointed out in his ground breaking work, The Logic of Collective Action why citizens do not necessarily collaborate or act on issues that affect their well being. This "logic" also explains why business can succeed in putting through its agenda and form enduring alliances with government. The economic constraints model, however, does not focus on the political dynamics of a business elite interacting with (or substituting for) the political elite. Rather, it downplays and minimizes the role of a ruling elite; the central argument focuses on economic constraints that act as necessary restraints for any ruling elite.

Scholars who support this view of urban politics (Paul Peterson, Tiebout, Floyd Hunter) question the traditional spectrum of power-analysis theories of urban politics, and stress a compelling degree of economic determinism in policy decisions put forth by urban policy elites. Policy choices, rather than being a function of who (effectively) rules, are structurally determined by certain economic realities. Competition between cities to woo businesses to settle in their respective areas (thus ushering in investment, jobs and middle to high income residents) effectively eclipses any other considerations when making policy.

For instance, Tiebout maintains that cities strive to achieve an optimum size, and such an "optimization" is reflected in its fiscal (taxation and spending) policies as well. People choose to settle in a locality that meets with their expectations on these matters, reducing the dynamics of city policy choices to a simple supply and demand transaction.

However, it is possible to visualize people moving into a neighborhoods for reasons other than those that Tiebout specifies. For example, it has now been documented that gays move into derelict and run-down locales in big cities for reasons that have little to do with economic acumen. (What is ironic is that as far city planners are concerned, this may be the best thing to happen to those neighborhoods because of their gradual gentrification). City choices, moreover, do not always align with city interests. A case in point is that of Williamson County in Texas, where a majority of people successfully protested against the establishment of a new branch of Apple Corporation. The factory would have generated new jobs and stimulated local economies, but the proposal was aborted by local citizens on the grounds that Apple Corporation was one of the firms which acknowledged -- in terms of health and similar job-related benefits -- partners of job workers regardless of gender or

marital status, thereby condoning relationships that were not sanctified by the Church. (Perhaps Tiebout's concept of cities following an "overriding interest" is similar to the "dominant principle" in IR regimes.)

Peterson's City Limits's model postulates that egalitarian policies initiated by cities are severely constrained by systemic competition for economic capital. Amongst all possible interests, economic interests usually dominate city planners' agendas, highlighting the role of developmental policies that promote local growth, and influence local politics as well. Peterson categorizes urban policies into three types based on how they affect the economy: developmental, allocational, and redistributive. Each category is further characterized by a certain style of politics as well.

Developmental policies are policies of economic growth. Since everyone concerned or affected is agreed on the primacy of economic well-being, such policies are processed by what Peterson terms "politics of consensus". Provision of basic services to urban dwellers (including public employment within its boundaries) falls under allocational policies, which Peterson sees as neither helping nor hurting economic growth. Not protected by the sanctity of economic interests calculations, this type of policy is subject to a greater degree of politicization, or simply the politics of bargaining and compromise in effecting outcomes. Redistributive policies (welfare, health care, etc.) affirm egalitarian principles, putting the interests of the underprivileged on city agendas. However, these policies do not render quick, economic pay-offs and it is not always in city planners' interests to act on these principles, except in a largely symbolic way.

This makes for a satisfyingly parsimonious model of policy making, since it "unclutters" the theory of any political variables. City limits pertain to realities of economic imperatives, and these limits are shared by all city governments under a federal structure.

Mark Schneider (1989) points out that the relationship between actual fiscal benefits and economic development policy offering incentives to business has come under scrutiny. Cost of such incentives offered by local governments (tax abatements or subsidies) washes out fiscal benefits received. He cites research substantiating events where such inducements actually led to a net loss for city government budgets.

He also questions the role of governmental incentives in deciding where firms choose to locate. The costs taken into account by business firms when deciding to put down operations are not necessarily those controlled by local governments. Firms consider factors such as access to raw materials, markets and minimal labor costs. This does not mean that local governments and business do not negotiate over development policies; merely that the dynamics of such an interaction might not be as deterministic as is supposed. A Neo-Marxist analysis of such a situation would be that firms have an information advantage, they know what they want and the costs involved; this allows them to coerce or manipulate municipalities into generating favorable policies.

Most of the objections that are raised when criticizing Tiebout's "optimum size" theory are also pertinent here. Economic interests are not necessarily clear cut and city residents may have their own preferences which do not always align with those assumed by city planners. For instance, state governments deciding on a site for building prisons meet with severe resistance from local citizens despite the economic benefits which might be generated. While

a typical correctional facility brings in anywhere from three thousand to five thousand jobs, local residents are opposed to the idea for a variety of reasons. For one thing, it considerably skews statistics on per capita crime for that region, making it seem inhospitable on the "most livable city" index ! Residents of Queens, New York are trying to shut down sex paraphernalia stores and topless bars that have been part of a very integrated neighborhood, not for economic reasons or for concern with crime, but rather because of a drive for neighborhood respectability. Environmental concerns also figure largely in local residents' expectations of local government decisions.

C. Models of Political Choice

Ken Wong in City Choices (1990) presents a more integrative model of policy-making; he combines elements of the economic constraints and power distribution models. This he terms the "political choice" model. While city governments operate within the broad guidelines suggested by the economic determinism model, political choices made by political actors within the policy areas suggested by Peterson (developmental, allocative, redistributive) are of equal significance. Thus, policy is a function of not merely economic variables but also of city politics and administrative diversity. Political dynamics can interact with and affect each category of policy (developmental, allocative, redistributive) to produce results that align with preferences of political actors rather than economic imperatives (assuming, quite rightly, that these are not identical). The political choice model suggests a synthesis between "rational" decision making by the city as a whole and its "politically fragmented subcomponents" (Wong, 1990, p.157). Wong stresses not only the role that political leaders

(say, in a reform administration) can play in shaping political choices, he also emphasizes the role of "reform institutions" that affect the implementation of redistributive policy. This pertains in large part to the point that critical pluralists make when talking about the increasing professionalization of administrative agencies that introduces an element of countervailing power in the system. A bureaucracy based on merit rather than patronage facilitates reform agendas and increases local responsiveness to issues of equity.

This is echoed in Mark Schneider's review of bureaucratic politics in The Competitive City (1989). It is easier from an empirical point of view to equate bureaucratic objectives with overall budgetary expansion. However, he argues, it is possible that what bureaucrats are in reality attempting to accomplish is maximize discretionary spending. Ostrom (1981) and Parks and Ostrom (1981) have worked towards developing a "bureaucratic utility function" that includes terms that help us measure and understand some of the rewards bureaucrats receive from meeting demands of their constituencies. While the more obvious goals are deemed "selfish", Schneider suggests the inclusion in the model of terms measuring "responsiveness".

Similarly, Schneider goes back to the work of scholars like Fenno and Fiorina in exploring the role of political leaders in policy agendas. While strategies that maximize chances of re-election are generally accepted to be highest on the political agenda, this also means that politicians cannot consistently violate the principle of responsiveness to constituents. This implies that partnership between business and politicians may be over-emphasized in some of the urban politics literature.

Lastly, Wong suggests strategies that overcome a fundamental problem for city governments which is to find a balance between issuing redistributive programs and

maintaining fiscal well being and competitive status, while at the same time avoiding political controversy that can kill such programs at the planning stage itself (eg. enterprise zones that are targeted to inner city development).

Clarence Stone, studying Atlanta politics (Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta 1946-1988), concludes that politics is dominated by a coalition of cooperating city government leaders and downtown business owners; this translates into a regime seeking to promote the prosperity of downtown commercial districts. In Atlanta, this policy bias survived even the change in composition of political participants from predominantly white to black. Even though Clarence Stone takes care to theoretically distance his work from that of the economic determinism scholars, the conclusions one might draw from Regime Politics (or any study of Atlanta politics) certainly seem to point to politics of economic determinism.

D. Regime Theory

Stephen Elkin, in City and Regime in the American Republic, summarizes regime as "the desired political way of life". Aristotle (Politics, 1289) states a regime to be "the regulation of offices in a city, with respect to the way in which they are distributed, what is sovereign in the regime, and what the end of each community is." Clarence Stone, in Regime Politics (1989), describes an urban regime as "the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions." Regimes have traditionally been treated as intervening regimes between "basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behavior on the other" (Krasner, 1983).

For a while, after the 1950s, the study of urban politics focussed on issues that were seen as distinctly non-normative, and which lent themselves to empirical study. As with the bulk of empirical work in social science, these studies were chiefly explanatory and descriptive, and concerned with the distribution of power, and how this related to democratic theory, in American cities.

The earliest theoretical contributions towards the concept of regime stemmed from classical assessment of popular government as a workable concept. The concept was normative in nature, with a view towards looking out for the amelioration of the community. Political institutions are intended to serve as instruments used for fulfilling the interests of the people who established them. These political institutions, set up to process political wants, are defined by the political aspirations of a community, within the context of current political conventions and political traditions of the past, and circumscribed by practical¹ reason. "What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us"² (Rawls, 1980, p.519).

The Founding Fathers of the American Republic -- Federalists and Anti-Federalists both -- were agreed on the concept of limited republican government directed by two guiding

¹Aristotle emphasizes this practical aspect of reasoning -- that it is subject to a consideration of how we ought to coexist given our circumstances. (Nichomachean Ethics)

²As Rawls points out in a subsequent paper, "justice as fairness is a political conception in part because it starts from within a certain political tradition." "Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, no.3 (Summer 1985):225

principles: A concern for individual rights and the promotion of a commercial society. They believed that a regime of popular sovereignty would work towards fulfilling both these aims. The crucial distinction is that a commercial republic was conceived of as a means to an end; it was seen as supportive of the political institutions that the Founding Fathers wished to establish. They were doubtful about free government evolving and surviving solely on the basis of virtue. Self-interest being a consistent and powerful motive, free government had to work within the paradigm of self-interest, working to create a system that benefitted society as a whole. A commercial society would spawn a plethora of interests; republican institutions would channel these interests and thus prevent any one "faction" from dominating government. Further, they believed that a commercial society would increase the overall well being of all citizens who would then come to associate this level of prosperity with a republican form of government. Finally, considerations of economic profit would thrust into the background matters of religious beliefs, political ideology or civic virtue, thus diminishing reasons for friction within society. Given the acknowledged importance of private enterprise for overall well-being, it is not surprising that governments have taken an activist stance in promoting investment-oriented efforts.

Clarence Stone, rejecting the economic determinism of Peterson's model, makes a compelling arguments to promote the idea or existence of some "regime" that is prior to and independent of the kind of decisions that shape urban development. Stone makes the following arguments quoting from organization theory: One, business and other organizations tend to "satisfice" rather than optimize; second, decision making in organizations is accomplished by not by the organization as a "homogenous whole" but by "strategically

situated" individuals who are influenced by their unique backgrounds, experiences and values. And third, Stone questions the infallibility of so-called market discipline that apparently guides or even determines the scope of economic decision making.

Stone divides regimes into three types: corporate, progressive (further divided on the basis of community, identification and environment) and coalitional regimes. In another typology, he divides regimes into maintenance, development, middle class, progressive and regimes devoted to lower class opportunity expansion. H. V. Savitch and John Clayton Thomas, in Big City Politics in Transition (1991), draw four broad categories of "ideal" regime types, based on the strength of political leadership and cohesiveness of the business elite for each type: "Corporatist" regimes, with strong political leaders and a cohesive business elite; "Elitist regimes, with weak political leadership and cohesive business elite; "Pluralist", with strong political leadership and dispersed business elite; "Hyperpluralist", with weak political leadership and dispersed business elite.

Operating within the context of limited authority (confined to relatively autonomous city sectors) and limited resources, local governments must rely on means other than formal interaction with private and public interest groups to attain their goals. Business and local governments share a symbiotic relationship in that the former is advanced the currency of legitimacy and authority in return for capital investment desired by the latter. This "civic cooperation" that facilitates communication and cooperation between public and private sectors comprises a city regime.

This theme is also sounded earlier in an article by Andrew McFarland titled "Groups without Government: The Politics of Mediation". The article focusses on efforts of various

interest groups within a particular issue area to reach accord on diverse agendas with minimum governmental intervention; in fact, just enough governmental supervision necessary to bring about closure. The reason why this might be a successful formula in policy decisions (though it failed in the particular issue area that was being studied for the purpose of the article) is that, as Mcfarland suggests, "many Americans adhere to values that affirm the importance of individualism, limited government, and coordination of personal activity through the "hidden hand" of the market" and that "these values, as expressed in the concepts of market economics, can compel far-reaching agreement among seemingly disparate people".

Regime theory, as defined by Stone, rejects traditional models of power which he terms "social control" theories. He suggests that conventional analyses of power originate from some deep, ideological beliefs about dominance; about who controls whom in any given society i.e. Stephen Lukes' "third face of power" (Lukes, 1974) argument. Instead, power as it operates in modern societies is largely a function of compromise, bargaining and coalition building -- what he terms a model of "social production". Even if business has the resources and the legitimacy to influence patterns of production and development, it is change in minute details of behavior, in "the piecemeal evolution of new practices and patterns of cooperation and exchange". Stone sees countervailing power (what he calls "opposition movement" presumably within a "loose network of institutional arrangements" that "promote action on behalf of various social goods"(Charles Tilly, 1981). Society is far less integrated or convergent on any set of accepted norms and beliefs than social control models presume.

In the same vein, one has to wonder whether the distinction between an electoral coalition and governing coalition is really meaningful other than to strengthen the point that

there is no dominant hegemonic ideology to which society as a whole subscribes. This, I think, is intuitive; Stone's argument then falls prey to the same empirical realities that threatened pluralist ideology via the "second face of power" critique (Barach and Baratz, 1962, p. 947-52).

Empirical studies have challenged the popular conception of regime as a system of norms, values, beliefs and principles. Economic determinism in city governments is seen as a theoretically superior model to one which talks about the importance of internal norms within a governing coalition.

I see regime theory as a resurgent pluralist argument. There is a host of literature that dismisses this argument, of course. Clarence Stone, for instance, stresses that "fundamental differences separate the two approaches to urban politics". However, the similarity is more fundamental than parallels in coalition-building and the belief that "politics matters" (Stone, 1991). Stone claims that pluralists underestimate the "gravitational pull of an effective governing capacity" nor do they "perceive the attraction between potential partners for a regime capable of governing". I am not sure that failure to make explicit the dynamics of coalition building between interests groups necessarily implies that pluralists did not conceive of such an activity.

E. **Critical Pluralism**

Critical Pluralism may be defined as an analysis of "variances in the extent to which governments approach pluralist ideals" (Schumaker, 1991, p.19). In a sense, the development of Critical Pluralism has signalled a move away from attempts to conduct purely scientific,

objective studies of political behavior to focussing on democratic norms, expectations and performances of urban communities. This is a trend started by regime theorists, who structured in elements that had been overlooked by elitists and pluralists. However, as Schumaker points out, regime theorists have not yet developed well-operationalized indicators of the normative trends that they study.

Critical Pluralism builds upon earlier urban paradigms in exploring three issues central to the study of community politics in the U.S.: First, the question of what considerations (economic, or community values) fuel policy preferences. Secondly, the issue of who rules in local communities -- elites, bureaucrats, special interest groups, or a democratically empowered citizenry? Different paradigms speak of different influences, but we know now that political communities differ across the country. Under what circumstances might we find one kind of political rule as against another type? And third, a concern with the social, political, economic and cultural divides that characterize most communities on the basis of gender, class or race. Critical pluralism attempts to resolve the question of whether these divides reflect community norms (or may perhaps be attributed to the more sinister machinations of some policy elite).

F. **Conclusion**

In the final analysis, it is not practicable to extend economic determinism to analyses of urban (or international) decision making. Development regimes are host to a variety of inputs and influences; ideas, values and beliefs impact decision making, rendering unrealistic

the idea that simple cost-benefit analyses and similar tools of economic decision-making are in fact dominant variables.

However, Peterson's model has had an important impact on the field of urban policy-making; it has spawned several studies of city politics that have attempted to elucidate and theorize the complexities of decision-making involved at local levels. Examples of such research include Beyond the City Limits (1990) edited by John Logan and Todd Swanstrom, Governing the Ungovernable City (1985) by Barbara Ferman, and Post-Industrial Cities: Politics and Planning in New York, Paris and London (1988) by H.V. Savitch, City and Regime in the American Republic (1987) by Stephen Elkin and of course, Clarence Stone's ground-breaking work in Regime Politics (1989).

What these scholars have brought back into the discipline is a belief that politics matters; that local governments possess greater autonomy than economic models would have us believe; that economic decisions are motivated by political considerations and political processes; that political leaders can use resources like bargaining skills, charisma, character and knowledge to push their agenda. And they possess ultimate governing authority needed by economic elites to achieve their goals. Political science scholars have to keep in mind that regardless of how much political science has benefitted from input of economic analyses, whether in studies of IR or urban politics, it is politics that drives economics in "the authoritative allocation of scarce resources" rather than the other way around.

To conclude, regime theory, to my mind, incorporates all the factors that these different models highlight: the role of interest groups, political influence, system constraints and democratic ideals and norms. Each model taken by itself is deficient in some crucial

variable. I believe that an understanding of city politics is incomplete without reference to all of the factors (subsumed under Ideas, Interests and Institutions) that comprise regime theory.

V. LINKAGE BETWEEN URBAN, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY

A. Introduction

This chapter elaborates a key premise of this dissertation, which is that International Relations scholars, national politics scholars and urban scholars have something to offer one another in terms of advancement of the discipline as a whole. Previous chapters have covered the development of different paradigms in International Relations, National and Urban Politics. Now I will discuss some ways in which Regime theory can span subfields so as to facilitate our understanding of certain political phenomena.

In order to better illustrate these linkages, the chapter is divided into four sections:

1. Regime theory's applicability to the three subfields in Political Science.
2. Regime theory as opposed to the system constraints model in Urban Politics and IR.
3. Different units of analysis in the application of regime theory in a given issue area.
4. Regime theory and the Levels of Analysis Approach.

B. Regime theory in Political Science

Dahl's Who Governs? attempted to demonstrate how well, given inequalities in resources, pluralism could contribute towards a greater understanding of democratic politics in America. Legal equality may be counterbalanced by the unequal distribution of resources used to influence voters' choices, on the one hand, and policy-making, on the other. Dahl suggested that power in any community should be ascertained by assembling case studies of decision-making in several "issue areas" of importance to the political system.

In studying the community of New Haven, which he assumed to be generalizable to the American political community at large, because it "embodies most of the equalities and inequalities that lend this enterprise its significance" (Dahl, 1961). In 1957, the fifty largest property owners, constituting less than one-sixteenth of one percent of the taxpayers, held nearly one-third of the total assessed value of all real property in the city. In 1949 the median family income equalled roughly \$2700 a year. One family out of forty had an income of \$10,000 or more; over one family out of five had an income of less than \$1000.

Dahl ascribed six characteristics to a system of what he termed "dispersed inequalities" that are vital to his interpretation of pluralism and interest group politics:

1. Many different kinds of resources for influencing officials are available to different citizens.
2. With few exceptions, these resources are unequally distributed.
3. Individuals best off in their access to one kind of resource are often badly off with respect to many other resources.
4. No one influence resource dominates all others in all or even most key decisions.
5. With some exceptions, an influence resource is effective in some issue-areas or in some specific decisions but not in all.
6. Virtually no one, and certainly no group of more than a few individuals, is entirely lacking in some influence resource.

Dahl' study also traced historical trends: rule by Federalist aristocrats and then immigrant machine politicians who were in turn replaced by technically skilled administrators.

New Haven, once predominantly "oligarchic" evolved into more pluralistic patterns of political rule.

Dahl, in studying the political dynamics of the New Haven community, pointed out five patterns of leadership:

1. Covert integration by Economic Notables
2. An executive-centered "grand coalition of coalitions"
3. A coalition of chieftains
4. Independent sovereignties with spheres of influence
5. Rival sovereignties fighting it out.

Specific mayoral administrations usually combined a dominant historical pattern with a temporarily successful political coalition in the city. In accordance with his hypothesis, Dahl studied the formulation of public policies in areas such as education, urban renewal (redevelopment, taxes, etc.), and party nominations for public offices in New Haven. Careful analysis allowed Dahl to disprove his hypothesis that Economic Notables or elites dominate public policy. On the face of it, urban redevelopment, for instance, could be attributed to the initiative of a small handful of leaders. Yet, a scrutiny of the development elite exposed a greater involvement on the part of public officials (the Mayor and his redevelopment team) than private individuals or groups. This was a trend that showed up even in the analysis of different influences on public school education. The differences could be attributed to varying skills and temperaments and to the nature of the offices, expertise and resources available to different leaders. For instance, the mayor's role in the building of high schools was that of chief negotiator in the executive-centered coalition.

All these factors were perceived as incorporated into a trend resembling what became known as a "regime" in international relations and in the Elkin-Stone formulation of urban politics. A caveat to this is that Dahl's formulation of Who Governs? was limited by the emphasis on Mayor Lee and other politicians as individual political entrepreneurs assembling political resources, expended in pursuit of political strategies, a line of thought tending more to rational actor analysis, than to regime theory. (Krasner, 1984).

The most important limitation to Dahl's theory of pluralism and study of city politics was imposed by the "two faces of power" critique (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). According to these critics, Dahl's empirical case study approach ascertaining the scope of power was all right, as far as it went, but it missed the second face of power, control over political agendas. The critics argued that Dahl studied issues on the political agenda, but neglected to study that aspect of political power which kept other issues off the political agenda. Dahl, in discussing the difficulties inherent in a study of political power, admitted that indirect influence is more covert and does not lend itself to observation. For instance, democratic rituals like nominations for public office (discussed in Chapter 9 of Who Governs) obscure realities of power. However, Dahl and his associates were never able to deal with this criticism in a manner that was satisfactory to other political scientists (See Polsby, 1980).

Around 1970, IR theorists found themselves confronting some questions analogous to those which had confronted Dahl and his associates. Adopting the method that Dahl and other political scientists (Polsby, 1980) employed to study dynamics of political power, students of IR turned more attention to systematic case studies of decision-making in international

relations, visualized more specifically as a conger of issue areas, similar to the way in which Dahl conceived city politics and power.

In domestic politics, writers such as C. Wright Mills (national politics) and Floyd Hunter (local politics) argued that politics was controlled by a single ruling elite (Mills, 1956; Hunter, 1953). Similarly, around 1970 there was an upsurge of left-oriented, sometimes neo-Marxist criticism that the U.S. was an imperialist super-power, a sort of worldwide ruling elite, except for the Leninist bloc. The response in both cases was the same: let us take some important issue areas, do case studies of the decision-making, and see who, in fact, rules.

At this point international relations theorists had to deal with the two faces of power critique, the basic criticism of Dahl's method of studying power through empirical case studies. This is how regime theory was developed. Regime theory was an attempt to deal with the second face of power, the agenda-setting face, by postulating that values, behavioral norms, rules, and "principles" (beliefs about social causality) were to be given a place in a case study equal to the study of winning or losing on the contended issues (Krasner, 1985a, 1-21). Values, norms, rules, and principles were seen as "embedded" in the institutions and behavior of some issue area of international politics, such as international trade negotiations, for example (Ruggie, 1982). Such agenda-setting factors usually are tied to particular national interests. For instance, developed, Western states prefer to advocate a liberal regime for international trade, while many poor, third world countries prefer to advocate an anti-liberal regime of protection for less developed economies (Krasner, 1985b). Politics and political power in such international-relations regime analysis was to be analyzed, then, not only in

terms of winning or losing on the issues, but in terms of the issue-area regime, and which nations a regime apparently benefitted.

There is an understanding that regime theory incorporates the effect of norms into policy analyses; this theme is central to usage of the concept "regime" in both subdisciplines. Yet it has evolved separately -- and been applied differently -- in each field.

Regime analysis provides a different perspective from Dahl's power analysis, because one can argue that a third world country might, in general, win some trade issue, and hence have power according to Dahl. But if the overall liberal trade regime was not beneficial to the poor country, it still remains an overall loser in the power equation, even though winning on some issues on the political agenda. A regime theorist would argue that on Dahl's major issue area, urban renewal, while the mayor was in apparent control in terms of winning on the first face of power, one should give equal attention to the values, norms, and principles of the urban renewal regime. This would point out the importance of assuming the preeminence of downtown political development and of tearing down poor quality low-income housing, making losers out of some low income blacks (Dahl, 1961, 115-140).

This line of thought is reflected in Stephen D. Krasner's standard definition of "regimes" for international relations theory. "Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice." (Krasner, 1985a, p.2).

Regime theory in international relations became a tool to analyze issue areas of international politics. If some theorists argued that an imperialistic U.S.A. exercised hegemonic control over international trade issues, for instance, scholars might analyze the question in terms of a liberal trade regime, including GATT and other negotiating institutions, and the norms and values of a liberal regime (Krasner, 1985b). Using regime analysis, analysts might argue that while the U.S.A. had great power in many issue areas of international relations, it was not some kind of "power elite" dominating everything. Even so scholars are not then forced to make the vapid conclusion that there is pluralism in international relations, simply because decision-making is somewhat decentralized, with hegemonic powers forced to negotiate with other nations in the international arena. With the terminology of regime theory, one can find a certain degree of dispersal of power, but yet cite the existence of various regimes in different policy areas, with some regimes favoring great power interests. Along these lines, regimes include not only the obvious and important one of international trade, but numerous specific areas of interaction, such as telecommunications, types of environmental agreements, seabed mining rights, the governance of Antarctica, World Bank funding decisions, and so forth (Keohane, 1984).

Consequently, regime theory in IR became a kind of post-Dahl, post-pluralist analysis, which avoided the vocabulary of pluralism, which by 1975 was rejected by so many political scientists. And regime theory was an improvement over Dahl in that it had the virtue of building in the second face of power, agenda setting practices, into the very foundation of its analysis. Intense pluralism, for instance, talks about policy agendas using much the same general components as regime theory. Stated in this way, it is clear that one could take regime

theory out of IR and apply it to urban politics, or to specific issue areas of public policy, at the national or the city level. This is implied by Stephen Elkin's book City and Regime in the American Republic (1987).

C. **Regime Theory and the Systems constraints model**

Realist scholars like Morgenthau stress that ideologies or cultural factors or religions are irrelevant to the policy equation. Universal morality has no place in international politics; rather, the latter is subject to universal constraints or guiding principles based on national interest defined as power. These principles are enduring and eclipse considerations of leadership or personality, or any other variable that characterizes a certain political unit. States that are widely differing in their political, social and economic systems face very similar constraints in their drive for national power. This is, to realists, what constitutes rational policy making: prudence and practicality.

Urbanists have reconstructed this argument of international relations theory between realists, who see systemic determination of domestic policy, and theorists who argue that internal factors within a state have a great impact on its behavior in international relations (Waltz, 1964; Krasner, 1985; Keohane, 1986) and applied it to what Urban scholars describe as the economic constraints model. Governments need to survive and flourish; they devote the resources at their disposal to attract businesses and tax-paying property owners. Regardless of who is in power, the system imposes its own rules and guidelines. While state and local governments do not possess the same degree of autonomy and sovereignty as nation

states, that they perceive inter-state competition as a zero sum game. Realist assumptions may find purchase here as well.

The issue of systemic constraint versus internal differentiation applies to the behavior of a number of different types of analytical units: specific policy sectors within the international system, the state in international relations, and the city, the state government, or a particular policy area in the context of the overall system of federalism. As with the nation-state, different areas of city politics may be systemically constrained and, therefore, may be explained as resulting from internal factors without much systemic influence, or as resulting from a mixture of systemic and internal factors in which both play an important role. Peterson points out that the geographical distribution of urban-policy benefits is likely to be internally determined, (Peterson, 1981, 150). In a different study (Peterson, Rabe, and Wong, 1986), Peterson and his co-authors found that federal and urban public administrators had collaborated to control the implementation of Title I grants (federal grants to schools in poor neighborhoods). In this significant area of urban policy, policy was determined by joint action by national and local levels of government.

From this discussion, we see that in characterizing urban politics in terms of regimes, certain analytical choices are necessary. First, normally one is most concerned with theoretical assertions such as Stone's, that the basic governing structure, controlling the most important policies, has some continuing political and normative quality that is characterized as a regime. Or, we might identify some cluster of issues or activities as basic to the city, and find that there is no regime, no significant continuity in governing structures. But both international relations theorists and urban theorists generally follow Dahl's lead in dividing up political

action into various issue areas, and refusing to characterize the politics of such issue areas without some empirical evidence. In some cases, there might not be a consensus among scholars on whether control of certain issues is so basic as to constitute a "regime." If in a city that is 50% black, one coalition controlled local civil rights policy (say a city council majority), while another coalition controlled downtown development, analysts might not conclude that downtown development coalitions constitute a regime for the city as a whole. It might be plausibly argued that civil rights policy is as important as downtown development, and ultimate judgment about relative importance could be largely subjective.

Both Peterson and Stone, therefore, are making a judgment that control over taxation and economic development is basic to city politics. Peterson admits that other issue areas are often controlled by various coalitions, usually not systemically determined, but he does not regard these as important as development, at least in his work City Limits. An urban regime theorist, on the other hand, may very well admit that both basic issues and peripheral issues are somewhat systemically constrained, but yet argue that there is enough internal differentiation to insure the existence of a single regime. One might take the position, for instance, that there is only partial systemic constraint in several different issue areas, but that coalitions vary among these areas, and that none of the coalitions or issue areas is so basic as to constitute a single governing regime.

Some cities might be characterized by the old-fashioned model of an incoherent pluralism of ad hoc coalitions, one of the alternative models proposed by Dahl (1961) and Polsby (1963).

An important resolution of the theoretical problem of understanding system constraint on the governance of constituent states is Peter Katzenstein's theory of corporatism in Small States in World Markets (1985). His model is similar to the City Limits model, except for a greater emphasis on internal differentiation. Katzenstein argues that the macroeconomic policies of seven European states (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands) have been strongly constrained by the realities of the international system of trade, and that this economic constraint has produced corporatist decision making. Corporatism may be understood as a system in which leaders of political, business, and labor hierarchies jointly negotiate macroeconomic decisions. The theory of corporatism is relevant to this discussion, because it admits both the realities of systemic constraint and of internal differentiation. Small states in world markets may adopt a similar decision-making pattern, but their policies are hardly homogenous. Corporatism may be biased in the direction of business or towards socialism. The different corporatist nations in different ways develop an economic niche for their economy in competition with much larger economies. Denmark invests in agricultural exports, Switzerland in watches and in international banking, Norway in oil, and so forth.

The City Limits model puts forth a strong argument that egalitarian policies initiated by cities are severely constrained by systemic competition for economic development. (The empirical limits of this point are illustrated by a report that the city of New York spends \$500 million annually in benefits for the homeless. New York Times, July 6, 1993.) But the analogy of corporatism indicates other significant and interesting questions not addressed by Peterson. It's not as if hundreds of cities are engaged in some joint auction, in competition

to bid down tax rates. In fact, while constrained by systemic competition, cities (like small states) are pursuing economic development by finding an economic niche, a comparative advantage, which is pursued through development of initial resources, and evolves as competitors tacitly acknowledge one another's economic "turf." One basic conclusion to city-limits theory is an analysis of how cities select their particular economic niches, and a further analysis of what such niche selection implies for a city's politics and policy-making.

A city pursuing the niche of developing a gambling and entertainment complex may raise taxes to increase police services and build roads and airports, expecting to recoup the expenditures through taxation of gambling. A city pursuing the location of high-tech research, such as small biotechnology firms, may not minimize taxes, but feel free to spend to develop professional-class amenities, such as excellent schools, and park development to provide opportunities for healthful exercise. Such a city may pursue zoning policies which will prevent the construction of lower middle-class housing; while it might increase the tax base in the short run, this might bring into the city limits residents not desired by scientific and technical workers. Do such niches actually exist? What are their main types among the American cities? What do they mean in terms of politics and policy-making? Could we thus speak of different regimes within the city-limits systemic constraints? (See Wong, 1990). These questions, made obvious through a comparison to standard works in international relations, seem to be important extensions of Peterson's and Stone's model.

The system constraints model is obviously linked to the question of corporatism. European small states were led to adopt corporatist decision-making because adversarial groups saw a need to cooperate in light of such threats as fascism in the 1930's, communism in the 1940's,

and the relatively great resources commanded by the United States, France, and Great Britain. One might speak of these small states as suffering from endemic stress in international trade and national security. Similarly, as American cities have generally suffered increasing fiscal stress in the last several decades, one might assume that the adoption of corporatist decision making, or at least major movements towards regimes of inclusive cooperation, would be one of the major trends in current urban politics. A trend towards municipal corporatism, or at least cooperative pluralism, might seem likely as corporatist writers have argued that the fragmented, decentralized model of pluralism, popularized by writers such as Dahl, Truman, and Polsby, is not more "natural" or basic than the corporatist model (Truman, 1951; Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963; Schmitter, 1974; Katzenstein, 1985; Clarke, 1986; Ferman, 1990; McFarland, 1993).

Other issues raised by international and comparative theory of corporatism seem relevant to the study of cities. For instance, Japan and France are governed by cooperative coalitions among business leaders, elected politicians, and powerful bureaucrats; such cooperation is referred to as "statism," not corporatism. Normally, corporatism requires that a national labor federation be part of the basic consulting body (Katzenstein, 1985). This reminds one of Stone's description of Atlanta as governed by a coalition of business, elected politicians, and administrators, with labor officials and civil rights leaders not included. Cooperation in Atlanta is not corporatist.

If fiscal stress produces corporatism in cities, then one must distinguish between the Atlanta model, and one in which a third, powerful group, less oriented to market values, is a basic part of the cooperative decision-making process. Such a third group might be a central

federation of labor, a coordinating body of African-American or Hispanic-American leaders, or a federation of environmentalist lobbies. (In contrast to Europe, environmental lobbyists in America are roughly as influential as labor leaders.)

In American cities, theoretically one might have a corporatism of as many as five constituencies. If there is a trend to corporatism in the cities, as one would expect from city-limits theory, then in some cases corporatist regimes might be established. Such regimes would go beyond a simple, temporary, mutual consultation process, and would embed such a process in norms, values, beliefs, and rules about the virtues of the consultation process. Local or urban corporatist regimes would be distinguished from the pattern of bargaining among interest groups in Washington, in which lobbyists operate as hired agents, not constrained to loyalty to some community of residence.

Such an interaction among lobbyists, based on contracts and exchange relationships, is particularly resistant to corporatist group patterns, especially as American interest groups are not organized in inclusive, hierarchical national federations (Heinz, *et al.*, 1993; McFarland, 1993; Schmitter, 1974). Corporatism is more likely to appear in cities under fiscal stress than in national policy areas, because adversarial factions in city politics mostly live in the same community, or at least feel some loyalty to the common welfare of their urban community, and thus have some incentive to cooperate in the face of enduring conflicts of interest. At any rate, references to international relations theory imply that questions such as these are basic to the study of urban politics and policy in America today.

D. **Different Units of Analysis in the Application of Regime Theory in an Issue-Area**

Krasner's definition of regime theory incorporates norms into the set of behavioral variables that explain decision making in an issue area. Such norms, established at an international level provide national-level actors with certain minimal guidelines or criteria for policy making. One could, then, judge the ubiquity of some regime in the international arena by studying the extent of conformity to the principles of that regime on the part of national actors. For instance, one could evaluate the free trade regime by doing a case study of GATT (General Agreement on tariffs and Trade), since GATT, more than agreements like the NAFTA or the European Community (EC), embodies the absolute -- versus relative -- gains from trade. Another area of interest is that of human rights, embodied in institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

International movements, such as nationalism, Leninism, religious fundamentalism, and human rights doctrines affect the course of politics of individual nations. But of course the linkage is even closer between social movements within a particular national system, and their expression within the individual city. Internationally, events, doctrines, and leaders serve as models for imitators within individual countries. The same point holds for individual cities in which national social movements prescribe patterns of behavior to be imitated by local citizens. For instance, the national civil rights movement provided models for action for a local social movement in the city of Milwaukee to protest police brutality (Wolliver, 1993). At the same time, the national movement ties is to the international movement towards abolition of the slave trade across the Atlantic, which preceded the movement towards full emancipation. The regime was bolstered by some of the most powerful states in the

nineteenth century, including Britain. In fact, Britain played a hegemonic role in coercing other states such as Brazil and Portugal to abandon slave trading practices, monitoring and maintaining a regime it had established through several treaties (Krasner, 1993).

National social movements can precipitate local social movements, even if there is no direct organizing. Such local social movements have the potential to change the city regime, or establish a new one, or establish a pattern of regime and counter-regime in cycles. Such social movements are often opposed to the norms of commercial urban regimes, such as downtown business regimes, for as movements, they tend to stress the role of identity (blacks, Hispanics) or some conception of community interest as in environmentalism or the Progressive reformers (Miranda, Rosdil, and Yeh, 1992). On the other hand, commercial regimes may strive to discredit local social movements (Wolliver, 1993), or as in the case of the Atlanta regime, may adapt by coopting new elements into the governing structure, which, however, functions according to the same norms as formerly. The study of social movements is not well incorporated into our study of the functioning of American political institutions, so that it is not unusual that a secondary question, such as the relationship of national to local social movements, has not been systematically incorporated into the urban politics literature. Nevertheless, this question is a fundamental one for the study of the city, as the analogy to international relations studies demonstrates.

A regime may be said to have a dominant principle (Alexander, 1989; Mcfarland and Yarnold, 1993). This may be defined as a specific pattern of beliefs and norms central to the regime, more central than a list of all of the beliefs, norms, values, and rules which might be identified. For instance, in the policy area of the implementation of American asylum policy

during 1980-88, the dominant principle was that refugees from Communist countries and other opponents of the U.S. were to be favored over refugees from governments defined as friendly to the U.S. The dominant principle was reflected in that practically all refugees from Cuba and the Soviet Union were given asylum, but practically none from Haiti, Guatemala, or El Salvador got asylum (Yarnold, 1990). The dominant principle in a liberal international trade regime is the theory of comparative advantage and the free market. The dominant principle in the international regime to govern Antarctica is that no state is allowed to claim territory in that continent, or the internationalization of land there. The dominant principle in the domestic policy regimes of peanut and tobacco growing is that production is limited to those holding permits granted about 50 years ago. The dominant principle in the Atlanta governing regime is to enhance the economic interests of the downtown business district. In the traditional urban political machine, the dominant principle is the exchange relationship among the machine's supporters and those elected to political office by the organization.

Regimes are based in coalitions which behave according to certain norms, values, and beliefs. The regime coalition is weakened if these ideas lose their legitimacy and/or empirical validity. If the regime's dominant principle is thus undermined, the regime may be expected to change rapidly. For instance, with the end of the Cold War, American asylum policy changed rapidly and nonincrementally to admit fewer refugees from the former Soviet Union, and more from Central America (McFarland and Yarnold, 1993).

The rapidly spreading belief in deregulation undermined regulatory regimes, bringing rapid policy change (Derthick and Quirk, 1985). In terms of urban politics, a downtown business regime would be undermined in the case of a small city if major shopping centers

opened outside the city limits, rendering the downtown business district no longer a significant commercial force. The patronage political organization was undermined by the growth of the federal welfare system, a more efficient source of benefits to the poor and needy, and by the increasing socialization of voters into norms of individualistic political choice, as opposed to choice limited by traditional loyalties.

Puchala and Hopkins use the term distributive bias (described in Chapter 2) to describe regimes that prioritize values based on the interests of the participatory members. Given the uneven power capabilities of actors within a regime, there is a corresponding inequality in terms of benefits to be received from compliance with that regime. Regimes benefit those who dominate it, and the distributive pattern of benefits is in a sense institutionalized and legitimized by its incorporation in that regime. Weaker members tend to be exploited, their interests subordinated to those of the stronger members. Compliance may be imposed or simply a function of the weight assigned by the weaker members to the costs of noncompliance. Though used in IR, this reads as an adequate analysis of the "machine politics" model in urban studies.

A counter-regime may be defined as a possible substitute regime that is opposed to the dominant principle of some regime (McFarland and Yarnold, 1993). A counter-regime to the Cold War principle in asylum policy would be the granting of asylum according to abstract criteria (likelihood of death or imprisonment if returned) without giving weight to the foreign policies of the home country (Yarnold, 1990). A counter-regime in the peanut and tobacco growing areas would be a return to the free market. A counter-regime to the liberal regime in international trade would be one giving special protection to the economies of third-

world nations (Krasner, 1985b). Progressive reformers set up counter-regimes to the political machine in states such as California, Oregon, and Washington. A counter-regime in Atlanta would be governance by an egalitarian regime, favoring more spending in the neighborhoods (including white areas) and increasing spending for the needs of the poor.

In regime theory, one may find cycles from regime to counter-regime. Then a core of the analysis is to determine how these cycles operate. This is most clear in public policy analysis, in which many policy regimes seem to have cycles between rule by subgovernment (interest group, executive agency, congressional subcommittee acting in coalition) to intervention by reform forces, acting in "the public interest" to limit control by "the iron triangle" (McFarland, 1990). In international relations, there have been historical cycles between regimes of autarchic international trade (e.g. the Depression era) and liberal trade (after 1945).

This observation is helpful for the study of city politics. There are classes of cities which, until recently, would swing back and forth between patronage regimes and reform regimes. In the current era, one type of city might cycle between progressive¹-egalitarian regimes, often led by black mayors, to downtown-business regimes, operating more closely to Peterson's city-limits theory. This observation helps us to deal with questions of urban politics, such as: in the case of Chicago, was Harold Washington's unprecedented regime really a "regime," if it lasted for only 5 1/2 years? According to the theory here, Washington's regime was a counter-regime to the normally prevalent downtown-business regime, which was more of a city-limits type, emphasizing the construction of massive public

¹For a definition of the term progressive, see Chapter.6.

works (Ferman & Grimshaw, 1992). While not existing in the last five years, the counter-regime could be a latent political force, existing as an understanding of what coalition might overturn the Daley administration in a mayoral election, and what policies might follow such a victory.

The significance of this latent counter-regime is a question which can be discussed empirically. For instance, the Harold Washington electoral coalition included almost all of the black vote, combined with a majority of the white gentry vote, and a majority of the Hispanic vote. One can then analyze the possibility of some other candidate organizing such a coalition to bring back the counter-regime; one such person was Carol Moseley Braun, who was enthusiastically backed by a coalition of feminists, black voters, and the Daley led city government in her exit from Chicago politics to the U.S. Senate. If a regime is based on a coherent coalition, and if it possesses some dominant principle, it need not hold power for long to be an element in the analysis of urban politics, in the same sense that the Kerensky regime held power for only a few months, but is important for the understanding of Russian history.

Yet another application may be found in Charles Lindblom's Politics and Markets; he compares the relationship between giant multinational companies (MNCs) and small nations to that which exists between Big Business and state and local governments. In both cases, economic interests frequently hold policy hostage, with an implicit understanding that it is in a government's interests to compete with other governments in wooing business opportunities its way. This seems to evidence a pervasive economic ideology that is constant across all levels of analysis, guiding policy makers at local as well as national levels.

E. **Regime Theory and Levels of Analysis Approach**

Another way to study regimes at an urban level would utilize an International Relations theoretical construct termed "Levels of Analysis". International Relations theory breaks down explanations of international events into three main categories:

1. System
2. State
3. Individual

This approach pertains to what kind of questions are most useful; "Are bipolar systems more politically stable or less war-prone than multipolar systems?" It also pertains to the sort of answers or explanations offered, for example the sort of factors used to explain foreign policy decisions or political events. Analysts of foreign policy may believe that decision makers are influenced by the type of political system they serve under- whether democratic or authoritarian.

The implications of this distinction between different levels is not so much that one is better than another, but that analyses on different levels may lead to distinctly different conclusions and theories regarding the relationship between the explanatory factors and events being analyzed.

A brief explanation of each level follows:

1. **System**

A "top down" approach, where the primary focus is on external events, on the world political environment that is claimed to determine patterns of interaction. This level derives from systems theory; system analysts claim that any system operates in predictable

ways. eg. the solar system (Kaplan, 1979). Configuration of the system therefore determines certain rules of international behaviour. These are not laws, but pressures or tendencies such as the fact that systems tend to be relatively stable. Change may be slow (evolutionary) or revolutionary.

2. State

The state is still considered the most powerful actor on world stage, the fundamental decision-making unit in international law. At this level, analysts are concerned with characteristics of states such as geographical size, size of economy, type of political system, type of economic system, etc.

Identifying patterns or relationships among these characteristics and relating them to external events often leads scholars to some interesting correlations, such as linking internal unrest and foreign conflict, economic development and patterns of cooperation and, interesting hypotheses (Ray, 1995), such as personalist regimes (rather than centrist or polyarchic) are more likely to engage in foreign conflict when faced with domestic unrest. Or, that the United States is more likely to be assertive in its foreign policy when the economy is not doing well (Ostrom and Job, 1986 ; Russett, 1990; James and Oneal 1991) or in the event of loss of support from the president's political party (Morgan and Bickers, 1992).

3. Individual

"No social laws operate independently of human understanding; all explanations can be reduced to the level of the individual and couched in terms of the nature and intentions of these actors." (Little, 1985, p.74) This approach covers a variety of explanations based in psychological and biological theories of aggression and human nature, for instance, that wars

occur because human are evil, and that we are doomed to conflict because it is merely the product of our nature. (Waltz, 1959, p.3) Also included in this level is the Humans-as-Individuals Approach that touts, for example, the "Great Man" theory in history. Other factors include considerations of mental and physical health, personal experiences that often serve to establish belief systems² or "operational codes". The latter play an important role in formulation of policy; frequently there is too much information to be processed. At such times, policy makers rely on their beliefs or perceptual screens to interpret information. For analysts of world events, these can be invaluable in trying to explain state actions that have proven irrational in terms of being disastrous for the state in question. for example, belief systems might explain the following anomalies in foreign policy making: FDR had information that could have led him to conclude that there would be a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Stalin had received warnings before June 1941 that the Germans were about to attack the USSR. Truman had information from which he could anticipated Chinese intervention in the Korean War if MacArthur led his troops into North Korea.

Obviously, a general theory about such belief systems is more welcome than breaking each event down as attributable to individual personalities of these leaders. However, personal and biographical information does help us understand some momentous events better. This approach has some application in the analysis of urban politics, studied from different levels. A systems approach would involve the same considerations as expounded in the material earlier in "System Constraints", namely that the system imposes its own constraints upon

²eg. International Relations scholars are of the opinion that "lessons of Munich" might have dictated Truman's dictates in Korea, or JFK's in Cuba.

policy makers who, regardless of ideology or personality or individual preference, are subject to its laws.

At a state level, the application parallels the study of political culture, an idea introduced by Gabriel Almond who used it to study the concept of political socialization, or in other words, "attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system" (Almond and Verba, 1963) in a comparative cross-analysis of the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico. This concept was developed aggressively by Daniel Elazar (1972) to study urban America in terms of differences in states or regions and attendant political cultures. Elazar views American political culture as an amalgam of three political subcultures: moralistic, individualistic and traditionalistic.

Moralistic political culture is exemplified by communities in New England, where religious groups such as the Puritans exerted a great deal of influence. Governmental intervention, when seen as working towards the public good, is accepted as positive and legitimate. Individualistic political culture is seen in the Middle States, in establishment of freehold farms, banking commerce, manufacturing and politics, vying for personal liberty and wealth. Governments's role is primarily to support and maintain a market economy. Intervention for reform might come about as a response to public pressure or consumer demand, in that sense. Traditionalistic culture is embodied in what may be described as the feudal aristocracy of the south, based on a plantation economy run by slave labor. Not surprisingly, this culture institutionalizes social hierarchy and an elitist tradition of the old boy's club, with an emphasis on factional and personality-oriented politics. Political power

is not solely attributed to elected officials, and there is much hostility towards bureaucracies on account of the competition over turf that is bound to ensue³.

Elazar traces this development back to three main migratory movements that moved across early settlers westward across the northern, middle and southern portions of the country. A certain degree of interaction among these groups did not negate the development of distinct ethnic and religious cultural identities and subsequent political orientation. Subsequent immigrants tended to adapt to existing political cultures or in fact settled in a certain region because they found that culture to be compatible with their own set of beliefs. Elazar's exhaustive study of this idea goes a long way in explaining policy outcomes in different cities, whether Chicago or Minneapolis or Nashville.

While considered very promising in explaining comparative and intrastate politics⁴, the idea of political culture as an explanatory variable in accounting for factors like voter turnout, interparty competition, political efficacy⁵, etc., has been ignored in recent urban politics literature. For instance, it would certainly be useful in explaining why cities on the west coast (eg. San Francisco) seem to have more of a capacity for generating "reform" regimes.

³I find it interesting that Clarence Stone observed this in Governing Atlanta, but did not acknowledge the existing intellectual tradition that predicted this trend.

⁴This brings to mind a quote by V.O.Key that the "political distance from Virginia to Alabama must be measured in light years". V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics, 1949, New York: Vintage Books, p.36

⁵See "Political Culture, Interparty Competition and Political Efficacy in the American States", Russell Hanson, in Political Culture, Public Policy and the American States, 1982, ed. John Kincaid.

Lastly, at the individual level, policy could be explained as a product of the dynamics of interaction between major players at the legislative and executive level. Perhaps whether a certain mayor can sell his ideas to the city council is largely a function of his personality and charisma and his support base in the city, at least as perceived by the other actors. It is a factor that is taken into account when analyzing presidential strength or effectiveness. I think that the argument endures to an appreciable extent even given differences between federal and local or city decision making structures. Jeffrey Pressman, in Federal Programs and City Politics (1975), uses the "operational codes" phenomenon to describe and analyze the relationship between federal and city officials. Policy makers, in an effort to deal with either the absence -- or glut -- of information they receive, use their "images" of their counterparts at the federal or local level. These images may be based on a collage of knowledge, bias, prejudice, assumptions, etc. For instance, American foreign policy makers relied strongly on their image of Soviet policy makers (such as Khrushchev) during situations such as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1961 to formulate an appropriate set of responses. These images or belief systems have provided as much of a foreign policy guideline as has other pertinent information about a given situation.

F. Conclusion

The regime concept was sparked by the legacy of the pluralist theory of power of the 1960s, as international relations theorists sought to deal with conceptually similar problems. Consequently, it is no surprise that regime theory can be taken back out of international relations theory and applied to parallel problems in the domestic politics fields of public

policy studies and urban politics. This is one perspective on the intellectual background of the work of Elkin and Stone.

In addition, Peterson's City Limits presents theoretical issues analogous to the systemic determination versus internal differentiation issue in the study of international relations. Katzenstein's version of corporatist theory is a resolution of this level of analysis problem to describe the behavior of some small states in the international system, and urban politics theory may develop a similar solution. Regime theory's use of the concepts of counter-regime, dominant principle, cycles in regimes and in federalism, and ideas about alliance formation and social movements should also be of interest to scholars of urban and national politics. Communications gaps among subdisciplines of political science have unnecessarily slowed down the progress of research and theory and need do so no longer.

VI. CASE STUDIES IN LINKAGE

A. Justification for the Study

This chapter features three case studies, of GATT and the liberal trade regime, of trade policy of the United States from the post-World War II era to the present day, and economic development policy in San Francisco, and is useful in illustrating four major points:

1. An analysis of these three kinds of policies allows an understanding of regime theory operating at the urban, national and international level. It makes an excellent argument for resolving the debate between internal differentiation (eg. comparative foreign policy) and system constraints models (eg. neorealist or structural models) vis-a-vis their respective claims to understanding the policy process.
2. Trade policy has always fallen into the purview of Foreign Policy analysis, and reflects primarily the theoretical underpinnings of IR theory. Yet, the theoretical advances in this area apply just as easily to explaining the dynamics of urban politics as they do to national or international politics.
3. A regime is not just a set of decision making rules; it also embodies certain beliefs, norms and ideas that influence policy making in domestic and international spheres. The use of regime theory to analyze the three cases below helps resolve the tension between neorealists who pursue a mechanistic approach to state behaviour, and institutionalists, who emphasize the role of non-state actors and non-material influences.

4. The following issue areas (trade, economic development) provide a useful medium in which to ascertain the existence of a regime, given the controversy over whether a regime can be said to exist at all apart from in the minds of social science theorists trying to explain aspects of social behaviour that do not conform to standard paradigms. GATT, for instance, has inspired compliance for the most part in its member states (that cannot always be explained away by considerations of self-interest), this notwithstanding occasional violations of GATT rules. The U.S.' post-World War II trade policy, as a dependent variable, is best explained with reference to regime variables (ideas, interests and institutions), as is any urban policy we would care to examine, such as housing or education or economic development.

B. Introduction

This chapter attempts to draw parallels between policymaking at international, national and urban levels in the sense that policymakers at all three levels are subjected to similar categories of constraints and influences. In pursuance with this goal, the chapter incorporates three case studies: international policy as reflected in negotiations within the liberal trade regime, an analysis of U.S. foreign trade policy, and urban policy within the issue of economic development, taking into consideration the pressures brought to bear on these areas of government at external and domestic levels. By external pressures I refer to those imposed by a regime on nations, national or local government, which includes factors such as a sense of obligation to other members of that regime, behavioral constraints imposed by those members by way of social pressure, influence of habit and custom, perceptions of mutual

obligation and a sense of community that fosters certain responsibilities and tempers totally self-interested behaviour. By domestic I refer to the pressures that impinge on the policy agenda from sources within the political unit, such as congressmen or city council members, electoral considerations, presidential or mayoral initiatives, interest groups, etc.

These influences are subsumed under the categories of ideas, interests and institutions for each level of policymaking, and contribute towards a general understanding of regime theory. Regimes come into existence when states re-evaluate their concerns with immediate self-interest based on their accruing knowledge about some issue area and institute rules and mutual obligations in compliance with convergent beliefs and ideas about that issue area. I believe that an understanding of regime theory is incomplete without reference to the part played by these three factors. Under the heading of "Interests" I provide arguments for realist, power-based variables, while institutionalists and cognitive theorists make a case for "Institutions" and "Ideas" respectively.

The distinction between interests and ideas is sometimes a tenuous one; but what I am trying to show here is the dialectics between these three components. For instance, a government might find it in its best interests to be protectionist. So what does the term interests mean here? In this case I tend to use it to denote material interests, pressures brought upon any policy by powerful groups who have a stake in the pertinent policy. As opposed to those interests, there are the interests of foreign firms who want to get in, or some domestic firms that think that their best interests are served by an open market.

Secondly, I believe ideas exist independent of the interests that perhaps created them. Market liberalism is the sacred cow of the western, developed world and the idea has begun

to impact on economic policies of developing nations as well. For the U.S., it is not just an idea that is propounded by some part of the electorate; it is a powerful guideline for national policy that has some sort of a higher appeal or legitimacy that leaders cannot afford to ignore. And third, institutions reflect the interests that created them, and they breed modes of behavior that can be compelling even in the absence of an enforcing authority. Institutions created to serve hegemonic powers may be coopted over time by lesser powers, and the institutional structure used to further the political agenda of these less powerful states. Why do the greater or hegemonic powers allow it? The answer is not to be found in one simple facet of IR theory. The key to understanding regimes certainly lies in an understanding of the ideas, interests and institutions involved in any issue area. Regime theory thus serves to illuminate the complexity of factors that impinge on any given policy agenda. This should become clearer in the following sections.

It is generally acknowledged that economic policy represents a "hybrid" (Cohen, 1968) of politics and economics. Yet economic analyses, or the professionalist school stresses the distinct and incompatible aspects of political and economic analyses¹. Economic rationalization is supposed to provide the basis for optimal policy-making. A deviation from the latter is attributed to the "political" process, involving inputs from "noncompetitive societal groups", with few attempts to genuinely understand the dynamics of this process.²

¹An exception to this might be the "endogenous theory of tariffs" which incorporates social demands for protection within a general model of trade theory. It highlights political variables that determine the range and extent of a tariff.

²A corollary to this would be the argument that absence of (expected) trade shifts reflect "lags" between interest and policy. (Discontinuity is said to occur when the institutions created to serve special interests develop their own sense of professional norms, much like the

This is a problem that Urban scholars have been struggling to come to terms with as well. Judith Goldstein accuses both the economic and interest group approaches of this type of short-sightedness that overlooks considerations of systematic (as versus ad hoc and propitiatory) state policy. I believe that the policy process is complex enough to defy easy explanation but that it is not primarily random or ad-hoc such that it might be dismissed as "political" deviation from some established norm. Regime theory captures those complexities within its analytical framework of principles, norms, rules and procedures, and makes a very credible case for representing a theory of political authority³. "Authority is another name for the willingness and capacity of individuals to submit to the necessities of cooperative systems." (Barnard, 1968)

C. **Three Levels of Policy Making**

1. **GATT: A Case Study of International Policy**

a. **Background:**

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has come to embody the principles and rules underlying the liberal trade regime⁴ since its inception in 1947. It has seen the triumphant conclusion of eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations

administrative agencies entrusted with regulatory functions avoiding "capture".

³"... authority rests on a form of legitimacy that ultimately can derive only from a community of interests." John G. Ruggie, "international regimes, transactions and change: embedded liberalism in the post-war economic order" in International Regimes ed. by Stephen Krasner, (1983).

⁴The section on "Ideas" explicates the rationale behind the establishment of a liberal trade order.

and disputes; the initial six rounds were concerned mainly with reduction of tariffs (from 25 percent to 40 percent on manufactured goods immediately after WWII, then to an average of 10 percent by 1970, and to an average of 5 percent or 6 percent for industrial countries in the Tokyo Round). GATT faces significant problems as regards issues like noncompliance, MFN status and free riders, regionalism and dispute settlement. Nevertheless, these are eclipsed by the fact that the regime has survived, even through times like the early 1980s which saw the worst global recession since 1930s, with countries clamoring for increased levels of protectionism. I explore the different components of this regime- and the obstacles it faces- under the categories of Ideas, Interests and Institutions.

b. **Ideas**

Under classical theories of trade first stated in the eighteenth century, active governmental intervention to restrict free trade, whether domestically or internationally, would result in a net absolute loss for all concerned, assuming that all valued higher (rather than lower) levels of production and consumption. Adam Smith presented an appealing philosophy of economic production in his book An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Altruism was not needed to push society ahead on its path to economic betterment; if the force of self-interest were allowed to operate, individual efforts and skills could be harnessed to ensure production of most goods.

Import restrictions go back to the old mercantilist doctrines that saw regulation of trade as a means to accumulating wealth. Modern-day protectionists rarely invoke the old mercantilist arguments, but they sometimes invoke balance-of-trade as an end in itself, that

justifies such import barriers. They assert the need to save jobs, the costs of adjustment owing to increases in imports and the need to give domestic firms the chance to modernize.

The concept of "rent-seeking" is really useful in providing an understanding of current trade policy. Rent seeking is the pursuit, involving the expenditure of resources, of transfer payments (or monopoly franchises) from the government. As with any economic activity, rent-seeking will be pursued more vigorously the higher its expected rate of return, and the lower the costs of seeking protection. In other words, there is certainly a market for protection, with suppliers and consumers (Cagan, 1987).

Nations benefit largely under assumptions of "static conditions"⁵ which hold all domestic factors of production (land and other resources, labor, capital) to be in fixed supply. No two countries are exactly alike in natural resources, climate or work force. These differences give each country some sort of an edge over others in some products. The resulting "theory of comparative advantage" is rife with implications about the gains to be had from engaging in trade:

Trade results in increased income for all the participants; the world market provides an opportunity to buy some goods at relative prices that are lower than those that would prevail at home in the absence of trade. How is this possible? A country can gain by exporting commodities that it produces using its abundant factors of production most intensively, while importing those goods whose production would require relatively more of the scarcer factors of production. That is, using the principle of "specialization" or of

⁵Ricardo did develop an explicit dynamic model of growth and trade, relating to "gains from growth".

"division of labor", people produce some goods that they sell to others in exchange for goods they want to consume.

People place different marginal valuations on scarce goods. The basis for trade is that a country's labor, capital, and other resources are not equally efficient in every field of enterprise. The goods for which a country's production resources are especially effective, and which consequently have relatively low unit cost and price, are the ones which will be exported, while goods that are relatively expensive to produce at home will be imported. In a sense, this is an extension of Ricardian price theory (a cost of production theory where all factors of production were reducible to labor or technology of production) to international trade⁶.

If trade depends on the comparative cheapness of products in different countries, then the concept of cheapness must be elucidated. If goods are produced competitively in each country, money costs of producing those goods will reflect quantities of land, labor, capital and other resources employed in production. These costs are reflected in prices. So costs of goods are a function of the physical resources required to produce them. So for instance, a country with a lower ratio of the "wage-fund" to the supply of land would have a comparative advantage in agricultural products, and hence export these in return for imports of manufactures under conditions of free trade.

⁶It is obviously unreal to treat a day's labor in one country as equal to a day's labor in another. But the assumption of equal labor equality is not essential to the argument. Just as Ricardo could convert "skilled" labor into equivalent units of "standard" or unskilled labor to arrive at an acceptable theory of prices, international differences in labor productivity may be accounted for in the context of international trade.

This does not reflect absolute levels of productive efficiency of the economies concerned. But productivity advantages are relative and usually uneven -- so it is viable to concentrate on producing those goods in which the productivity advantage is the highest, i.e., in which there exists a "comparative advantage", and to import those goods in which the advantage is the least.

The principle applies within nations as well as between them; within a nation for instance, one may find cases of "regional specialization". Another advantage of this is theorized as follows: Suppose that region A enjoys an "absolute" advantage in everything, but a comparative advantage in good X. The people in A enjoy a higher standard of living (than region B) since real wage rates, which are based on actual productivity, will be higher too. Region B (its trading partner) has a comparative advantage in good Y, where its absolute disadvantage is least. Not only can A and B trade (reaching favorable price ratio⁷ levels) but this economic situation will stimulate migration of capital and labor from B to A for higher profits and wage levels respectively. The flux will continue till until productivity levels and income levels are roughly equal in the two regions. Thus, in the long run, differences in absolute productivity levels among regions tend to be eliminated by movement of labor and other resources toward the high-productivity regions.

Another gain from trade is the increase in total output which results from each region - - or country -- specializing in the goods in which it enjoys a comparative advantage. This is in contrast to people only self-sufficiently producing what they intend to consume.

⁷In international relations this is called "terms of trade", defined simply as the price a country receives for its exports to the prices it must pay for its imports.

Free trade also stimulates competition within participants; producers, in an effort to win over the market, try and offer consumers quality goods at competitive prices. In terms of price, quality and total output, the classical model of free trade sees everyone as better off under these conditions. Hence, governments should try to minimize restrictions on free trade in order to maximize aggregate production and consumption of goods.

Other suggested benefits from trade include increased domestic savings formation and foreign capital inflows, improved quality of entrepreneurship resulting from exposure to foreign competition and access to new technology and methods of production.

As a final political argument, free trade helps ease friction between countries and promotes understanding and cooperation in possibly other fields as well (what functionalists would term a "spillover" effect). It is an economic incentive for good relations, and inculcates a trend that can spiral into more and fruitful forms of global cooperation.

What is the thrust of these ideas? That in this era of growing interdependence -- defined as societal, economic and political sensitivity to events in and pressures from other countries (Pastor,) -- nations need to structure foreign economic policies geared towards fulfilling a broader understanding of national interest. Conventional self-interest considerations have been over-represented in analyses of foreign policy legislation. They no longer suffice to explain policy outcomes in areas that are considered "globally interdependent" such as trade, investment, environment, etc. The idea of a more "long-term" rationality is better geared to explain current policy.

On the other hand, increased interdependence has not necessarily meant greater cooperation or stability or even peace. The OPEC pricing revolution is testimony to this

"dangerous" aspect of interdependence. The equation is made more complex by the inclusion of two factors: an increased number of actors (with the capacity to do "substantial harm to the world economy") and greater uncertainty about policy trade-offs. The evolution and establishment of an international regime, with a set of rules, procedures and norms that preserve order and viewed as being just and fair to all concerned, is of increasing importance (Hart, 1983).

For instance, developing nations seek a more equitable institutional arrangement for trade policies than what they find in GATT. Developing nations are far more likely to support UNCTAD, with its espousal of preferential treatment of developing economies, though the Tokyo round of GATT negotiations did incorporate norms and suggestions for special privileges for LDCs. Consider some of the arguments put forth in this area:

The Strategic Trade Policy argument observes that given increasing returns and imperfect competition, certain firms in some industries may be able to earn returns higher than the opportunity costs of the resources they utilize. For example, if the economies of scale argument deems room for only one profitable industry in the world market, then a country can raise its national income at the expense of other countries if it can ensure that this firm is domestic rather than foreign.

Differentiation in products is another process in which larger economies are advantaged. Smaller economies (Belgium, Sweden) might be able to produce standardized products on long production runs, but differentiated products are usually tackled by economic entities that can handle production that is on a large scale and varied as well.

Countries that held patents for new and innovative technology would also have an advantage in trade. However, given the quick pace of technology development (and transfer), this may work only in the short run. An example would be Britain's once-flourishing textile industry; now, it is almost out of the textile business. Related to this is the recent crisis in America's manufacturing technology; traditional mass-production techniques that once gave the U.S. an edge over other producers, are now considered "massively inefficient". By utilizing and refining ideas that have their origin in the U.S., Japanese manufacturers have instituted practices (some call it the "Ohno" system after Taiichi Ohno who guided it in the Toyota factories) that cut costs and shorten production time while raising quality. The emphasis here is on processes, not products. (The same argument probably extends to U.S.-China negotiations over piracy of American technology and products). Whatever the underlying principle, the U.S. is hurrying to catch up to this level of manufacturing sophistication while protecting its markets.

Perhaps countries with developed educational infrastructures and institutions for research can boast of a larger supply of scientists and engineers and skilled labor in general, giving them a science-oriented advantage. Government can highlight "dynamic" economies of scale by investing in technology research for domestic industries. Governments that have the resources to offer such services have an advantage over others; this again is a case of government supporting its firms in international competition and using trade to raise its level of welfare at other nations' expense. All these are powerful arguments that affect developing nations' decisions to participate in a regime, given the knowledge of their structurally disadvantaged status in the issue area in question.

Some economists (Prebisch, Singer) feel that the gains from trade are biased against low-income countries. Terms of trade of producers of primary goods (LDCs) are unfavorable compared to the terms of trade of manufactured-goods producers, resulting in a long-term transfer of income from developing to developed nations. Even if technological progress were to raise productivity in primary sectors geared for export (where domestic consumption does not change significantly), this would generate no benefits since the purchasing power in terms of importables is declining.

On the demand side, lower income elasticity for primary products (as compared to that of manufactured goods) is seen as constraining growth or imposing lower growth on developing rather than developed countries. It is suggested that there is an inherent tendency on the part of primary producers to payments deficits, currency depreciation and terms of trade deterioration.

Owing to the falling relative prices of exportables, along with the additional pressure of population growth, labor in LDCs is not able to enjoy higher wages stemming from productivity gains. (The wages of the industrial worker in the Dcs are successfully defended by labor organizations and governments and higher prices are defended by monopolistic firms).

Developed countries also enjoy a technology lead over most LDCs; trade patterns are determined by manufactured goods in particular. Even if LDCs produce "old", standardized products, trade may be structurally biased in that the North (or Dcs) has a monopoly advantage in "new" products which may permit returns not possible on the "old" ones. (This opens up the possibility of greater South-South trading). India, for instance, had been a major

producer of textiles in the eighteenth century but lost its edge during the colonial period when the British forced Indians to grant free access to British-produced textiles. Colonization has imposed plantation agriculture, foreign-owned and -- controlled mining concerns, and transportation systems oriented almost totally towards export-marketing.

Countries trying to protect and develop "infant" industries might also be disadvantaged by the (often fatal) competition that free trade brings in its wake. A historical example of this fear is that of the period following the Marshall Plan, which had been so successful in rebuilding economies of western Europe. Post-war revival of Japanese and European industry came to represent strong foreign competition to U.S. manufacturers.

The asymmetries arising out of "North-South" trade are not seen by many as convincing on theoretical grounds; rather, they arise from a "distortion" of market forces arising from imperfect or partially monetarized labor markets.

c. **Interests**

Functionalists tend to believe in some sort of implicit cooperation between nations. As I said, the idea might not seem as utopian when considered in the context of long-term interests of nations. Ernst Haas, studying the integration of a more unified Europe, has found the driving force behind this integration to be that of economic self-interest. As he stresses, there has to be something in it for everybody involved.

Hegemonic powers benefit the most from a free trade regime (a political argument propounded by authors like Krasner and Robert Gilpin). It was the primacy of American military and economic power after the Second World War that enabled the U.S. to establish and maintain the Bretton Woods system: that is, the arrangements of trade, investment and

monetary flows which were embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the economic organs of the United Nations.

The British, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, championed the cause of free trade; it rationalized their ensuring freedom of the seas. Obviously it was in British interests at the time to seek foreign markets for goods produced within their increasingly industrialized economy.

"Counter-culture" theories in international trade qualified formal models of trade but did not argue about the gains from trade. An example would be the theory of increasing returns from trade. Countries specialize and trade not only fueled by underlying differences, but also because increasing returns are an independent force leading to geographical concentration of production of each good. This was seen as an equally fundamental cause for trade.

However, this rationale was overtaken by the theory of what is termed "dynamic" comparative advantage. It involved protecting domestic "infant" industries from foreign competition, creating comparative advantages where previously none existed. These policies were predominantly nationalistic, with a view to increasing state autonomy and curbing economic dependence on other countries.

Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson, in 1941, correlated effects of protection -- and liberalization -- to relative endowments of factors of production within different countries. So, for example, liberalization would benefit an economy with abundant labor, but would prove harmful to a country with poor capital reserves. Even in an age of growing interdependence,

it was acknowledged that this interdependence could be asymmetrical, suggesting greater vulnerability. This led subsequently to the "import-substitution" policies of developing countries.

since the dollar appeared to be undervalued in the 1920s too.

Free trade is a controversial goal; there are legitimate reasons why government can make a strong case for protectionism that has little to do with political soap-boxing. Interest group lobbying notwithstanding, opening markets can be a very risky venture especially for developing countries but also for developed nations. I list below some of the very real interests that would be hurt by unjudicious opening of markets.

Domestic industries would be exposed to competition from abroad. The developing, "infant" industries would lose their protection and perhaps be crippled by foreign competition before they have a chance to "mature".

Relative levels of technology, wage pricing differentials and other critical differences would come into play to exacerbate that competition. A developing, primary-products exporting country would feel more of a negative impact. The Stoper-Samuelson argument of "relative factor endowments" that I talked about earlier would apply here as well.

Also, enterprises and workers cannot move instantly and painlessly into whatever industries are favored by comparative advantage. Workers need time and training to relocate. And, when investment and employment have been depressed for several years, further losses of jobs will not be borne by the system.

Further, most prices in international trade are partly determined by the exchange rates of currencies involved -- and exchange rates can be affected by factors other than relative

prices in the exporting and importing countries. For example, when investors seeking higher interest rates or security bid up the value of the U.S. dollar, U.S. exports are affected, since they will have become more expensive -- and therefore harder -- to sell.

Some goods are central to a nation's security. It is doubtful whether national policy will permit such goods to be opened to free trade. Trading of such a good may result in the weakening of such an industry (vital to security).

d. **Institutions**

The liberal trade order has been fairly enduring over the period of this century, gaining greater legitimacy over the years. This regime has been embodied in post-war institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and GATT that have exhibited a remarkable resiliency in the face of self-interested, often intransigent behaviour on the part of its member states. The American Congress refused to ratify participation in the International Trade Organization (ITO) that came into existence with the signing of the Havana Charter in March 1948, by over fifty nations. Presumably, the current Administration is more hopeful about the fate of the newly-constituted World Trade Organization that will incorporate rules and obligations included in the original ITO document but not, subsequently, in GATT negotiations.

GATT was instituted as a temporary alternative to the ITO, and to some extent it has been hampered by its ad-hoc or temporary status (in spite of securing some of the trappings - - like a Secretariat -- of established international organizations). The GATT's Charter does not stipulate reciprocity or liberalization; these are the outcome of GATT's provision of a forum for states to meet and promote their mutual well-being. The only principle actually

codified in the Charter is that of nondiscrimination. Several of the issues that have been brought up in earlier rounds as contentious are in fact not covered by GATT rules e.g. infringements of intellectual property rights. Thirdly, GATT is hampered by the lack of some mechanism for effectively monitoring and enforcing its rules. Unanimous voting has not helped in this regard since maverick nations can veto resolutions to condemn.

The Uruguay Round of GATT dealt with the inclusion of new rules and revision of existing ones. There was almost something in it for everyone; for instance, developing countries managed to push through a motion to incorporate the principle of special and differential treatment towards LDCs. A major victory for the Dcs was the inclusion of new rules pertaining to trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs). On the whole, the greatest disagreement seems to have been between the U.S. and the EC over the issue of including agricultural reform. The resolution of international conflicts on issues of trade and economic development within a peaceful, deliberative forum raises hopes for an integrated, pacific environment of the future.

e. **Discussion**

I must emphasize again why regime theory is the best analytical tool to explain current trade policy trends. Ernst Haas noted that all international organizations are purposefully founded by their member states to tackle issues that call for collaborative efforts in order to reach a solution. This is significant in light of the various factors that might realistically thwart any such collaboration, such as uncertainty, lack of trust, informational asymmetries and transaction costs. Charles Lipson, studying the global trade regime, reached the conclusion that this trade regime has played a major role -- as an independent variable -

- in influencing the substance of trade policy output in the U.S. in the post World war II era. He also attributes to it the convergence of expectations and norms (reflected in laws and policy) among trading partners in the global community and finally, an overall proliferation in the volume of trade itself. An interesting albeit controversial argument that he introduces in order to make his point is counterfactual; a consideration of what an empirical analysis of trade patterns in the world would show at this point were there no existing trade regime such as the GATT (Lipson, 1983, pp.233-71).

Perhaps this is not as abstract as it seems. We could look at the difference between trade policies of the U.S. and its trading partners in the early part of this century and then contrast it with current policy patterns. If regimes do act as independent factors, then we could hypothesize the change in policy to a sort of "learning" within the international community (the problem of course being that all other factors contributing to such a change would have to be accounted for). This seen in studies of environmental regimes; Peter Haas, studying the direct effect of regimes, talks about how regimes "may serve as important vehicles for international learning that produce convergent state policies" (Haas, 1989, pp.377-403).

Another problem with identifying a "regime" comes with cases where the researcher is unsure whether the state in question would have behaved differently even if the alleged "norms" were not operating. Does a free trade regime have any methodological relevance to the study of U.S. trade policy? The answer suggested by Keohane (Keohane, 1993) is to look at cases where compliance is inconvenient, and then see whether there was, nevertheless,

observance of regime rules⁸. For instance, let us consider some of the arguments against open trade, that would dictate non-compliance with a free trade regime.

First of all, the issue of free trade lends itself very well to political rhetoric. Restrictions on trade often represent an immediate, convenient choice for leaders faced with severe economic problems. Most governments acknowledge the fact that open trade works towards an efficient utilization of their nation's resources, but other concerns -- eg. protection of jobs, foreign debt, etc. -- dominate the political agenda. Trade restrictions allow a leader to present his or her people with a solution that has a definite, albeit short-term appeal.

Further, the benefits of protection show themselves at different times; the gains are seen first and the losses experienced later. When trade restrictions are imposed, the apparent benefits to "infant", protected industries is reflected in the form of jobs saved or increased profits. The longer-term and diffused costs in lower growth are not as apparent. There is a lack of basic understanding of costs incurred by such a strategy, if only in terms of alternative opportunities sacrificed. The right questions are not asked; such as, what would be the total costs of a protectionist policy?

The benefits of free trade (given original conditions of inequality of resources, technology and infrastructure) may not be conceivable in the short run. Many countries attempted to create ("dynamic") comparative advantages in manufacturing by restricting trade in manufacturing temporarily, until domestic firms could compete with foreign firms. "The encouragement of the growth of domestic industry was widely perceived as a good which

⁸It seems to me that this could be a circular argument, hard to prove or disprove, since it has never been successfully or definitively argued in International Relations exactly what constitutes sound policy inasmuch as it conforms to some ideal version of national interest.

transcended strict adherence to free trade" (Hart, 1983). The success of DC industrializers in this strategy (via trade restrictions and new forms of capital accumulation) was a basis for the legitimization of the "import-substitution" policies later adopted by the LDCs. So policies based on nationalism lead to the belief that comparative advantages might be manipulable through deliberate government policies. Government intervention may be seen as improving on market outcomes; it can change the nature of oligopolistic competition, channeling excess returns from foreign to domestic producers. Stefanie Ann Lenway, in The Politics of U.S. International Trade terms this economic philosophy "pragmatic liberalism". The status of free trade has changed from "optimum to reasonable rule of thumb"(Krugman, 1990).

As I mentioned earlier, a prisoner's dilemma exists in the sense that it is always more desirable to close one's markets to foreign imports while exporting one's products abroad. Hirschman would not agree with this (he does not see imports as harmful) but it is certainly not an uncommon trade status-quo. The odds against reaching a Pareto-efficient equilibrium seem overpowering. In the absence of a hegemon, or some internationally accepted enforcing or coordinating authority, players would naturally revert to acts of individual defection.⁹

As I remarked earlier, foreign policy becomes domestic politics in the foreign-trade issue; considerations of National Security often inhibit practices of free trade. It is argued that

⁹ The solution obviously lies in reiterated plays of the game, not as a one-shot strategy. As Ordeshook states, "... in international relations, national leaders would prefer to believe that the time horizons of the nations that they represent are infinite." The basic assumptions therefore are:

- _ the game is played an infinite number of times
- _ future payoffs are not entirely discounted

interdependence weakens state autonomy, making a nation vulnerable to foreign demands and actions. Reliance on foreign exports is viewed as a weakness. (Which in a sense supports the "hegemony" argument). For "realists", trade interests -- in fact all state interests -- ultimately derive from the relative distribution of power in the international system. Nations structure commercial policy with a view to maximizing the general interest, defined in terms of national autonomy. Such theorists (Krasner, et. al.) overlook economic gains and consider only the political costs of trade; their perception of foreign policy is essentially that which strengthens state autonomy on the one hand and social stability and national economic growth on the other. Hirschman, in National Power, visualizes strategic trade policy as falling within the dimensions of power politics. (However, Jan Tumlir, in "National Interest and International Order", International Issues no.4, identifies national interest with an open trading order.)

Looked at in terms of game theory -- and from a "systemic constraints" perspective - - trade presents a classic prisoner's dilemma for the participatory countries. It is always desirable to close one's markets to foreign imports while trying to flood the other's markets with your exports. Functionalists, in a sense, see the rationale behind free trade to be that of absolute gain as the basis for common interests; realists on the other hand emphasize the relative gain of a state in comparison to that of others. These differences provide different implications for the classic solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma", that of the tit-for-tat strategy in iterated PD games. Functionalists may believe that this strategy works for cooperation. But realists argue that there are different pay-offs for different actors, and these pay-offs tend to

be constant -- so that one actor continuously cumulates a disproportionately greater quantity of benefits.

2. U.S. Trade Policy: A Case Study of Federal Policy Making

a. Background

In a very real sense, foreign policy does become domestic politics in the foreign-trade issue. A case in point is that of U.S. policy on food reserves, tied to an international negotiation but integral to domestic policy on stock accumulation and management. International acts like selling wheat to the U.S.S.R. or embargoing soybean exports to Japan may have important influences on U.S. economy (Destler, 1980). Or one could look at the explanation offered by James Cassing, Timothy McKeown and Jack Ochs in "The Political Economy of the Tariff Cycle" that suggests tariff levels tend to move in a cycle coupled with the business cycle.

There have been several explanations offered for the evolving anti-protectionist bias in American trade policy which is at odds with international tensions (both North-North and North-South relations are prey to this friction) over demands for changing the economic order and the "rules of the game". The dependent variable at the national level is American trade policy, operationalized primarily by levels of "openness" or protectionism (barriers to international commerce and investment eg. tariffs¹⁰.) It is interesting, I think, that a nation's trade policy, which is made at the federal level, falls under the purview of International

¹⁰A tariff is a tax on imports. The importer is required to pay either a certain percentage of the value of the imported article (an "ad valorem" duty) or an agreed upon sum of money per physical unit imported (a "specific" duty).

Relations or International Political Economy theories and has been conventionally studied as such; while urban politics began focussing on dynamics of policy making in cities, it ignored the conventional wisdom that IR or IPE offered in the broad area of domestic policy.

In the post-World War II era, the United States emerged as the major actor in world politics, and took upon itself the mantle of defender of free trade. "This was not simply a response to the altered distribution of power; it was also based on a new foreign policy consensus which included, as one of its tenets, the idea that maintaining an open international economy would help to prevent the return of fascism, minimize the spread of Communism, and thereby reduce the probability of war in the international system" (Hart, 1983).

This does not refute the structuralist argument that a nation's trade policy reflects its foreign policy bias; on the contrary, the United States' "hegemonic" status relates positively to its interest in promulgating liberal trade. The argument is historically borne out by the shift in U.S. trade policy from support for protectionist barriers to a post World War II relative "openness". Seeing the structuralist argument through, a decline in American hegemony constitutes a decrease in the profits accruing from involvement in an open trading order.

Another factor inhibiting free trade would be domestic industry pressure -- the "constituency" factor -- upon government for protection of its industries from foreign competition. E. E. Schattschneider in Politics, Pressures and the Tariff concerns himself with interest groups finding fertile ground for their demands in Congress. His analysis focuses on the 1930 Tariff Act and an analysis of the excesses of the Smoot-Hawley tariff. This is a classic case of distributed costs and narrow benefits; consumers do not realize or deem it irrational to act upon the fact that they lose from protection. They pay higher prices for a

poorer choice of goods, taxpayers lose by paying higher taxes to finance subsidies, workers lose out of lost opportunities for the jobs, and share holders lose because their companies suffer from shrinking markets for export products. Congress faces the responsibility of doling out favors to industry and it often becomes hard to maintain any sort of independent position. Special interests advocating protectionism have used campaign contributions, especially to the Republican Party (that once favored a protectionist stance, at least in principle) to prevent cuts in tariffs or rate increases. (Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1963).

And yet, all these theories do not explain why the U.S. has not turned increasingly protectionist in the post-70s era. Also, as it slipped from its earlier "hegemonic" position, free trade all over the world, in the entire global trading community, should have gone into a protectionist decline involving spiralling trade barriers. This is not a trend borne out by empirical evidence; In seven rounds of multilateral negotiations, U.S. tariffs fell to an "historic low" of 5% by the early 1980s.

Another explanation offered, by Helen Milner ("Trading Places: Industries For Free Trade") is that the level of exchange rates was influencing trade policy, especially in the 1970s. This however was a short-lived suggestion, not borne out by empirical evidence.

b. **Ideas**

Further, I think we have evolved into a better understanding of the system; one aspect of this argument is borne out by the fact that it is generally considered that the real causes of trade imbalance lie elsewhere. Abnormal fluctuations in exchange rates are related to international capital exchanges, or expectations about future rates of inflation or the

need to invest funds at low risk. During House deliberations in August 1971, the steady improvement in trade accounts was attributed to currency realignments; reinforcing the stand that the trade balance problem was better tackled by monetary policies than trade legislation.¹¹ In a sense, the liberal bias in U.S. trade policy has two aspects: one, the intellectual, "free-trade" paradigmatic tradition of an economic philosophy stemming from Adam Smith and enormously appealing in its promise of "self-determinism". And second, it is a reaction to the effects of protectionism in the aftermath of the experience it was closely linked to- the Great Depression. Then too, no other alternative explanation for this economic catastrophe was as immediately available or suitably attributable.

Goldstein (1988) suggests that "ideas" feature twice in an understanding of protectionism: first, as critical independent variables that explain the passage of different laws in different historical periods, and second, as ideas and beliefs of those who make policy. To predict protectionism, analysts must consider not just the legal statute (escape clause provision, anti-dumping statute, etc.) but also the administrative agency; variations in the letter and actual content of policy result because individuals who are "entrusted to carry out laws are biased in their interpretation of the law."

I think we have a more liberal interpretation of "national interest" as a guideline for legislating on controversial issues. Traditionally, international trade has been viewed as a constraint on "state strength", defined as the ability of states to act autonomously¹². Congress

¹¹GATT Study Group, Why Open Trade is Better Trade.

¹²Krasner, for example, overlooks the economic gains and considers only the political costs of trade; his perception of foreign policy is essentially that which strengthens state autonomy

has, since then, a greater awareness of its role in perpetuating liberal trade measures. American pressure group activity is no longer the major factor affecting the tariff; U.S. policy makers recognize the need for access to foreign markets and this gives them the economic leverage to resist demands of powerful domestic interest groups¹³. Mention should be made here of the pressure put on such legislation by lobbying groups (often American lawyers and information brokers) working for foreign companies and interests, a phenomenon that has grown in proportion in the last decade or so.

Also, the same ideological defensiveness that affected Congressmen seems to operate in the business community as well; protectionism is ideologically passe. Self-interest then, as a criterion, is found to be highly subjective, biased, and unpredictable.

Judith Goldstein (1989) compares agricultural and manufacturing policies, pointing out that policy-makers do overcome structural and ideological biases (as in state intervention in agricultural policy). Economic policy is determined by more than the structural needs of the economy. Neither an inherent logic nor an "invisible hand" directs policy; rather, Goldstein

on the one hand and social stability and national economic growth on the other. Hirschman, in his National Power visualizes trade within the dimension of power politics; Jan Tumlir, "National Interest and International Order" International Issues, no. 4, identifies national interest with an open trading order.

¹³Bauer, Pool and Dexter (American Business and Public Policy) argue that Congress acts independently of interest groups. Lowi, reviewing the above, suggests that conflicting interest groups negate each other's influence on trade policy. Michael Hayes suggests looking at other institutions as arenas for the interest group battle. Congress is irrelevant to the trade policy struggle. Schattschneider assumes that Congress is subject to and influenced by pressure group demands for protection, conforming to the public choice theory of re-election being a Congressman's main motive. This does not explain Congress' support for GATT.

suggests, policy-makers make mistakes, sometimes in starting with incorrect assumptions¹⁴ and therefore applying technically incorrect solutions to "wrong" kinds of issues. Needs of the economy are sometimes "misinterpreted".

Domestic "regimes" however, dictated a liberal commercial policy arising out of two different traditions. The Great Depression was perceived as following (in large part) from the consequences of high trade barriers. Secondly, the state has always sought to protect the interests of producers who have claimed that these interests were being endangered by unfair trade practices of foreign producers. Judith Goldstein lists three components to American protectionism: A belief, ironically enough, in the efficacy of free trade, a "fair trade" criterion of American policy and third, a welfare component that deems U.S. policy redistributive (Goldstein, 1986).

With the threat of war abated, a surplus in the Treasury and the infant industry argument obsolete, the justification for making tariffs a political issue declined.

Jeffrey Hart (1983) also highlights the role of ideology and personal beliefs in influencing U.S. policies towards the New International Economic Order (NIEO). He sees this factor as being responsible, along with others, for the transition in U.S. policy from: (a) confrontation to conciliation (Kissinger changed his mind about the nature of the NIEO proposals, (b) return to confrontation and (c) confrontation to limited conciliation (the Carter campaign stressed the need for a more humane and moral foreign policy).

¹⁴The article states how the differing beliefs on government intervention in agriculture were so strong that various government agencies actively supported opposing programs.

An alternative explanation suggested by Judith Goldstein is that ideas may be assumed to peak cyclically. This is a concept used to describe social movements and interest group and countervailing group pressures over periods of time, and it may relate to the "mood" and economic circumstances of a nation.

In general, there seem to be linkages between tariff attitudes and attitudes on internationalism versus self-interest; at the same time, some of the findings suggest a loss of ideological initiative on the part of the protectionists.

Maximizing theories sometimes fail to predict because they "assume that what (a man) ought to do is what he will do." Individual utility functions are the precinct, then, not of maximizing theories but those of personal psychology.

c. **Interests**

The issue of the tariff has always been a controversial one in American history, lending itself to political rhetoric. The war of 1812 and the need for revenues, competition from British manufacturers, infant industries, an attitude that labelled low tariffs as treachery, advent of nationalism all these worked for the special interests who advocated protectionism for the U.S.

This medium of analysis emphasizes the "domestic component" of trade policy using a micro political economy approach favoring "behavioral" variables. It is basically a social choice analysis, portraying state policy as a function of the "equilibrium which emerges from the efforts of those who want a protectionist policy and those who represent interests in free trade" (Goldstein and Lenway, 1989). This section deals largely with the "internal differentiation" model, which is contrasted with that of systemic constraints.

The focus here is on uncovering how closely adopted policies reflect the interests of the business community¹⁵. One is led to believe that the United States is a breeding ground for pluralist interests, or more accurately, those interests that can affect the agenda owing to the diversity and strength of the resources at their command (the plural elitist school of thought).

One possible hypothesis in this case is that politicians are little more than puppets of organized interests, and that Congress plays a more covert role in influencing its "agents" towards industry-favorable policy. An in-depth analysis should expose this trend if it actually prevails.

Neo-classical literature holds that special interests have the deciding vote that breaks the tie between a legislator's personal beliefs and those expressed by his constituency or by the public at large. A congressman has to manipulate issues on the agenda to meet "fixed" answers; "he can select those issues on which he feels no special tension between his own views and those of his constituents" (Goldstein, 1986).

My readings inspired me to conclude that policy had been made not by the processes of simple economic determinism, and indeed did not stand up to a "rational, self-interest" analysis. E. E. Schattschneider, in his Politics, Pressures and the Tariff states that interest groups find fertile ground for their demands in Congress. But his analysis focuses on the

¹⁵Judith Goldstein, in her article, "The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection" American Political Science Review Vol.80 No.1 March, 1986, talks about the policy making style of American politics whereby any (legitimate) government has to be perceived as being responsive to plural interests. This has resulted in largely symbolic aid, to be "as unrestrictive as politically feasible".

1930 Tariff Act; the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Act rendered the American tariff negotiable and introduced differing interests into the policy-making spectrum. Arye Hillman and Heinrich Ursprung, in Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests and International Trade Policy, introduce an interest group variation of this argument. Foreign interests are incorporated into a nation's international trade policy as a function of foreign producer interests competing politically with those of domestic producers. Both groups represent political support to candidates in the form of campaign contributions; trade policy is made with a view to maximizing political support (from producer interests). The model continues to support the traditional view of trade policy as distributive politics; this is facilitated by the fact that VERs (Voluntary Export Restraints) have been regarded as economically and politically superior alternatives to tariffs¹⁶ whose benefits tend to be more "zero-sum" in nature, and are short-sighted and costly since they invite retaliation. In a sense, the zero-sum argument extends to ideological stances taken by policy makers on one issue; it is harder to compromise on tariffs. VERs, on the other hand, provide "opportunities for mutual collusive gain favored in political outcomes"¹⁷.

The paper makes a very strong argument for VERs, in that "political equilibria are inconsistent with any candidate's making a protectionist policy when the option of using export restraints is available." But the interest group linkage is at best hypothesized and

¹⁶This point underscores Timothy McKeown's argument in his article, "Firms and Tariff Regime Change: Explaining the Demand for Protection" that governments used tariffs in the late 1890s and early 1900s because of the lack of alternative policy instruments that the state could offer.

¹⁷It is to be remembered that the rents created by these quantitative restrictions accrue to the exporting (foreign) governments.

supported by a documented evidence of foreign lobbying expenditures. For a variety of reasons I do not believe that this model solely explains the making of trade policy today.

An alternative explanation for the lack of a protectionist bias in trade policy has been the existence of pro-free trade groups. One of the strongest proponents of this view is Helen Milner. She theorizes that increased international interdependence after World War II led to the internationalization of firms and reduced their interest in protection. So, on the one hand this has meant more foreign competition, but on the other it has created economic ties for other firms in the area of exports, imports of necessary resources, multinational production and global intrafirm trade. She lists five reasons why protectionism would be harmful to interests of such firms:

First, it would invite retaliation in kind, hurting businesses that export or produce abroad. Second, protection in one market may invite greater foreign competition to other markets, trying to edge out other exporters. Third, to such firms, trade barriers are one more cost that undermine their competitive pricing levels. Fourth, costs will also escalate for import-dependent firms, again affecting competitiveness. Fifth, international firms will have to fight domestic producers for anti-protectionist policies, and this will be a costly process too.

Milner looks at trade policy as a function of industry preferences. She lists as evidence several case studies to validate her theory. Take for instance her analysis of the Machine Tools Industry in the 1970s; she records it as having "high" levels of Export Dependence though "low" levels of Multinational and Global Intrafirm Trade. As expected, the industry favored open markets especially abroad and touted free trade in spite of losing markets to

imports and facing other economic difficulties. Their preferences were not for protectionism but for aid for exports (especially to the U.S.S.R. and the eastern bloc); the policy outcomes were tariff reductions during that period. When the firms' export orientation declined due to failure of export initiatives chiefly, the industry lobbied for protection and got it in the form of VERs.

An article in the Business section of the Chicago Tribune dated Saturday, October 5, 1991 proclaimed the "U.S. tool industry still divided over the issue of import barriers". The National Machine Tool Builders Association (NMTBA) which is the industry's main group representing some 350 manufacturers is lobbying the government, petitioning President Bush for an extension of these Voluntary Restraint Agreements (VRAs). But several machine tool companies say extending the agreement would actually "hurt the industry more than help it". Brian D. McLaughlin, president and chief executive of Hurco Companies Inc., an Indianapolis-based machine-tool builder, said the following: "Those supporting continuation of the VRAs are overlooking the fundamentals of international economics and CNC technology- both factors critical to the industry's competitiveness and the country's national security."

He and his supporters insist that the future of the \$4 billion domestic industry lies in overseas markets, which are valued at some \$46 annually, where American-made machine tools are more competitively priced than Japanese ones. They also feel that by erecting trade barriers at home, American companies are penalized abroad by governments bent on retaliation.

It was found, in a poll conducted in the spring of 1954, that the proportion of businessmen favoring reduction of tariffs was more than seven times as great as that favoring a raising of tariffs: 38 as compared to 5 percent (Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1963). The younger men in the sample were more likely to favor reducing tariffs; this showed a trend supporting liberal trade, that did not suffer any real, sustained decline. Furthermore, a very large proportion of men were unwilling to take a categorical position; protectionists constituting a small minority both absolutely and relative to supporters of reduced tariffs.¹⁸ On the other hand, although liberal trade proponents appeared to be more likely to give verbal support to their attitude, this did not mean they were more likely to take action on the basis of this avowed stand. Only a limited portion of the business community cared enough to act. The general conclusion was that this issue was of relative salience to "some industries, some men and some businesses". (Milner's analysis on the other hand did account for the differences in trade policy outcomes among industries.) It seems that lacking strong direct interest, businessmen avoid policies that they know will hurt others. And as mentioned earlier, there is also an educated awareness of counter-retaliation in the instance of protective policies.

Traditionally, the Democrats advocated low tariffs and Republicans sought higher levels of protectionism. "Rate increases were obtained or cuts prevented via campaign contributions, especially to the Republican Party" (Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1963). One of the more curious current phenomena has been that shifts in political climates have not necessarily

¹⁸Empirically, the tariff stand that businessmen took did have a strong relation to the level of their current business. Protectionists were more likely than liberal traders to say business was "worse last year". The prospect of gain (foreign markets for export) was found to have less of an impact than that of loss (foreign competition).

affected liberalism in trade issues. Until the North American Free Trade Agreement found its way onto the political agenda, neither party had organized a substantive anti-free trade platform.

Republicans remained protectionist "in principle"- after all, American interests and sound American policy were at stake. The "constituency" factor had given an interesting slant to traditional linkages. For instance, Democrats in Congress found themselves voting protectionist on account of changes in the location of American industry and in the economy in general that affected influential members of their constituency.

Given the pressures on any congressman, the responsibility to dole out favors to industry and "placate the insistent pleas of petitioners" and constituents, it became hard to maintain any sort of independent position. Tariff making became a "scandal and a farce".

Often, reciprocal trade meant nothing to the interests that fought over it except to provide a platform for their coalition. There was evidence of an even broader alliance, including both protectionists and liberal traders. For all of them, the particular problem they had in mind could be dealt with and negotiated within the medium of "government business". What the bill meant would depend on administrative practices and court decisions over the years.

At a domestic level, this has remained the status quo more or less over the years. The NAFTA debate forced congressmen to discuss specifics of free trade implications, and take a definite stance on the issue. The fact the Administration currently opted to bail out the Mexican economy with loan guarantees gives credence to the idea that there is still support for liberal trade, even in the face of appeals like "America, first". This suggests

acknowledgement of the fact that the futures of trading communities in the world are tied together.

d. **Institutions**

Another hypothesis is that trade policy is largely a function of the organizational set-up of governmental bodies involved in the creation of this policy. This includes parametric variables like degree of centralization or decentralization, division of powers between Congress and the Executive and their respective Departments, establishment of independent governmental agencies like the ITC, STR, etc. Institutional constraints were introduced in order to manipulate the agenda; for instance, ITC is to Congress what GATT is to the U.S.

Government policy can change the nature of oligopolistic competition, channeling excess returns from foreign to domestic producers. Stefanie Ann Lenway, in The Politics of U.S. International Trade, terms this economic philosophy "pragmatic liberalism". The status of free trade has changed from "optimum to reasonable rule of thumb" (Krugman, 1990). Consequent economic analyses have tarnished the intellectually "pure" image of free trade. For instance, the theory of "increasing returns" suggests that economies of scale encourage specialization; this creates international markets that are imperfectly or oligopolistically competitive. Yet neither comparative advantage nor increasing returns in trade theory contest the gains from trade. Re-thinking the causes of trade might lead to a re-evaluation of trade policy; might government intervention improve on market outcomes?

Judith Goldstein (1989) suggests that Ideas drive Institutions; "Institutions are prone to inertia; change is most likely to occur in periods of crisis." Yet the thrust of causality is not unidirectional; new ideas must "fit" and accommodate existing structures.

Glenn Fong (1990) brings in yet more interesting frameworks; the first is an industry structure analysis that includes characteristics of industries and their firms, such as size of the industry, concentration in industrial production, and unionization of labor. The model uses these characteristics to explain their political behavior and impact upon government policy. Looking at those aspects that make industries more amenable to intra-industry as well as inter-industry cooperation gives rise to interesting implications:

Where industrial production is concentrated in the hands of a few large firms, the limited number of private actors facilitates both the formation of industry-wide consensus and public-private consumption. eg. American automobile and steel industries and the Japanese steel industry as well. However, there are obstacles where production is fragmented and highly dispersed across a large number of firms. Thus, government initiatives are fruitful in sectors with large work forces and strong labor organizations. In contrast, government policies often prove ineffective and are resisted in industries characterized by intense intraindustry competition and technological dynamism- eg. the U.S. Chemical industry. As a final point, individual policies may fall prey to corporate diversity; this borne out by differences within the industry itself between large and small firms, such as in the case of the American shoe manufacturing industry or the U.S. television industry, where some of the firms are nationally based and other manufacturers are multinationals.

The second analytical framework is that of state capacity or state structure, highlighting two structural constructs that affect state capacity, viz. centralization and policy networks. Executive-legislature and executive-agency power relationships are I think vital to an understanding of this issue. (Fragmentation of U.S. policy making, with different institutions having their own agenda, is an issue discussed separately below.) Policy networks, seen as part of the policy instruments at the disposal of the state¹⁹ do not enjoy a high degree of acceptance; while "American business leaders enjoy easy access to the political process, they remain hostile to government interference".

Domestic political factors always play a strong role in influencing nations' trade policies, and the U.S. is no exception. Article I of the Constitution grants the U.S. Congress the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations" and to assess and collect duties (tariffs) in accordance with such a policy. In the mid-1930s, after the passage of the infamous Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, Congress authorized the executive -- with the enactment of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements of 1934 -- to regulate commerce with other nations, while still retaining final authority over trade policy matters. This balance between Congress and Presidential initiative has resulted in interesting variations in the development of a coherent trade policy over the years.

To protect their own freedom, congressmen needed to reduce their power. The assumption of executive power helped in this respect. Congressmen did not have to vote for

¹⁹Timothy J. McKeown explains the dearth of state controls on economic activity during the period from 1848 to 1914 as a function of a relative lack of "policy instruments". The tariff during this era served as a key source of revenue, as an important means of dispensing side payments to various special interests, and as a "crude macroeconomic countercyclical tool" as well.

increases or cuts in tariffs, merely opine on them; and also vote on very ambiguous legislation that set general guidelines, but not on any specific issues.

This did prove somewhat of a problem to the protectionists since the executive branch was committed to a liberal trade policy. This meant that power had to be shifted to the Tariff Commission, an independent body, from the president. Overall, there seemed to be an implicit consensus that all interested parties go on struggling over marginal changes, while they more or less agreed on how the system should work. The Reciprocal Trade Act (passed in 1934) was framed under the New Deal and accomplished two major things: It reversed a long-range trend of increasing American tariffs, and transferred trade policy initiatives (negotiating reciprocal trade concessions in trade treaties with other countries) from Congress to the Executive branch of government. The motto became "trade not aid" and this brought it under the purview of foreign policy and Executive prerogative.

This free trade bias may also be seen in the statistically-borne-out trend that the office of the President has been active in protecting America's liberal stance. Although congressional positions have been ambiguous at times on the issue of free trade, the executive has taken a more or less consistent stand. When confronted by a choice between giving aid or not, the executive has opted for the latter. When protectionism was mandated by the bureaucracy, the President often opted for transfer payments, or to give less than what was asked for, or in the case of countervailing duties, to sanction a tariff waiver. In "dumping" legislation, the President has attempted to inhibit petition activity through a variety of incentives geared to persuading the petitionists to drop the dumping investigation of their own volition.

Congress has always been seen as the protector of domestic interests while the Executive has been viewed as more cognizant of broader or international considerations. The issue of foreign competition narrows the number of voices congressmen have to heed; on matters of broad national policy -- like export issues -- every citizen's voice is relevant. For example, while liberal trade as well as high levels of domestic employment are considered desirable and compatible with the concept of national interest, the Executive might be more likely to give weight to the former and Congress to the latter. Individual institutions have different biases and the end result -- policy -- is dependent on the level of coordination, trust and responsiveness between these institutions. For instance, the Treasury Department has the reputation of backing liberal trade policies, while the Commerce Department is considered sympathetic to industry. The Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) usually sides with the Treasury, mostly because of its concern with the actual costs of protectionist policies. The State Department ties national interest with international stability, and is opposed to policies that adversely affect the trade flow of other countries. The Department of Labor is concerned with American jobs and tends to be pro-import restraints. The Office of the STR is oriented to free trade and also very responsive to Congress. It conflicts often with the Department of Commerce. One step towards easing communication between the Executive and Congress has been the creation of independent administrative agencies establishing the "scientific rationality of duties in a bipartisan forum" (Goldstein and Lenway, 1989), like The International Trade Commission or the office of an independent negotiator like that of the Special Trade Representative.

On the other hand, if the Executive acknowledges broader trends in trade politics, and one can trace legislation as favoring this trend, would that mean that with the passage of time and certain legislation²⁰ (Schlesinger, 1973) the Executive has come to be more important a player in trade legislation than the Congress? An important factor, I think, is that Congress is less zealous about guarding its "power of prerogative"; it tends to delegate and abdicate its power to a greater extent (Schlesinger, 1973).

In comparing the weight of institutions by "decision-mode", Robert A. Pastor comments that similar to the pigs on George Orwell's Animal Farm, all foreign policies are equal but some are more equal than others (Pastor, 1980). This in a way gives credence to the influence of a trade regime on domestic policy. Policymakers are exhorted to abandon, for a change, narrow-based considerations that would lead to a plethora of protectionist mechanisms (as awarded by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act earlier in this century, operating in the absence of a liberal trade regime). Instead, an open-trade regime legitimizes and pushes its agenda on its member states. As discussed earlier, import-competing industries are appeased by administrative concessions. Charles Lipson, 1983) points out how even the courts have been influenced by American involvement in a trade regime such as GATT, and have been chary of poaching on the diplomatic preserves of the Executive branch. The judiciary, in the case of VAT rebates, preferred to wait on the judgement issued in the Tokyo round of negotiations.

²⁰The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 1934: Congress delegated advance power to the President to raise or lower by as much as 50% all rates on agricultural as well as industrial goods, subject to a check in its consultative capacity only. The Trade Act of 1974, which passed Congress in December 1974, was in the nature of an internationalist document that delegated unprecedented powers to the President.

e. **Discussion**

Judith Goldstein, analyzing agricultural policy in the U.S., draws three comprehensive conclusions: One, that ideas influence policy only when they are carried by individuals or groups with political clout. Two, policy making tends to be incremental, avoiding "radical departures" from established policy. And three, nothing works better to establish the legitimacy of an idea than success (Goldstein, 1989).

As regards the power of special interests, one argument (suggested by Bauer, Pool and Dexter) is that there seems to be more an illusion of pressure group dominance (based on propaganda from both sides) than an existing reality. There have been failures of the protectionist-groups agenda that were not recorded or known. Secondly, the efforts (causes, campaigns) and effects of the protectionists are easier to identify. The "other side" is more concerned with general interest, and therefore with educating the public to that effect -- efforts that are necessarily more diffused and harder to track. Thirdly, pressure groups face resource constraints. Direct lobbying is a very minor activity, and directed at the business community. The authors also conclude that pressure groups function differently in the arena of foreign policy than other legislative areas.

Even if U.S. trade policy is occasionally described as inconsistent, I do not believe that policy-making in the U.S. is as "ad-hoc" as is suggested, with constant "trade-offs" between domestic and international interests. There is always conflict between ideologically opposed forces, and the multitude of policy models bears witness to the fact that the verdict is still out on just who makes foreign economic policy. Robert Dahl and Louis Henkin visualize the Executive as the "car-driver" with Congress applying the brakes (Dahl, Henkin, 1972).

Over time, the tariff became just one of the means among many (quotas, licenses, subsidies, preferential buying, etc.) to a protectionist end. Starting with Britain's departure from the gold standard in 1931, its value as a revenue-generating device (primarily during times of war) was also found to be somewhat counter-productive; exports were found to be tied in with imports, the one necessarily affected the other. Teachings of classical economists and the example of Britain deemed free trade an exemplary economic doctrine. Market-control of the economy was considered more efficient. "Home-market" appeals to farmers and consumers no longer worked. For consumers, especially, foreign competition brought lower prices and better quality; they did not have to pay to subsidize protected industries. The "infant" industry argument could not be expounded with a straight face; there were very few industries by that time to which this argument applied. The tradition of seeking protection on this rationale passed on instead to the "vested interests"; established manufacturers did not want to be disturbed. The Treasury faced a surplus, and some way had to be found to spend it or tariffs had to be lowered to lessen the federal revenue. The tariff was considered more than just an economic tool, it became representative of a nation's foreign policy in general. Another aspect to this was that strengthening the economies of the non-Communist countries was considered the best way to combat Communism. Finally, other forms of trade regulation (as mentioned earlier) came into practice. Authors Bauer, Pool and Dexter, in American Business and Public Policy illustrate this decline with an example of how the chairman of one of the important Congressional committees dealing with foreign economic policy in the Eighty-fourth Congress was quoted as saying impatiently that he hoped the committee's staff members would review the "tariff stuff" quickly and then "forget it.... it's no longer of any

importance." The authors claim "ignorance" and "indifference" to be the primary factors responsible for ambivalence on this issue; immediate payoffs were simply not evident, most of the time. Thus, it was often institutional structures, like size of the firm, affecting communication, that were relevant to an understanding of the trade issue.

To summarize, regime theory is best equipped to explain developments in policy on the issue of the tariff. Pluralism highlights the role of interest groups while elitism suggests the dominance of some political elite that make fairly arbitrary decisions. Intense pluralism comes close to describing the complexity of variables that affect the policy in question (public opinion, interest groups, independent executive agencies, etc.). But the explanation is still limited; for instance, intense pluralism does not account specifically for the role of norms and ideas, though these account in some part for the cyclical nature of policy changes. A careful analysis of the variables involved within a regime may help us predict the nature of policy-decisions to be made.

3. Economic Development: A Case Study in Urban Policy Ming

a. Background

Urban scholars have been using the concept of regime to help understand and explain the dynamics of urban policy making. The theory helped bridge differences between varying interpretations of city politics, such as those offered by the political power distribution models (pluralism, elitism, etc.) and the machine politics model.

As a case study of regime theory applied to urban policymaking, I concentrate on economic development policy in San Francisco. The major source of information for this case

study is Richard Edward DeLeon's Left Coast City, which, as the subtitle explains, is the study of progressive politics in San Francisco from 1975 to 1991. I chose this research because it represents a genuine triumph for regime politics, highlighting the role of nonmaterial norms and representing some amount of consensus on those norms on the part of players involved in making urban policy.

Clarence Stone, on the other hand, discusses various types of regimes in his book Regime Politics, but his case study of Atlanta, Georgia still reads like an analysis of elite politics, where policy decisions reflect the cooptation of policy choices by private firms and political decisions by legislators. Stone defines a regime as the "informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions" (Stone, 1989, p.6). Hence, his emphasis on the distinction between electoral versus governing coalitions. If Regime Politics does not deviate in any meaningful degree from the way in which urban politics has been studied since the 1990s the most part, this is a function of the nature of politics in Atlanta rather than any deficiency in Stone's theory.

Studying San Francisco politics on the other hand is more gratifying in the sense that it more obviously factors in non-material norms into the study of local policy. Since my other case studies deal with evidence that goes against what one might expect to see in a typical "political" scenario or a "politics as always" situation, this case study fits within the trilogy. Stone's argument that regime theory is about "power to", about empowerment and social production, rather than "power over" and social control may be made with greater flair in reference to the political dynamics of San Francisco.

Left Coast City studies the period between 1975 and 1991, and the kinds of policies that were put forth in Mayor Art Agnew's "social production" agenda, especially with regard to issue areas like land-use and economic development. San Francisco, during this period, was apparently a hotbed of progressive political philosophy, starting with the successful election of George Moscone's mayoral coalition in 1975.

The term "progressive" is used in the San Francisco context to describe an ideology (occasionally referred to as postmaterialist) that takes a Leftist stance on three issue areas of political culture: liberalism, environmentalism and populism. Liberals support government activism and redistributive programs, protection of individual liberties and civil rights, and equal opportunity structures for the poor and minorities in areas such as jobs, housing and education. Environmentalists support government regulation of business and limits on economic growth in land use, transportation, commercial development and historical preservation, on the basis of ecological concerns and overall quality of life. Populists value a grass-roots political culture that finds expression in mechanisms of direct democracy and community empowerment. Some of their major concerns are about the use of urban space and encroachment by both public or private sectors. San Francisco residents denote the term "progressive" to signify a broad spectrum of social change and political reforms. Progressivism is seen as a counter-regime to a pro-growth or material regime.

The progressive agenda was carried over into Mayor Agnew's political term that started in 1987, in spite of the setback offered by Mayor Dianne Feinstein's electoral term from 1978 to 1987 which brought a resurgence of the old coalition between business elites and political leaders. Left Coast City also deals with San Francisco's current struggles to find

a coherent and stable political order in the face of strong pressure from the downtown business community, "recalcitrant" mayors and internecine conflicts. A regime has to be able to successfully present an agenda of political options that is acceptable to its people; while San Francisco still continues to fight the dominance of market, pro-growth forces, it is a manifestation of a political culture united in opposition to some combination of social, economic and political philosophy or trend (an "anti-regime" in DeLeon's terms) or a regime waiting to happen. What is needed is mobilization and establishment of political resources by a strong, firmly entrenched progressive coalition.

b. **Ideas**

DeLeon's study of San Francisco starts off with an introduction to the idea of *feng-shui*, the Chinese philosophy of harmony in the home environment. Apparently it is a principle that plays a strong role in understanding San Francisco culture, whether exhibited in real estate or local politics. Community values (DeLeon distinguishes three popular, distinct, leftist ideologies: liberalism, environmentalism, populism) are emphasized over commercial or material interests, as evidenced by the support given to the city's leaders in their effort to institute a slow-growth coalition in favor of a classic pro-growth coalition. In that sense, San Francisco is similar to the residents of ultra-conservative Williamson County in Texas who voted against the establishment of a branch of Apple Corporation (because Apple allowed extension of health benefits to same sex partners). These residents were also voting against their economic interests.

Here are some of the terms used to describe important aspects of San Francisco: progressive, liberal, semi-sovereign, non-conformist, emphasizing human development over

physical development, a sanctuary for gay and lesbian communities, conscientious objectors, political refugees, undocumented workers and HIV carriers. Policy-making has been innovative and combative, resulting in unique pieces of legislation supporting controversial and divisive issues like rent control, affirmative action, domestic partnerships and smoke-free work areas. City council members have frequently supported environmental concerns over economic imperatives. This is not just symbolic politics as practiced in most of the country, but a vehicle for the implementation and enforcement of ideas outside mainstream thought in America. DeLeon warns that these values, goals and ideas resemble an "unstable compound" (an anti-regime, or a political configuration set up on a transitional basis mainly to prevent a resurgence of the old pro-growth regime) that has not yet coalesced into a stable, permanent, progressive regime.

DeLeon attributes San Francisco's progressive culture to a variety of forces: the migratory waves of various ethnic populations, and of the gay and lesbian community (estimated at anywhere from 10 to 20 percent of the city's population). Ironically, homosexuals were initially drawn by the promise of massive economic restructuring and growth potential, but now support keeping the city much like it has been for several decades. As compared to other American cities, San Francisco boasts of a well-educated, affluent and highly skilled population. The mix of occupational categories defies conventional class analyses; what you see is not the traditional division along lines of (exploited) labor versus (exploiting) capital. This makes for some interesting and non-traditional political alliances as well.

c. **Interests**

Just as the highly decentralized governmental structure in San Francisco is described as "government by clerks", DeLeon terms the power distribution network in the city as "politics by clubs". This includes most of the city's politically organized groups²¹ such as clubs, caucuses, societies, unions and campaigns, ranging from Gay American Indians to the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce. These political groups exhibit high and fairly consistent levels of political activity.

Starting from planning studies in the wartime 1940s, San Francisco was seen as an opportunity to tap into the network of growing, highly commercialized "world-class" cities of the Pacific Rim such as Hong Kong and Tokyo. This vision included the usual remedial alterations to San Francisco's downtown area: improvements in regional transportation, removal of decaying neighborhoods and construction of high-rise office buildings. The Bay Area Council (BAC) was set up in 1946 as a regional planning body to coordinate a growth strategy for the city. However, at the time, an urban regime to carry out this vision had not been established.

When such a regime was finally put together, it included the mayor, city planners, real estate brokers, business elite, civic leaders, newspapers magnates, union leaders and voters. Apart from BAC, other pro-growth interests included organizations like the Blyth-Zellerbach (B-Z) Committee which in turn created the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association (SPUR), and the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA). From about the

²¹Tony Kilroy, Kilroy's Directory of San Francisco's Politically Active Groups, 1985 and 1990 editions.

early 1960s to mid-1980s, a pro-growth agenda flourished under this core of development interests, with the blessings and support of the community. Talking about the 1970s, Frederick Wirt comments that, "most citizens by the bay put their money, votes, labor and skills into another urban dream, in which not cable cars but gleaming new towers 'reach halfway to the stars'. These are the politics of income, in which the shared values of acquisition fuse most social strata into a coalition of mutual interest" (Wirt, pp.212-13).

However, in the mid 1970s, elements of political culture that would later come together as a progressive regime under Mayor Moscone began to organize and flex muscle in the form of organized resistance to new development projects. George Moscone's leftist campaign rode the crest of this wave, promising jobs and affordable housing instead of a trickle-down approach embodied in downtown high-rises. Moscone not only appealed to low income residents, he also represented the interests of ethnic minorities and gay and lesbian groups. Once in power, he made good on his promises in spite of opposition from the Board of Supervisors. (The Board had a long history on conservatism, and was being challenged by citizen groups such as Citizens for Representative Government (CRG) who felt it did not reflect the diversity and views of the city's populace.) His Planning Commission and the Redevelopment Agency helped usher in the slow-growth agenda, and he appointed a transition commission to recruit people from diverse walks of life, making his administration more representative of, and responsive to, its population.

d. **Institutions**

San Francisco has a unique history as regards establishment and evolution of political reform institutions. In 1932, a special charter creating a consolidated

structure of city and county government was approved by voters. The charter severely limited the discretionary authority of local politicians, especially with regards to licensing and other administrative powers that normally allow leaders to manipulate city resources for votes and other favors or play the game of classic distributive politics.

"Executive authority is divided between an independently elected mayor and a chief administrative officer (CAO) who, although appointed by the mayor, can be removed only by a two-thirds vote of the Board of Supervisors or by recall. The mayor has appointative, budgetary, and veto powers, but administrative control is restricted to those agencies and departments outside the CAO's domain (e.g., police, fire, and land use), and even within this limited sphere the mayor's leadership is filtered through a layer of commissions and boards (such as the Police Commission, Planning Commission and Board of Permit Appeals), whose members are appointed by the mayor and in only half the cases serve at his or her pleasure. Because the mayor lacks formal executive authority over their powers, these boards and commissions exercise considerable autonomy in making policy decisions. Mayoral appointments to certain other agencies and commissions, such as the Redevelopment Agency and the Port Commission, must be confirmed by the supervisors. The controller, like the CAO, is appointed by the mayor and operates independently of the CAO, thus dividing fiscal management functions. The offices of assessor and city attorney, typically staffed by appointment in other cities, are elective positions in San Francisco and highly prized by ambitious local politicians." (DeLeon, 1992, p.21)

The role of the mayor is thus institutionally constrained; he has to rely on his bargaining skills and personality to sell his vision and build coalitions friendly to his agenda.

Neither the mayor nor the Board of Supervisors has centralized control over city politics. Furthermore, citizens play a direct role in influencing policy through mechanisms of direct democracy such as citizen ballot initiatives, referendum and recall elections. Most American cities do not feature these direct citizen legislative mechanisms. Further most cities do not have populations as politically savvy and able to truly take advantage of these powerful tools. Policies sponsoring the slow-growth movement (favoring environmental concerns most notably) have been instituted by an initiative-wielding public as well as supported by some elected officials. On occasion, these devices have been used by conservative sectors of the city population to influence policy as well.

e. **Discussion**

I have discussed at length why San Francisco is so progressive, or why the pro-growth regime collapsed. For my purpose, I only wish to point out the efficacy of a single, unifying theory of regimes when it comes to explaining political phenomena at various levels. Pluralist theory sees government as a medium for group interests, and elitist theory holds that government makes policy in a virtual vacuum of public opinion. Theories of economic constraint stress the structural determinism inherent in government, while a bureaucratic model of politics sees government as a composite of its administrative organs. The machine politics model considers government to be in the business of trading material benefits for votes and political resources. None of these theories is adequate to explain this instance of San Francisco or many other cities. Nor can they account for the multitude of variables: constituency preferences, business interests, economic imperatives, governmental initiative, ideology and culture, and the institutions which process these. The concept of

regime comes the closest to accounting for all these variables as they pertain to the policy produced.

D. **Conclusion**

I do see these three variables -- Ideas, Interests and Institutions -- as essential in developing an explanatory theory of policymaking. I contend that policy making falls somewhere between them. Institutions, in the long run, not only respond to public opinion and public interests but they shape them as well. "Institutions, then, reflect a set of dominant ideas translated through legal mechanisms into formal government organizations" (Goldstein, 1988). Institutions are thus responsive to Ideas, but they are often the source of these ideas (norms, conventions, beliefs, paradigms) as well. Perhaps Interests are more stable and enduring over time, which is why shifts in policy are perceived as being a function of Interests either dominating or losing out to Ideas and Institutions. This corroborates the "cyclical" theory of Ideas, with Institutions playing a mediatory (but not "epiphenominal") role between the two forces. The justifications for non-compliance are, therefore, considerable.

Understanding cooperation lies in the common ground between institutionalists and neorealists. Membership in a regime within an issue area affects calculations of (state) interests as well as of (state) capabilities. Capabilities and Interests may be served by membership privileges such as access to information flows, reduced transaction costs and favorable decision on issues of property rights, among other things. Ideas impact independently on members, inspiring, reinforcing or altering beliefs held about issues such

as the environment, peace, conflict, sovereignty, self-determination and so on. Regime theory is a meeting ground for scholars propounding very different paradigmatic influences, whether in IR or in urban politics.

At an "internal differentiation" level, the following (discussed at length above) constitute some of the factors that seem to affect the passage of legislation:

- 1) Political and economic ideology of legislators;
- 2) Response to constituency pressure; public opinion;
- 3) Business interests;
- 4) Information (including dominant economic paradigms);
- 5) Role of the political entrepreneur;
- 6) Perceived goal of legislation;
- 7) Priority given to other matters; time constraints;
- 8) Change in the economy; and
- 9) Norms and rules directing policy.

These points can be applied with suitable changes to explain policy decisions at a domestic-inputs level for all three levels of policymaking. I think that further, all three cases make a strong argument for the inclusion of norms and ideas into any theory trying to explain policy; this is especially significant given that "possibly urban regimes devoted to and capable of pursuing redevelopment are easier to build than regimes devoted to and capable of pursuing human-capital development. It may well be, that other things being equal, what is easier to assemble is able to crowd out what is harder to construct, especially given the short time frame that elected politicians operate within" (Clarence Stone, M.Orr and D.Imbroscio,

1991). This means that any theory trying to account for the existence of progressive or activist regimes at any level, is going to have to account for the interaction between dominant interests and dominant ideas, and the political institutions that work at processing them.

These three case studies of policymaking illustrate, to an appreciable degree, this theoretical convergence experienced (if not acknowledged) by political science scholars. The research also helps resolve the debate between internal differentiation and systemic constraint. Finally, it bridges to some extent the conceptual gap between policy studies in major subfields in political science: International Relations, National and Urban Politics.

VII. CONCLUSION

A. Summary of the Study

This body of work is, for the most part, an exercise in the application of regime theory to issue-areas within three sub-disciplines in the field of political science, International Relations, Federal Policy-making and Urban Politics. However, the research serves to highlight the main thrust of my overall argument, which is really a call for more collaborative work among political scientists working in different areas of the discipline. With a view to making my point, I trace the development and application of regime theory in political science. Essentially, a line of argument was developed by Dahl for community power studies (1961); it was taken up and developed by Keohane and Krasner for international relations theory and styled "regime theory" (Keohane, 1984; Krasner 1985a). Then this regime theory was brought back to urban studies by Elkin (1987), developed by Stone (1989), and this conceptualization is also likely to be applied to public policy studies in the future (Alexander, 1989; McFarland and Yarnold, 1993).

The application of regime theory to explaining international politics, though considered a fad for several decades, has united the discipline in the sense that it has brought together differing threads of thought about how international politics works. For scholars of IR, regime theory is a theory of cooperation that has been grafted on to realist assumptions, thereby distancing itself from the classic idealist paradigm and validating its claim to empirical thought rather than normative or prescriptive work.

For researchers in the urban politics field, regime theory is a way of studying the second face of power; it provides an explanation for agenda-setting at the local level of politics. For both IR and urban politics scholars, what is significant is that they now have a theory that talks about convergence of ideas on the part of the major players. This convergence, whether implicitly acknowledged or explicitly contractualized, affects the establishment of policy guidelines. The convergence is also significant in predicting policy outcomes; more so at the urban politics level, perhaps because the cost of obtaining information on city governments' policy agendas proves more costly to citizens at an individual (or group) level, than it does to member states (nations) participating in some institutionalized form of cooperation.

The dissertation also focuses on other areas of commonality between the various subdisciplines, such as the concept of systemic constraints. Chapter V explores the idea of structural determinism in making policy. While central to an understanding of inter-city competition and economic constraints on city governments, this idea has also been used to explain policy making at the international level by scholars working in the realist tradition, against a background of an anarchic international environment. Realist scholars see survival as the primary end of all states; politics, then, is largely a matter of most efficiently ensuring that survival. Congressional and urban scholars have focused on this structural constraint largely from an individual level of analysis; that is, politicians consider re-election their primary goal and this, in essence, shapes their capacity to influence policy agendas. On the other hand, their political survival is tied up with the fiscal health and general well being of their unit of government, and politicians do a balancing act between these two goals. Studies

dealing with inter-city or inter-state competition focus more on the system level of analysis but are equally interested in structural determinism.

Idealist scholars since the 1920s have talked about the role of norms in explaining policy outcomes. At the international level, the emergence of institutionalized cooperation in the second half of this century has challenged our assumptions of self-interested behavior and other realist constructs. Forces like transnationalism and supranationalism have further weakened the dominant role of the nation state as primary actor in world politics. Policy outcomes in issue areas such as the environment, nuclear nonproliferation, arms control and trade that one might expect to be dominated by hegemonic powers do not conform to conventional predictions of power politics. Our conception of national interest has evolved from a narrow, short-sighted focus to encompass global concerns and non-material benefits.

In the urban arena, this focus on norms includes ideas on reform of government, environmental clean-ups, non-discriminatory practices in social, political and economic situations, and similarly "progressive" and "conservative" ideas. Whether it is in the governing coalition's interests to actually act on these beliefs, there is sufficient force and convergence behind these norms that politicians have to voice such concerns in their political platforms. Institutions that have been established to process political wants have an independent impact as well on political agendas. This may result in, at the very least, the passage of symbolic legislation, or in the establishment of a truly progressive regime, as in San Francisco politics. Just as in IR, certain ideas (civil rights, anti-apartheid policies) become more powerful with the passage of time, and governments aspiring to any degree of legitimacy must conform to or abide by these principles.

Regime theory ties together all these considerations, of material interests, norms, contractual obligations and institutionalized behavior between states. This inclusion of norms and cooperative relations is a rather old tradition in IR. Regime theory therefore, is in some ways a resurgence of an old idea (that is only now coming to fruition). It is now more explicitly laid out, with far more empirical evidence to its credit. The bulk of this work falls within the neoliberal paradigm. I have focussed on patterns of cooperative behavior within institutions set up for this purpose, without losing sight of the pressures put upon these collaborative ventures by narrowly-based interests. I think that neoliberalism is one application of regime theory -- with an emphasis on cooperation, on the role of NGOs, MNCs and TNCs rather than state-centric models, and institutionalized collaboration. But regime theory itself has a wider scope. While it may be used to explain cooperation, say in the issue area of trade -- specifically GATT -- it could also explain noncompliance and breakdown of cooperation, within the context of state interests.

Finally, the components of regime theory are broadly applicable to urban politics. The theory of intense pluralism is analogous to regime theory. Ideas translate to the concept of countervailing power, while interests are perceived as powerful commercial interests, and institutions correspond to the role of administrative agencies set up to regulate these interests. The theory of intense pluralism helps explain the dynamics of policy agendas by studying all three political phenomena.

To conclude, regime theory not only describes convergence at a policy-making level, but also makes a case for collaboration between scholars in a sub-discipline, and between sub-disciplines in the field of political science.

B. Implications for Future Research

There are limitations to comparing Urban Politics, National Politics and International Relations theory, and this exercise may be carried too far without enriching the discipline. Political scientists such as Charles Lindblom, Theodore Lowi and Jeffrey Pressman have in the past occasionally borrowed from IR theory to explicate some urban political phenomenon, or the other way around. Dahl's study of New Haven was an urban-level application of his work on polyarchies conducted at a national level. Polsby and Wolfinger, who were part of the New Haven community project, went on to study national-level politics such as in the dynamics of Congress and Congressional committees. There used to be greater unity and purpose in the discipline of political science as a whole. After all, inter-disciplinary work has always been part of the behavioral tradition in social sciences. Curiously, there has been little, if any, recent developments along these lines and that is why the discipline is so fragmented today.

Some of the concepts introduced in Chapter V on Linkage, such as corporatism, counter-regime, dominant principle or social movements, have been discussed in a cursory fashion, since they were not part of the main thrust of this research, but they are part of my overarching argument on collaboration between different subfields. I believe that each of these concepts may be elaborated on, and used to explain political phenomena in urban politics as well as IR.

Regime theory itself may be better served by more empirical work that supports assertions that a regime does, in fact, exist. In conjunction with this research, it would be productive to clarify and identify a typology of regimes, which in a sense, IR theorists have

already done to some extent. It would also help to know more about regime change, especially at the city level. The question of when we know that a governing arrangement constitutes a regime, is still largely unanswered. What prevents San Francisco's progressive elements from wresting power, and why is this coalescing union of progressivists be a regime in waiting rather than a governing regime? What are the criteria for identifying a regime as progressive or pro-growth? More work, empirical and theoretical needs to be devoted to these issues.

Something else I have not developed in this study is the possible relationship between idealism in IR and pluralism in national and urban politics, and between realism in IR and plural elitism in national and urban politics. Idealism and pluralism are essentially based on an optimistic view of human behavior, and invest in democratic ideals. Realism and elitism are founded on the belief that resources are inequitably distributed and this inequity perpetuates itself through political leadership of the haves over the have-nots. This suggests a perpetual underclass, a structurally determined social ordering that is antithetical to principles of democracy. International Relations scholars in the Marxist paradigm use the term "core" and "periphery" to denote these different strata. William Julius Wilson (1987) brings this viewpoint to his study of urban poverty, what he terms "persistent poverty", a phenomenon characterized by, amongst other things, the "intergenerational transmission of poverty". Wilson's book is a thoughtful treatise on the relationship between commonly-held beliefs about the urban underclass and the thrust of public policy. At the IR level, a similar discussion describes policy efforts of institutions such as the IMF or the IBRD in dealing with a global "underclass". The analogy, however, has not been exploited to a meaningful extent.

Studies of empowerment (which is one interpretation of regime theory) in any of the subdisciplines could learn from one another. Research in IR has gone beyond mere empiricism to a sort of post-behavioral trend which includes a prescriptive approach. Perhaps a similar extension could be made to research in urban politics; if regime politics is the politics of empowerment, then urban politics scholars could pursue a line of enquiry about how to best achieve that empowerment. Here, again, a theoretical overlap between IR and urban politics -- say, in the area of institutional analysis -- might be advantageous to everyone concerned. For instance, Axelrod's conclusions with his game-theory models led him to believe that political units that were able to cooperate with one another proved to be more competitive and successful than those units which were unable to get beyond mistrust and narrow self-interest to reach cooperation. This is a principle that can be used to explore cooperative behavior at all levels.

Or Stone's (1989) definition of a regime that has three elements that he stresses:

- (1) a *capacity* to do something
- (2) a *set of actors* who do it
- (3) a *relationship* among the actors that enables them to work together.

This is a definition that is equally comprehensive of regimes at international levels. If we were to think along these lines of enquiry, then perhaps collaborative research could take us further in our respective fields. Scholars have much to learn from each other by this effort at unifying existing areas of research in different subdisciplines.

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